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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

A PEDAGOGY FOR JUSTICE: KANT, HEGEL, MARCUSE AND FREIRE ON
EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

Rousseau’s educational treatise Emile is a well-known pedagogical work often
noted for its progressive educational insights. Although Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy is
much less well known, Kant suggests a solution to an educational problem Rousseau is
unable to solve: the problem of whether or not education can work for the good of
humanity. Rousseau is concerned that society, and the schools in society, inflames people’s
passions and leads to inequality and enslavement. Rousseau sketches an educational
program that ideally develops students’ autonomous moral reasoning untainted by
inflamed passion, an education which enables students to be moral and just citizens,
working for the good of humanity. I argue that Rousseau’s educational philosophy
ultimately fails because Rousseau maintains a deep skepticism that society, and therefore
schools, can ever be a good place for humans. Rousseau suggests education must go to
extreme measures such as isolating students in a rural environment and manipulating all
aspects of their lives to prevent passions from becoming inflamed. Implementing this kind
of education is not only improbable for individual students; it is especially improbable that
it could be implemented on a large scale.
I further argue that Kant’s educational philosophy provides a solution to the
problems which beset Rousseau’s educational philosophy. Kant embraces negative
passions as necessarily educative, and so his educational philosophy does not require
extreme measures to combat negative passion. In addition, Kant argues that is only in
society and through these negative passions that humanity develops. Kant’s educational
philosophy is achievable for both the individual student and also on a large scale because

it focuses on developing three key aspects of students that draw on capacities within the
student and that are developed in community with others: a robust will bent towards the
good; good and skilled moral judgment; and a commitment to the ethical commonwealth.
Lastly, I argue that Hegel, Marcuse and Freire, three philosophers who follow after Kant,
develop important aspects of Kant’s solution to Rousseau’s problem. Taken together, these
four philosophers present a compelling educational philosophy which suggests that
education not only can but indeed must work for the good of humanity.
KEYWORDS: Justice, Education, Freedom, Ethics, Liberation, Virtue
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Chapter 1: The Problem and the Potential of Education
§1—Education: The Greatest and Most Difficult Problem
In Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant refers to education as “the greatest and most
difficult problem.”1 Kant specifically ties the problem of education to the fact that “Man
must develop his tendency toward the good” but that this is something that is very
difficult to do.2 The potentially problematic nature of education becomes apparent when
we realize as Kant states that “Man can only become man by education. He is merely
what education makes of him.”3 If the full development of humanity rests on its
education, then it seems imperative that educators fully understand the nature of humans
and how to move their students towards the full development of their abilities for
goodness. However, as Kant points out, “It is noticeable that man is only educated by
man—that is, by men who have themselves been educated.”4 The potential danger in the
fact that we are educated by those who have been educated is that all of us are educated
by people with an imperfect understanding of what it means to be a human being and an
imperfect understanding of the nature of a society that supports the flourishing of the
good in human beings. As Kant writes, “There are many germs lying undeveloped in
man. It is for us to make these germs grow by developing his natural gifts in their due
proportion and to see that he fulfills his destiny.”5 The danger with trying to develop
these abilities through the process of education is that often we are educated by people
who hold an incomplete and often flawed understanding of human nature and how to
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support its full flourishing. If it is true that all that we are comes from our education, then
we begin to see why Kant calls education the greatest problem: Education holds the
power to help humans realize their full potential or to prevent them from ever realizing it.
It seems then that educators must have a clear idea of the good of humanity in
order to go about providing an appropriate education. Having a clear idea of the good of
humanity as a whole is admittedly a lofty ideal, and given that there is so much
disagreement over what the good of humanity is, it seems initially that it would be better
to focus education on other goals that are more clearly defined and attainable. For
example, two such goals that seem more easily defined are the goals of preparing
students to become members of the larger society and the goal of helping students to
pursue individual fulfillment. However, in exploring these possible goals of education, it
soon becomes apparent that even these goals lead us back to the problem of the good of
humanity as a whole.
For example, an education that prepares students to become members of society
as a whole will focus on cultivating work skills, cultural values, a sense of patriotism, and
other skills and attitudes that are necessary for a person to become a full-fledged member
of a particular society. Cultivating such skills certainly seems laudable, but upon closer
examination, it is unclear that cultivating these skills is necessarily good either for the
individual or for society as a whole. For example, if the society at large is oppressive to
human beings, then by preparing students for society, education actually apprentices
them to their own dehumanization. Thus, while it may seem that preparing students to
become members of society is a good goal for education to have, this goal only serves
individuals and society well if society as a whole is good. Therefore, in order to prevent

2

education from promoting dehumanizing practices, it behooves educators to understand
what a good society is. And understanding the nature of a good society entails
understanding what is good for humanity as a whole.
Given the potential problems inherent in equating the goal of education with
preparing students to become members of society, some educators might instead decide
that the purpose of education is to help individuals fulfill their unique human potential.
Education that focuses on helping students develop their potential helps them to actualize
their emotional, physical, intellectual and social abilities. It might also prepare them to
pursue their goals and dreams effectively. Once again, just as with the goal of preparing
students to become members of society, the goal of helping students to reach their full
potential seems like a laudable goal for education to pursue.
Interestingly, however, upon closer examination, it is not immediately clear that
this goal is necessarily good for individuals or society either. For example, if educators
aim at helping students develop their unique human potential without discussing what
exactly human potential is, then it is possible for students to develop their potential in a
distorted manner or in a manner that conflicts with other people’s ability to develop their
full potential. For example, on a basic level, a person cannot achieve her full potential if
her neighbors or co-workers oppress her or endanger her life. Reciprocally, her neighbors
and co-workers cannot achieve their full potential if she acts in a similar manner.
Therefore, it seems that in order for people to reach their full potential, they must
understand what human potential is, and they must learn to fulfill their potential in a way
that doesn’t oppress others. Otherwise, everyone’s human potential is jeopardized
because one person’s ability to reach it can be hindered for the sake of others reaching
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their own potential. Therefore, it seems that the fulfillment of individual potential is
linked at least partially with society as a whole.
In addition, there is another way that individual fulfillment is inevitably linked
with other people. Human potential includes at least some skills that cannot be actualized
in isolation—human language and relationship abilities are at least two such abilities. In
fact, it is hard to imagine many human skills that can be fully actualized in complete
isolation. If it is the case that people can only achieve their potential in community, then
an education that enables students to reach their full potential must teach students to be
concerned with the fulfillment of other people’s potential as well as their own. This
implies, among other things, that education must help students understand out how to
organize a society so that people can live peaceably with one another and to reach their
full potential together. In other words, this education must be concerned about the good
of humanity and the type of society that best supports this good. Therefore, it is
important to note that whether education aims at helping students to become members of
society or whether it aims at helping students to fulfill their potential, education must
inevitably be concerned with what the good of humanity is and the type of the society
that supports the actualization of this good.6 In other words, it seems that education must
be concerned with the very issues Kant raises in his Lectures on Pedagogy.

6

It seems that any other educational goal leads back to the concern about the good of humanity. For
example, if education aims at job training, this education will only be good for humans and society if we
determine what jobs are good or bad for human beings, which leads us back to the question of the good
of humanity. If education aims at passing on a country’s tradition, this education is only good for students
and society if they can determine which aspects of that tradition are good to perpetuate and which
aspects of that tradition are good to discard. These issues can only be determined in the context of the
larger question of the good of humanity.
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It is one thing to say that education must be concerned with the good of humanity.
It is another thing to understand exactly how education approaches this concern
practically. The difficulty of doing this is exacerbated by the fact that there is no
blueprint for what the perfect society or human being looks like. Therefore, even
educators who are concerned with the good of humanity and who wish to educate for this
good are similar to someone who starts on a journey, the map for which is poorly drawn,
missing many major landmarks and lacking any clearly delineated final destination point.
Such educators may have a vague idea of where they are going and how they might get
there, but their journey is not clearly defined. Therefore, many false starts and wrong
turns are possible and even quite likely.
§2—Rousseau and the Problem of Education
The problem of education which we have been discussing is one that has been longrecognized by philosophers. Plato’s allegory of the cave in book seven of the Republic
speaks to this problem. In this allegory, we see people who have lived all of their lives,
viewing shadows on the wall, deceived as to the true nature of reality by their captors.
One plausible reading of the cave allegory is that the cave is the polis. The polis is a place
where people are educated, and in this educational process, they receive erroneous and
distorted teachings—the equivalent of shadows on the walls7. The cave allegory further
frames the problem of education because it highlights the fact that everyone, including
educators, is living in a cave to some degree. That is humans are born into, nurtured, and
educated in cultures which have not yet fully realized the good of humanity. To be
educated in such environment means to absorb at least some wrong ways of viewing life
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and other people—the equivalent of Socrates’ shadows—before we are old enough to be
able to critique these ideas.
If it is true that people absorb wrong teachings before they are old enough to be
able to critique them, it is uncertain how they ever come to see the error in the things they
have been taught. That education in the polis can distort from birth the understanding of
its citizens is an idea that is of great important to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and it is an idea
that plays a central role in his educational and political philosophy. It is important to
understand Rousseau’s concern about the problem of education because he was one of
the first modern educators to bring the problem of education into focus and to suggest
that education must inevitably be concerned with the good of humanity.
In his various writings, Rousseau was concerned about the way in which
education and society often destroy rather than support people’s ability to pursue the
good of humanity. Rousseau devotes most of his writings to suggesting how both society
and education can be organized to support this good. In order to understand why
Rousseau believes that education and society can be so corrosive, it is important to
understand Rousseau’s view of how this corruption of humanity takes place. It is in
understanding this corruption that one can gain a clearer view of Rousseau’s solution to
the problem.
In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau follows in the line of
social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke. Unlike Hobbes and Locke who view the
formation of society as a generally positive development for human in contrast to their
existence in the violent state of nature or state of war, Rousseau argues that humans in the
state of nature are peaceful and happy. It is only when humans enter into society and
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competition ensues that they become corrupt, engaging in practices that lead to
inequality, misery and injustice. Therefore, Rousseau does not assume that society is a
place in which freedom and a better state of living are naturally present. Rather Rousseau
argues that society is a place where corruption and dehumanization are more likely
present than not and that society must work to realize and overcome the corruption and
inequality that commonly arises in society.
Rousseau argues that in the state of nature, humans have very few needs and that
they are easily able to satisfy these needs: “His modest needs are easily found at hand.”8
Because of this, the state of nature lacks those painful elements of existence such as
violent competition, the pain of unfulfilled desire and the pain of jealousy and rejection.
Rousseau writes that in this peaceful state, humans face few difficulties besides
occasional hunger or physical pain. Rousseau writes, “His soul, agitated by nothing, is
given over to the single feeling of his own present existence, without any idea of the
future.”9 His existence is largely untroubled10: “His imagination depicts nothing to him;
his heart asks nothing of him.”11
It is only when people start to form attachments to other people and when they
begin to gather into communities that humanity’s troubles begin. Rousseau argues that
people gather into communities because they begin to recognize each other and prefer

8
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certain people over others.12 However, people also gather into communities because they
are, unique to all living creatures, aware of the possibility of their own death, and they
begin to realize that they can have a safer more secure and pleasant existence if they band
together in communities.13 Rousseau certainly thinks that some excellent benefits come
for humans when they form communities. He writes, “The habit of living together gave
rise to the sweetest sentiments known to men: conjugal love and paternal love”14, but it
is also true that the formation of communities is also the cause of all the misery and
corruption in individuals. Society, Rousseau argues, is generally oppressive to human
beings. Rousseau laments this condition eloquently: “Man is born free but everywhere he
is in chains”.15
In order to understand why Rousseau thinks that society corrupts humans, it is
important to understand the difference between two types of love Rousseau discusses at
length: self-love (amour de soi) and amour-propre. In Emile, Rousseau says of amour de
soi, the first kind of self-love, that it is a natural kind of love which motivates humans to
look out for their own preservation.16 Amour de soi is a moderate, benign type of love
because it is a love in which people’s primary concern is themselves, and so they don’t
bother much with other humans. In addition, it is a love that is easily “contented when
our true needs are satisfied.”17 This is the type of love and the type of outlook on life that
Rousseau’s pre-rational and pre-societal human displays when he lives by his maxim “Do
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what is good for you with as little harm to others.”18 Self-love is a simple desire to live
and let live, more or less.
The second type of love, amour-propre, is the type of love or passion from which all
of the woes of society issue. Rousseau argues that amour-propre has many causes but the
key characteristic of it is that rather than being focused on the self and survival, amourpropre is a passion that is inflamed when we start looking at other people, comparing
ourselves to them, and desiring their esteem, even desiring them to esteem us more than
themselves. Rousseau writes
Amour-propre, which makes comparisons, is never content and never could
be, because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands
other to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible.19
When people become consumed with amour-propre, they want everyone to love
them and to love them best of all.20 Amour-propre can never be satisfied, and it is
quickly disappointed because of course people will not be loved best all of the time
by everyone. Thus, amour-propre soon gives way to “dissensions, enmity, and
hate.”21 Rousseau describes the dire course amour-propre follows when he writes,
“Self-love, ceasing to be an absolute sentiment becomes pride in great souls, vanity
in small ones, and feeds itself constantly in all at the expense of their neighbors.”22
It is important to recognize that Rousseau believes that amour-prope is a
malleable passion, and if it is developed in the right way, it can be the catalyst for
all of the best things in human nature. It is amour-propre that enables primitive
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man to be able to look outside himself for the first times and see things from
another’s perspective—to consider what might please or pain another person.
Rousseau writes of the birth of amour-propre, “This is the second birth of which I
have spoken. It is now that man is truly born to life and now that nothing human
is foreign to him.”23 This potentially civilizing effect of amour-propre is indeed a
positive quality. Amour-propre, it appears, is a door that leads to civilization and
the development of human potential. Nevertheless, when society is corrupt, it
inflames amour-propre, and this leads to the degradation and enslavement of
humans.24 Rousseau writes, “This species of passion, not having its germ in
children’s hearts, cannot be born in them of itself; it is we alone who put it there,
and it never takes root except by our fault…It is time to change our method.”25
Education is the method that Rousseau suggests for properly nurturing people so
that their amour-propre is not inflamed.
For Rousseau, education is the primary means by which potentially
corrupting influences of society can and must be remedied and the means by
which amour-propre becomes the proper catalyst for humanity. In Emile,
Rousseau illustrates how he takes a young child, his fictional charge Emile, and
raises him from birth to young adulthood to be a completely autonomous
individual and a loving friend, husband and citizen. Rousseau nurtures Emile so
23

Rousseau, Emile, pg. 212.
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that his amour-propre is not inflamed and only brings about the healthy
flourishing of his personhood. Rousseau further trains Emile so that his strength is
great and his needs are few. Therefore, he relies very little on other people and is
not overly concerned about their opinion. When he becomes desirous of
attachments to other people, with the awakening of his sexuality, Rousseau
carefully nurtures him so that Emile comes to value people in their own right,
rather than as instruments to be manipulated. Emile develops amour-propre but
under the careful guidance of Rousseau, it doesn’t become inflamed. Rather, his
amour-propre is used to develop good attachments to others such as Emile’s
companions in society and his future wife Sophie.
Rousseau intends the ideal society to mirror the processes of the ideal education.
The ideal ruler is much like the tutor in Emile. In Discourse on Political Economy,
Rousseau urges that rulers need to rule by love and example rather than fear and
manipulation.26 One of the most important concepts of Rousseau’s ideal government is
that the ideal governor should follow “the general will in all things”27 and that he
encourages virtue to reign in the city, which means that he encourages private wills to be
in conference with the general will.28 The general will, for Rousseau, is always that
which is in the favor of the public good.29 It is a pure, good human will untainted by
inflamed amour-propre.
The general will represents actions, states of mind, and institutions that allow
people to be fully free, self-sufficient and whole and yet relate with others in a
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meaningful and productive manner. In Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau
writes, “The body politic, therefore, is also a moral being which possesses a will; and this
general will, which always tends towards the conservation and well-being of the whole
and of each part.”30 What Rousseau wants is a society that will arrest the forces that
inflame people’s amour-propre and that will allow them to develop self-sufficiency and
autonomy, the precursors to any peaceful and happy society. So for Rousseau, the
primary goal of education is help the student become completely autonomous and to form
a will that is the general, just will. In doing so, education works for the good of humanity
as a whole because it allows students to develop a good, non-corrupted, will that properly
reflects the general will.
Rousseau’s ideas are significant to any study of education because they confirm
the concerns regarding the problem of education raised at the beginning of this chapter.
If education is not concerned with the good of humanity, there is the very real possibility
that education further inflames inequality, injustice, and oppression rather than acting as a
positive force in the lives of individuals and communities. Rousseau suggests that the
primary role of education is to educate students in such a manner that they are able to
critique society, resist dehumanizing influences in it, and to be citizens who can
contribute to strengthening the morality and justice of the society to which they belong.
Rousseau offers invaluable insights regarding various problems in society that can
negative affect education, but his philosophy raises several worries. If people are
peaceful, good and compassionate before they enter society, and if society is more often
than not a site of degradation, there is the worry that perhaps society is bad for people
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after all. Perhaps Rousseau’s philosophy suggests that people should live in isolation
from each other as much as possible and keep interactions to a minimum, given that our
interpersonal interaction seems to be so potentially destructive to the good of humanity.
Furthermore, if it is the case that people are better off living isolated from each other as
much as possible, perhaps the goal of education should teach people to build a
completely independent existence so that people do not risk developing an inflamed
amour-propre. Indeed, it seems that the advances we have made in technology would
allow us to achieve such an existence, so perhaps education should prepare us for this
type of life. This is one possible response we might have to the notion that society is
often destructive to the good of humanity.
Indeed, it is not clear that Rousseau ever entirely overcame his worry that society
is ultimately a hostile and oppressive place for human beings. In Emile Rousseau argues
that the truly happy being is the solitary being. He writes
It is man’s weakness which makes him sociable; it is our common miseries
which turn our hearts to humanity; we would owe humanity nothing if we
were not men. Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. If each of us had
no need of others, he would hardly think of uniting himself with them. Thus
from our very infirmity is born our frail happiness. A truly happy being is a
solitary being.31
In this quote, Rousseau laments our “frail happiness”, a frailty that proceeds
directly from our need to live in community with one another. In his writing it
certainly seems that Rousseau wants to show that the destructive tendencies of
society can be overcome and that humanity can at last find a peaceful and happy
home in society. In the final chapter of Emile Rousseau paints the happy and
idyllic life Emile experiences when he marries his wife, Sophie, a young woman
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who has been educated in a careful manner similar to Emile. In the final pages of
Emile, there seems to be no question that the idyllic life of a gentle and nurturing
family is the best place for Emile and the end for which he was intended all along.
On the final pages of Emile, Rousseau writes
Happy lovers! Worthy couple! To honor their virtues and to pain their
felicity, one would have to tell the history of their lives…If there is
happiness on earth, it must be sought in the abode where we live.32
Despite Rousseau’s joy in Emile’s condition, Rousseau’s writing also suggests,
whether Rousseau consciously means to suggest this or not, that it is unlikely that
humans can ever actually be at home in society in the manner Emile achieves.
It is important to note that Emile’s education which allows him to avoid
inflamed amour-propre is an extremely ideal education. Rousseau is chosen as
Emile’s tutor before Emile is even born, and once Emile is born, Rousseau
oversees virtually every aspect of Emile’s existence from his infancy until his
adulthood and marriage to Sophie. Rousseau’s sole focus is monitoring Emile
and making sure that his passions develop carefully and that his amour-propre is
not inflamed. One wonders how likely it is that the type of education which
Rousseau envisions could be conducted on a large scale and provided for the
majority of the citizens of a country. It seems unlikely that such a wide-scale
education like that of Emile could occur in society. That an education like Emile’s
would be impossible on a large-scale does not diminish the value of Rousseau’s
insights. It does, however, raise the worry that one of the primary means by
which Rousseau envisioned the proper cultivation of amour-propre—a careful
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education— may not seem possible on a large scale. Given how easily Rousseau
seems to believe our amour-propre becomes enflamed, and given the seeming
inability to achieve on a large scale the type of education which might militate
against the inflammation of amour-propre, one might worry then about whether
or not society and education itself can become place hospitable to human beings
or if humans will forever remain in chains.33
Indeed, Rousseau himself seems to be worried about the possibility of
achieving the kind of education and society he explored so carefully in his
writings. At the end of his life, embittered by the rejection of some of his friends
and countrymen of his work, Rousseau retired to the country and wrote Reveries
of a Solitary Walker in which we contemplated the benefits of the solitary and
natural life. After retiring to an island, Rousseau writes of his hope of being able
to remain indefinitely on this island:
I could have desired that this place of refuge be made my lifelong prison,
that I be shut up here for the rest of my days, deprived of any chance of
hope of escaping and forbidden all communication with the mainland, so
that now knowing what went on in the world, I should forget its existence
and be forgotten by those who lived in it.34
He writes on the next page about wishing to spend the rest of his life in idleness
on this island
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which I could not leave unaided and unobserved, and where I could have
not communication or correspondence with the outside world…that I
might end my days more peacefully than I had lived till then…35
In these reveries, it seems that Rousseau returns to his notion that perhaps the
natural, primitive life is the best one and that, ultimately, the pain that people
bring are unbearable. This is a sentiment he echoes in book twelve of his
Confessions when he writes
A tortured creature, battered by every kind of storm, and wearied by many
years of travelling and persecutions, I strongly felt the need of that repose
which my savage enemies denied me for their own amusement. More
than ever did I sigh for that delightful idleness, for that sweet repose of
body and spirit, which I had coveted so dearly and in which, cured now of
my desire for love and friendship, I knew my sole and supreme felicity to
be.36
Rousseau’s deep distrust of society leaves a lingering worry that perhaps people
in society are inevitably doomed to suffer only oppression and corruption there.
Indeed, Rousseau often seems as though he reached this very conclusion at the
end of his life. This creates a troubling problem in Rousseau’s project. Frederick
Neuhouser recognizes this problem well when he writes
If the tendency towards inflamed amour-propre is a nearly unavoidable
consequence of certain fundamental, nearly universal features of human
existence; if so much wisdom and artful intervention—requiring a godlike
legislator and superhumanly wise tutor—are necessary to avoid the evils
of amour-propre; if the number and variety of those ills are so great, then
is a genuinely comprehensive solution to amour-propre’s dangers
possible?37
In Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love, Neuhouser argues that Rousseau wants to show that
the ill- effects of inflamed amour-propre are not irreversible and that amour-propre is
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actually the means by which the salvation of humanity and society is achieved.
Neuhouser argues that Rousseau’s account of the proper education of amour-propre is
similar to a Christian theodicy in its attempt to provide an account of humanity’s fall and
salvation. Neuhouser argues, however, that Rousseau does not entirely succeed in
showing that this salvation is possible.38 Rousseau’s unsatisfactory solution to the
problem of education brings me to this current project.
In this dissertation, I wish to focus on the way that several philosophers after
Rousseau take up his educational endeavor. Specifically, I want to focus on the way that
Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Paulo Freire suggest solutions to the problem of education.
Kant and Hegel are, by their own admission, influenced deeply by Rousseau. In addition,
Marcuse and Freire are largely responding to various concerns related to Hegel’s project
and in this way carry on the legacy of Rousseau. It is interesting to note that these four
philosophers, like Rousseau, are concerned with the potentially corrupting influences of
society. Unlike Rousseau, however, all four of these philosophers remain optimistic that
society is indeed the place in which we fully realize our humanity and our freedom,
despite society’s tendencies towards corruption. In addition, like Rousseau, all four
thinkers are also concerned with the role education plays in shaping the just society.
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Therefore, these four thinkers trace out an important legacy connected with the
educational ideas raised by Rousseau.
In the remaining space of this chapter, I will highlight the unique insights that
Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire bring to the problem of education and the way in which
they suggest a solution to the problem of education that Rousseau highlights so well. In
discussing their views, I will highlight the general trajectory their philosophy takes, as
well as some of the potential questions and worries raised by their views. In addition, I
will also add a brief, biographical note that explains much of the impetus behind this
dissertation.
§3—The Trajectory of this Project
The first chapter of this dissertation details the way in which Kant solves the
problem of education that Rousseau is unable to solve: namely how it is that education
can work for the good of humanity. Kant believes the goal of education is to awaken
students’ latent rational abilities and to apprentice students to the rational community.
Educators must do this so that students may become members of the ethical
commonwealth which furthers the development of humanity towards the highest good.
Kant argues that educators do this by cultivating a robust will bent towards the good and
skilled moral judgment. Furthermore, Kant argues that social conflict and inflamed
passions, which he refers to as unsocial sociability, are necessarily educative and are the
means by which human beings cultivate their moral capacities. Therefore, Kant suggests
that not only is it possible for teachers to cultivate moral capacities in their students
through education, it is actually through education in society that this education ideally
takes place.
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Kant’s notion that educators must cultivate in students a commitment to the
ethical commonwealth so that they pursue the highest good shows how education is
directly tied in Kant’s mind to justice and the good of humanity. Nevertheless, the ethical
commonwealth is something that Kant mentions rather briefly in his religious writings,
and he seems to envision the ethical commonwealth as an entity similar to a church. It is
not entirely clear how the ethical commonwealth functions and the way in which
individuals and societies work together for the common good in the ethical
commonwealth. One likely reason for the vagueness in Kant’s conception of the ethical
commonwealth is that Kant is concerned that the sphere of morality and the sphere of
justice be kept separate. This is because Kant argues that the external realm of justice can
never coerce internal morality. Nevertheless, Kant certainly believes that external
conditions, such as our sensuous conditions, can and must act as a support to morality.
This idea plays an important role in Kant’s educational ideas. If external conditions must
act as a support to morality, this holds interesting implications for education and the
ethical commonwealth, implications which Kant is not able to explore fully in his
writings. I believe Hegel does this. Hegel develops important potential in Kant’s political
and education philosophy through Hegel’s notion of recht or justice. For Hegel, justice is
the idea of human freedom fully worked out in all of its moments of external material
relations, the inner moment of morality, and the unity of these two moments in the third
moment of ethical life.
In chapter two, I examine the way in which Hegel develops the potential in Kant’s
political and educational philosophy. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right argues that human
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spirit is distinguished by the will, which is free.39 So, the destiny of the human spirit is
freedom, and justice is actually “the realm of actualized freedom.”40 The goal of
education is to help humanity actualize justice or ethical substance. When education does
this, it allows humans to be reborn. In this chapter, I argue that Hegel believes that
education is the means by which teachers cultivate a political disposition in students
which entails the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation. This
educational process is grounded in an understanding of the dialectical development of
knowledge. The dialectic specifically honors the finitude and tragedy of the human
existence. I will also argue that Hegel’s notion of justice and the political disposition
develops the potential in Kant’s educational ideas and his idea of the ethical
commonwealth.
In the chapter on Hegel, I also argue that John Dewey’s educational ideas,
although Dewey did not always agree with Hegel, are a good expression of the types of
education Hegel’s philosophy implies. Dewey’s philosophy illustrates that educational
practices must always develop a clear and meaningful connection between what is being
learned internally and its expression in the external world. Dewey’s philosophy, as an
expression of Hegel’s educational ideals, illustrate to us how students can be educated to
be an active agent, working for the good of everyone in society.
Although Hegel’s philosophy develops the potential in Kant’s educational
philosophy, Hegel is primarily an optimistic philosopher whose main goal is to describe
how freedom develops in the world. Because this is the primary goal of Hegel’s project,
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he does not detail at length the various forces which can arrest the development of
freedom. However, in Philosophy of Right, Hegel does note in a short paragraph that
freedom can be alienated or blocked by certain forces in society. In chapter four of my
dissertation, I argue that the philosophy of critical theorist Herbert Marcuse develops
Hegel’s notion of alienation and illuminates the forces that arrest the progress of freedom
in our society. Specifically, Marcuse details the way that the problems of surplus
repression and one-dimensional thinking block the progress of freedom.
Marcuse is also very interested in education. He argues that the goal of education
is to cultivate a New Sensibility which allows the development of dialectical thinking and
an aesthetic disposition towards the world, both of which disrupt surplus repression and
one-dimensional thinking. The New Sensibility is an aesthetic sensibility which draws
on the liberating capacities of imagination, art and beauty. This sensibility creates an
erotic society in which people no longer relate to each other in a violent and purely
instrumentalizing manner. Rather, the New Sensibility enables people to enjoy each other
and their world receptively, as ends in themselves. In this way, Marcuse’s erotic society
resembles Kant’s kingdom of ends, the type of society Kant describes in his notion of the
ethical commonwealth. Therefore, Marcuse is also concerned, like Kant and Hegel, with
the full development of justice and the good of humanity in the world. His philosophy
explores how education can be a tool which disrupts the forces hindering the progression
of freedom.
In my final substantive chapter, I argue that the educational philosophy of
Brazilian educator Paulo Freire is an important complement to Marcuse’s philosophy. I
argue specifically that Freire makes a valuable contribution to this discussion that both

21

ties together the concerns of the previous philosophers and also adds an important
dimension: Freire argues that classrooms must become dialogical spaces of
conscientization which cultivates specific liberatory virtues such as love, humanizing
rebellion and hope. I believe that Freire’s notion of classrooms as dialogical spaces of
conscientization develops important aspects of Marcuse’s educational philosophy by
detailing a broad heuristic that allows us to discover the forces which block freedom. I
also believe that Freire’s notion of liberatory virtues is a unique contribution and that this
idea needs to be developed in more depth.
In the epilogue to my dissertation, I suggest how Freire’s notion of liberating
virtues might be developed further. I do not have the space in this epilogue to discuss
these liberating virtues in depth. Rather I suggest some of the liberating virtues that I
believe are either explicitly or implicitly stated in Freire’s work, and I suggest how they
may be developed. These virtues are virtues such as love and recognition, critical
problem-posing, play, an aesthetic sensibility, hope and compassion. In this final chapter,
I also argue for a renewed and invigorated dialogue between education and philosophy, a
dialogue which I believe has grown attenuated over the years, despite its great importance
historically to both philosophers and educators.
§4—A Biographical Note: My Specific Interest in Education and Justice
It would be remiss of me not to mention a few biographical details which explain
the impetus of this project. Before I came to graduate school, I was a middle and high
school teacher for over a decade. I also serve as a middle school principal for three of
these years. Many of my experiences during that time, as well as my own experiences as
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a student, fostered various ideas that specifically led to this dissertation. Three
experiences stand out to me as particularly formative.
The first experience was my own education. As a young, curious girl, I was
particularly enthusiastic about school. I was particularly fortunate to attend a public
school in Oregon in which I experienced a lot of creative, child-centered curriculum—
one that especially emphasized play, art, history and reading. At an early age, I remember
thinking about school, “Every day is an adventure!” In seventh grade, I had the privilege
of attending a small private school in Chehalem Valley Oregon that also had a rich
humanities curriculum. It was there that I fell in love with the classics and Greek and
Roman culture, something that significantly influenced my philosophical and educational
interests. This school also provided a lot of time for free play and imaginative, studentdirected activities. All of these experiences encouraged a love for learning when I was
younger.
As I grew older, however, I increasingly found school to be an alienating and
oppressive place. Teachers seemed less concern about providing rich and meaningful
activities for students and more concerned about teaching content, the importance of
which was not always very clear. It also seemed like there was less time for students to
imagine, to create and to play. Furthermore, it seemed to me that teachers were not really
concerned about how education made students’ lives richer or fuller. There seemed to be
a significant disconnect between education and the world. I remember my classmates
generally being bored and frustrated with school, and even though I loved reading and
writing copiously in my spare time at home, I often found that school interfered with my
learning rather than encouraging it. I remember thinking in high school, “Surely school
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can be better than this. Surely it doesn’t have to be this way.” At this point in my life, I
was more concerned about how school could be a humane place for students, rather than
thinking much about how education could bring about positive change in the world.
It was some of these concerns which eventually led me to major in secondary
English education in college. In my last semester of college, I had the privilege of doing
my student teaching at a bilingual school in Guatemala City, Guatemala. The school I
taught at was one of the better, more wealthy schools in Guatemala, but as a student
teacher I was often struck by how uncohesive and scattershot the curriculum was. In
addition, there were many teachers from the United States in that school, and I was often
shocked by how uninterested they seemed to be in their own teaching. As a young,
idealistic teacher, I was looking for a guiding philosophy to help me understand what
exactly I was trying to accomplish with my students, as well as how I could go about
accomplishing it. It seemed like the teachers around me often lacked a clear philosophy
of education. While I was in Guatemala, I also had the opportunity to visit a much
different school.
This school was at a local garbage dump. The woman who ran this school
explained to us that the people living around the dump suffered such poverty that the only
way they could survive was by scavenging through the garbage dumps not only for
clothing and basic necessities, but even for food. I remember vividly her telling us of a
family that scavenged every day for leftover bread, some of which was moldy, that they
would take and grind into flour in order to make new bread that they could sell to buy
food. This life, the woman explained, was of so difficult and dehumanizing that many of
the people living around the garbage dump became addicted to paint huffing in an
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attempt to escape their pain. The woman explained to us further that she had started the
school at the garbage dump because education was one of the few ways that people could
escape from the cycle of poverty and degradation. It was experiences like the ones that I
had in Guatemala which caused me to realize the transformative power of education. I
realized that education could transform not only individual’s lives but the trajectory of
society as a whole. It also caused me to wonder why so many teachers I met seemed to
fail to recognize and capitalize upon this transformative power. Furthermore, I questioned
why, if education was so potentially powerful, it had become such drudgery for so many
students.
As I began my own teaching career, I was very fortunate after several years of
teaching to get a job teaching in a school which took educational philosophy seriously.
While some of my earliest teaching experiences were in schools which lacked a unified
philosophy, the school I taught in now was sincerely dedicated to building critical
thinking and communication skills in students, as well as helping them to develop strong
habits of responsibility. The school was centered around Latin, logic and rhetoric and an
integrated humanities curriculum. As a regular part of the pedagogy in my school, I
conducted classroom debates and critical discussions around classic humanities texts. In
addition, the students regularly engaged in research projects which they presented as
experts to other classes or even adults. I watched the students in this school become
strong, confident thinkers and communicators who were eager to engage with the world
around them. Empowered by their education, they were becoming thoughtful people who
could critique problems in society in order to work for change.
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The school I worked in certainly had its flaws, like most schools, but it was
undeniable to me the powerful affect that its pedagogy and curriculum had on its
students. During the end of my tenure at that school (before returning to graduate
school), I actually had the privilege and burden of serving as the middle school principal
for a few years. Through this experience, I had the opportunity to refine and implement
my educational philosophy in the school. I had both great successes and significant
failures as a middle school principal. One of the greatest difficulties I had as a principal
was working to make sure that everyone understood our school philosophy and was
implementing it in a consistent way in their classrooms. Some of my greatest successes
and my greatest failures were tied to this struggle. My failures caused me to contemplate
why exactly it was so difficult to implement our educational philosophy school-wide. It
was experiences like this that made me want to understand the role that both individuals
and institutions play in creating a more just how society, as well as the specific role
education plays in this. All of these experiences are certainly the major impetus behind
the work in this dissertation.
§5—Concluding Introductory Remarks
The question concerning the role that education plays in society is more important
than ever. The institution of education is currently experiencing a time of great
upheaval. Educators and educational institutions are experiencing drastic funding cuts,
unprecedented job instability, and a breakdown in consensus of what the purpose of
education is. In conjunction with this crisis, there have also been efforts by some
communities to increase censorship in the classroom. These moves are often
accompanied by further measures that encourage social conformity and which cut the
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types of programs in school that foster critical self-reflection. Added to this problem is
that, in my opinion, there is a current breakdown in the dialogue between philosophy
and education, although education has always been of primary concern to philosophers
historically (an issue I will address in the final chapter). If it is true that humans become
human through education, and if it is true that too often education becomes an unwitting
instrument of oppression, then now more than ever, philosophers, educators, and people
in general, must attend to the problem of education.
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Chapter Two: Kant and an Education for the Ethical Commonwealth
§1—Kant and Education: An Introduction
In this chapter I discuss the way in which Kant takes up Rousseau’s educational
project, and I discuss the unique insights Kant adds to the discussion of the problem of
education. I argue that Kant believes the goal of education is to awaken students’ latent
rational abilities and to apprentice them to the rational community. In this way they may
become members of the ethical commonwealth which furthers the progress of humanity
towards the highest good. I also argue that Kant believes that everyone must be
committed to the project of education, as a practical expression of working towards the
highest good. Lastly, I argue that while Kant’s pedagogical insights contribute
significantly to the problem of education, he is unable to develop important potential in
his political and educational philosophy. As the end of the chapter, I gesture towards this
undeveloped potential. In order to examine these educational ideas of Kant’s, it is helpful
first to understand the educational climate of Kant’s day.
§2—Kant: The Student of Rousseau
Kant’s era was an era marked by educational fervor. The French Revolution
occurred later in Kant’s life, and people were filled with a vibrant enthusiasm about the
possibility of social equality and the improvement of the human race. People became
increasingly interested in education because they viewed it as the means by which
equality and progress would come about. Many of the educational ideas of Kant’s day
were directly inspired by Rousseau’s educational vision, and Kant’s state, Prussia, was in
the forefront of educational reform. Therefore, Kant’s pedagogical ideas are interesting in
themselves because of the pedagogical fervor of his day.
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However, there are further reasons why Kant’s pedagogical ideas are especially
interesting, and they pertain to Kant’s own personal education and his interest in
Rousseau. Kant’s formal education was varied. Kant’s childhood was distinguished by a
close relationship with his bright and nurturing mother, Anna Kant, who provided a lot of
spontaneous education for Kant, encouraging his curiosity. Kant writes about his mother
I will never forget my mother, for she implanted and nurtured in me the
first germ of goodness; she opened my heart to the impressions of nature;
she awakened and furthered my concepts, and her doctrines have had a
continual and beneficial influence in my life.41
When Kant was eight, he attended a local grammar school which was run by a Pietist
headmaster, and the school was extremely strict and took a hostile view to science,
denying the heliocentric theory of the universe. Proselytizing appeared to be the primary
goal of the school. Kant later viewed this period as one of the most difficult times of his
life.42
Given Kant’s fond memories of his early education with his mother and the
educational disappointments he experienced at the local grammar school, it is not
surprising that Kant was an enthusiastic supporter of Rousseau’s. Indeed, Kant is a
logical philosopher to examine after Rousseau regarding the problem of education.
History has it that Rousseau’s portrait was the only picture hanging in Kant’s sparse
house and that the only time Kant missed his habitual afternoon walk was when he was
reading Rousseau’s Emile.43 Kant once wrote that “’Rousseau brought [him] around,’
taught him ‘to honor human beings’, and inspired him to work, toward ‘establishing the
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rights of humanity’.”44 Rousseau makes frequent appearances in various works of Kant,
and Kant’s writings evince a deep concern with the very project that motivated
Rousseau:45 the manner in which good of humanity can be achieved.46
A Rousseauean influence is clear in Kant’s pedagogical ideas. This can clearly be
seen in Kant’s support of Johann Bernard Basedow, a German educator who founded a
special kind of school called a Philanthropinum in an attempt to implement Rousseau’s
pedagogical spirit. Basedow was one of the most prominent educators in Prussia. Kant
wrote several essays in support of Basedow’s Philanthropinum. In these essays Kant
writes about Basedow’s educational endeavors,
Perhaps never before has a more just demand been made on the human
species, and never before has such a great and more self-extending benefit
been unselfishly offered, than is not the case with Herr Basedow, a man
who, together with his praiseworthy assistants, has solemnly devoted
himself to the welfare and betterment of human beings.47
Kant continues with his excitement over the educational vision of the Philanthrophinum:
In the civilized countries of Europe there is no lack of educational
institutes and of well-intentioned diligence of teachers to be of service for
everyone in this matter. And yet is has not been clearly proven that they
were not all spoiled at the outset; that, because everything in them works
against nature, the good to which nature has given the predisposition is far
from being drawn out of the human being, and that, because we animal
44
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creatures are made into human beings only by education, in a short time
we would see very different human beings around us if that educational
method were to come into common use which is wisely derived from
nature itself and not slavishly copied from old habit and unexperienced
ages.48
In both of these quotes Kant echoes Rousseau’s concerns that education be an instrument
by which human beings learn to develop capacities given them by nature. We also see
Kant echo Rousseau’s concern that the human race be furthered through education.49 In
Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant clearly takes himself to be in conversation with
Rousseau, as I will discuss in this chapter, and he also clearly takes himself to be carrying
forward Rousseau’s work, providing some correctives to aspects of Rousseau’s
educational project while building on Rousseau’s insights.
§3—Nature and Society: The Scylla and Charybdis of Heteronomy
Kant’s educational project is tied directly to his view of the state of nature, and
therefore it is important to understand how Kant views the state of nature and why he
believes that learning to live well together in society is imperative for the good of
humanity. Kant certainly agrees with Rousseau that society can be a hostile environment
for humans. He suggests that society works too often to the detriment of human moral
flourishing, even when the society appears to be benevolently arranged. Kant suggests,
“Rousseau was not so wrong when he preferred to it the condition of savages.”50 Kant,
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however, dismisses the possibility that a pre-rational existence could be a state in which
humanity can flourish.51 In distinction to Rousseau, Kant suggests that the existence of
primitive man is not primarily marked by peaceful pre-rational reverie but by a type of
barbarism. Kant writes
With [man in his primitive state] it is not a noble love of freedom which
Rousseau and others imagine, but a kind of barbarism—the animal, so to
speak, not having yet developed its human nature.52
The barbarism Kant speaks of here is directly related to our lack of an educated rational
principle.53 If our human nature is uneducated, this means that people have not developed
their reason which is the capacity that allows them to rule and prioritize the very
incentives that motivate them. Therefore, the pre-rational state is a state of inner state of
inner civil war. In this state, people cannot even strive towards the ideal of humanity.
This ideal is for a human being to determine who he is by reason through choosing and
pursuing universal ends accessed by reason.54 Because a person living in the pre-rational
state of humanity is unable to “determine his ends through reason”, he struggles to
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constitute any stable personality in this state. Our personality is the capacity we have “for
respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will.”55 Therefore, Kant
suggests that in the pre-rational state of nature, human beings cannot even constitute
themselves as a person in any meaningful sense of the term.56
The pre-rational state is a state in which we behave more like non-human animals,
but there is a way in which we are uniquely set apart from animals, even in this state.
Kant notes that because humans have the capability of being ruled by reason, they are not
completely ruled by instinct. Indeed, they cannot fall back on some biological blueprint
to tell them exactly what they can and should become. Kant writes
Animals use their powers, as soon as they are possessed of them,
according to a regular plan—that is, in a way not harmful to
themselves…Animals are by their instinct all that they ever can be…But
man needs a reason of his own. Having no instinct, he has to work out a
plan of conduct for himself. Since, however he is not able to this all at
once, but comes into the world undeveloped, others have to do it for him.57
Kant points out here that even though biology and instinct cannot fully explain how
people should develop, our reasoning capacities are also wholly underdeveloped when we
are born. They cannot show us initially how to behave morally or how to set good ends
for ourselves. We are all initially helpless in matters of being human. Therefore,
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education is essential for human beings while it is not essential for animals. An education
by those who ostensibly have developed their reasoning and set good ends is the only
means by which humans become autonomous—i.e. education is the only way in which
human beings become human beings. Of course, in one way Kant believes that human
beings are always autonomous in the sense that they have the capacity to be autonomous.
However, it is only through education that human beings fully develop their capacity to
act consistently in an autonomous manner. It is our destiny, Kant suggests, to rise out of
our animal state to achieve morality, and this is the purpose of education.58
Although it is clear enough that humans must be educated in order to reach their
full potential, Rousseau’s worries about the corrosive aspects of society still linger.
There is the worry that society and its ability to inflame passions may actuality plunge
people into a worse state of inner chaos than any state they suffered in the state of nature.
Kant’s answer to Rousseau’s worries about this is to embrace the potentially corrosive
aspects we face in society as necessary, educative elements of our existence. Kant argues
that our human tendency towards “unsocial sociability”59, as he refers to the conflicts we
have in society, prompts humans to develop their full human capacities and potential.
Kant argues that our unsocial sociability arises from the fact that we have a
tendency to socialize because we are able to develop our predispositions more fully in
society; nevertheless, we have a strong desire to individualize, too, because other people
inevitably obstruct us in the pursuit of our goals.60 Kant notes that this perpetual tension
between our desires to socialize and individualize “constantly threatens to break up this
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society.”61 It is this attempt to gain a desired standing62 and a peace with others in society
that drives humans to develop their potential. Kant writes
Now it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human being,
brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence, and, driven by
ambition, tyranny and greed, to obtain for himself a rank among his
fellows, whom he cannot stand, but also cannot leave alone.63
It takes our reason and ingenuity to figure out how we can live in such a way that we can
achieve our goals for socialization without destroying our need for individuation (or viceversa). Thus, our unsocial sociability awakens our reason, so to speak, as we seek a way
to balance these tensions. Rather than inevitably corrupting us then, as Rousseau worries,
it is our unsocial sociability that causes human beings as a whole to break away from
their more animalistic and egocentric behavior and start to think as a whole about what
behaviors are best and most desirable in a human64 (i.e. the types of behaviors that
balance our needs for socialization and individuation).65
Interestingly, it seems that while Kant does not believe our unsocial sociability is
a sufficient cause of moral development, it is a necessary cause. In fact, almost in direct
response to Rousseau’s worries about society and our unsociable dispositions that arise in
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it (such as inflamed amour-propre), Kant actually praises inflamed passions such
“heartless competitive vanity” and “the insatiable desire to possess and to rule” because it
is through these potentially educative passions that man is driven to develop his
capacities. He writes
Nature wills that he should be plunged from sloth and passive contentment
into labor and trouble, in order that he may find means of extricating
himself from them. The natural urges to this, the sources of unsociableness
and mutual opposition from which so many evils arise, drive men to new
exertions of their forces and thus to the manifold development of their
capacities. They thereby perhaps show the ordering of a wise Creator and
not the hand of an evil spirit, who bungled in his great work or spoiled it
out of envy.66
Kant argues that these feelings of antagonism—even feelings of “ambition, tyranny and
greed—are the catalyst for a “mode of thought which can with time transform the rude
natural predisposition to make more distinctions into determinate practical principles and
hence transform a pathologically compelled agreement to form a society finally into a
moral whole.”67
While Kant believes that our unsocial sociability is ultimately a positive quality
that allows us to internalize our nature and respond consistently in a rational way to our
external projects, it is important to note for the trajectory of this chapter that the
antagonism inherent in our unsocial sociability, while necessary and educative, does
make it difficult for us to bring the moral law to bear on our tendencies towards goodness
and, thus, is not a sufficient cause for moral development. We must constantly make
good use of our unsocial sociability to prod us towards an ever-improving society, and
we don’t always do this or know how to do it. Kant argues that the end goal of our
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unsocial sociability is “the achievement of a civil society universally administering
right.”68 Nevertheless, the development of this civil society is a difficult goal to achieve
and indeed, Kant argues, takes many generations to achieve. Formal education is the
primary means by which this continued development occurs because, as we shall
examine later in this chapter, ideally it teaches us to bend our rational will towards moral
ends and to unite ourselves under the common goal of pursuing the highest good
together.
Because formal education is the primary means the development of humanity
occurs, it is especially important for educators to be enlightened. Educators must
understand this important role of education and to fully committed to this endeavor.
Furthermore, Kant argues, these educators must work so that that the entire human race
can eventually take up the important task of educating for the good of humanity. Kant
notes that developing all of the human dispositions cannot happen in one individual.
Rather this development happens over time in the entire species, specifically as they
endeavor educationally in a community together to bring about this end.69 Hannah Arendt
summarizes well Kant’s idea of our reliance on this rational community when she writes
that it is the fact that “no man can live alone, that men are interdependent not merely in
their needs and cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not
function outside human society.”70
Developing our predispositions through overcoming our unsocial sociability takes
practice and exposure to the reasoning process of other rational beings. This is why Kant
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argues that in regards to understanding morality and law, people must become a part of a
rational community and that education is an indispensable part of becoming part of this
rational community. Kant writes, “For the individual, it is absolutely impossible to attain
this object.”71 It is even impossible for parents or a single teacher to communicate the
totality of what is moral and lawful to students because the teachings of the parents and
educators are based on a limited number of experiences. What is needed is the whole
entire human race educating the child. Kant writes, “No individual man, no matter what
degree of culture may be reached by his pupils, can ensure their attaining destiny. To
succeed in this, not the work of a few individuals only is necessary, but that of the whole
human race.”72 To be fully committed to the project of morality and humanity, then, is to
become fully committed to the endeavor of education. I will discuss this issue later on the
chapter, as it is important for understanding Kant’s vision of education thoroughly.
It is important to note at this point that if we are to develop fully all of the
possibilities of the human race, investing in the enterprise of education in society is our
only option. Kant argues that our choice is not between the peaceful existence of man in
his pre-rational primitive state, as Rousseau suggests, and the potentially perilous
existence of man in society. Kant does not really leave us with the option of the peaceful,
pre-rational state of nature. Rather, our predicament for Kant is one of Odysseus steering
between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one side we have the Scylla of heteronomy that
comes from our undeveloped capacity for autonomy in our pre-rational primitive state.
On the other side, we have the Charybdis of potential heteronomy in society if our
capacity for autonomy is not properly developed in through education. The only way we
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find our safe way to Ithaca, where our happiness and safety lies, is charting our way
firmly between these heteronomies and becoming autonomous and free through our
proper use of reason. This entails us becoming moral agents in community together.
Education is the process by which we chart that course. The question now is how Kant
envisions education allowing student to chart this path to freedom.
§4—The Perplexity of Education: Autonomy and Restraint
Kant addresses several different aspects of education in his educational theory,
but the one I wish to focus on is the moral aspect of education. If students are to be moral
in the Kantian sense, they must learn how to do their duty. To do this they must learn to
act from the primary incentive of rational motives of duty rather than heteronomous
impulses, passions and emotions.73 Learning to be moral also entails that students learn to
be just which means they learn to act in such a way that their freedom can “coexist with
the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law.”74 Given that morality
entails autonomous rationality and non-coerced freedom, one of the problems Kant
realizes he must address in his educational theory is how it is that education restrains
students in order to discipline them but also promotes freedom: “One of the greatest
problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the
child’s capability of exercising his freewill—for restraint is necessary.”75 It is not
possible, according to Kantian moral philosophy, for teachers (or anyone for that matter)
to force students to be moral.76 To force morality on students is to make students act
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morally because of an external incentive. If students act this way, then they are not
autonomous and therefore not truly moral because they do not act from duty alone.77
Autonomy only occurs when students self-legislate the moral law. The question is how an
external force like a teacher can influence the internal conditions of students without
destroying autonomy.
The strength of Kant’s educational vision is that it suggests how parents and
teachers cultivate an environment which allows student to develop an autonomous and
moral disposition. This educational process differs depending upon the age of the student;
however, at all stages of education, Kant emphasizes the cultivation of reason and the
apprenticeship of students to the rational community.78 Because of this, Kant’s
educational philosophy is deeply respectful of student autonomy and views education as a
process that cultivates this autonomy rather than viewing education as a tool to perpetuate
the current society which may or may not be just. In this way, Kant’s educational
philosophy follows in the tradition of progressive educators of his day such as Heinrich
Pestalozzi and John Bernard Basedow, and it also foreshadows the ideas of progressive
educators such as John Dewey, Herbert Marcuse, and Paulo Freire, educators which I will
discuss later on in this project.
§5— Educating the Young Child: The Robust Will Bent Towards Freedom
Given that rational autonomy is central to our ability to be moral, Kant is
concerned with developing rational autonomy even in very young students. Developing
rational and moral autonomy in students is a difficult matter. It requires that teachers
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somehow encourage students to be governed by skill that is not yet developed and to get
them to do this on their own accord without too much external influence from authority
figures. On the face of it, this seems like a dubious enterprise. Kant, however, suggests a
process for achieving this goal. It is a process which (i) awakens children’s awareness of
the law that is already present in them; (ii) encourages a robust will bent towards duty;
(iii) encourages truthfulness in all matters as the foundation of moral character; (iv)
appeals to the child’s sensuous nature not as a ground for morality but as an aid to
morality.
Kant is concerned that students understand from an early age that human
dignity—both one’s own and that of others—is of the utmost importance and must be
safeguarded at all costs. Lessons in the dignity of humanity may seem like lessons far too
sophisticated to teach young children. However, Kant suggests that this awareness of the
dignity of humanity is an awareness that children already have within them. Therefore,
appealing to this law is to bring to the fore a latent knowledge. One of the ways Kant
suggests making children aware of the dignity of humanity is to appeal to their
conscience of which they are already aware. Kant says of this conscience that it is the
“Consciousness of an internal court in the human being” in which they find themselves
“observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an
internal judge”.79 Therefore, it seems that Kant likely thinks that making young children
aware of this “judge” they already have inside of them is one way to awaken them to the
dignity of humanity. By drawing their attention to their own conscience, educators make
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young children aware that humanity has a most important project: the project of attending
the moral law, which is what their conscience points them towards.80
Kant ties this awareness of the dignity of humanity directly to students learning
obedience to duties to himself and to others.81 His duties to himself entail the student
acting in such a way that he protects this special reasoning capacity he has that sets him
above other creatures.82 He also has a duty to protect this same capacity in other people
by treating them with respect. In order to make students aware of these duties, Kant
certainly emphasizes obedience in the training of young children. However, this
obedience is not a blind, unthinking obedience. It is a focused obedience that attends to
duties and cultivates a strong, robust will bent towards rationality and morality.83 Kant
notes that children must learn to obey the restraints of duty because if they do not,
children will develop the habit of being ruled by impulses. If they are ruled by these
impulses, they cannot be ruled by reason, which is the beginning of freedom, morality,
and human dignity. Therefore, Kant believes that the ability to resist these impulses
protects our humanity. Kant writes, “It is discipline, which prevents man from being
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turned aside by his animal impulses from humanity, his appointed end.”84 Nevertheless,
the ability to resist these impulses can only occur in the presence of a strong will that is
also a good will. Therefore, the strong, good will is foundational to virtue, for virtue is
the ability to resist all heteronomous impulses.
Even though Kant emphasizes obedience to duty in younger children, he argues
that if the child’s will is crushed, she cannot give herself the moral laws and is always
susceptible to external and heteronomous forces. This is a problem, even if these external
forces come from seemingly benign influences like authority figures. The ultimate goal
of education is that students will consistently self-legislate moral maxims. Since a robust,
good will is the key to moral decision-making for Kant, its healthy flourishing must be
protected at all cost. Kant reiterates his concern that the child’s will not be broken
countless times throughout his Lectures on Pedagogy. He cautions against adults who
would be too overbearing in their authority to children: “We must let the child see his
weakness all the more, but at the same time we must not overpower him with a sense of
our own superiority and power; so that, though the child may develop his own
individuality, he should do so only as a member of society.”85 Kant is also concerned
about authority figures that encourage a type of mindless, unreasoning obedience:
“Nothing does more harm than to exercise a vexatious and slavish discipline over them
with a view to breaking their self-will.”86
But how can parents cultivate a robust flourishing will that is, at the same time,
obedient to duties? Kant suggests here that students must learn to recognize the important
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of acting only in such a way that protects their own freedom, freedom defined here as
moral autonomy, and he has several principles for encouraging such autonomy. Kant
suggests that students should be allowed to act freely in a way that they choose as long as
their actions do not hurt themselves or other people or infringe on the liberty of other
people.87 For instance, Kant argues that a child must learn that “as soon as he screams or
is too boisterously happy, he annoys others.”88 In addition, Kant says the child is to learn
early on the that ‘he can only attain his own ends by allowing others to attain theirs”89
and that “restraint is only laid upon him that he may learn in time to use his liberty aright,
and that his mind is being cultivated so that one day he may be free.”90
In these injunctions, Kant is suggesting that the most important lesson we can
teach young children is that human dignity and liberty—both that of one’s own and of
others—is of the utmost importance and must be safeguarded at all costs. Therefore,
obedience for the sake of obedience is not what Kant has in mind. Obedience is always
for the sake of a higher good—namely the cultivation of a good will and human dignity.
In teaching children to act according to these principles and their duties Kant teaches
students the difference between a slavish obedience, such as an obedience encouraged by
despots and dogmatists, and obedience that is rational and purposive. Learning this lesson
early on is excellent training for the child to learn to resist heteronomous influences all of
her life, whether these are internal or external heteronomies.91
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One of the primary ways Kant urges teachers to help students to develop a robust
moral will is to teach them to act consciously from carefully formed maxims, rather than
acting from impulse or mere emotion. Kant writes on the importance of acting from
maxims
Moral culture must be based upon ‘maxims,’ not upon discipline; the one
prevents evil habits, the other trains the mind to think. We must see, then,
that the child accustom himself to act in accordance with ‘maxims,’ and
not from certain ever-changing springs of action.92
When students act consciously from carefully formed maxims rather than from the other
mentioned motivations, this encourages students to give reasons for why they are acting
as they plan on acting. It is interesting to note that Kant believes that children, even from
an early age, should become accustomed to engage in honest and opening reasoning
about their ends. For example, Kant says that children should be taught to ask openly
what they wish for instead of crying to get it.93 Asking teaches them to reason with other
about their ends; crying teaches them to manipulate and “extort”94 others—that is, it
teaches them to use others as means to their ends.
When students give reasons for their actions, they are practicing acting on
maxims, and acting on maxims prepares students to be able to measure their actions
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against the categorical imperative to understand whether or not their maxim is morally
prohibited. In addition, by considering and then articulating the maxims one takes to be
good, the child becomes accustomed to publicly announcing her reasoning. In this way
she examines her reasoning from the perspective of the community of rational beings so
that she can see if what she takes to be reasonable is actually reasonable to her
community. As the child practices this publicity regularly, she is apprenticed into the
rational community. This better prepares her to formulate maxims that could become
universal law and therefore prepares her to be an autonomous moral thinker. For
example, a child may believe that it is appropriate to strike another child with whom she
is angry. It is through discussion of this matter with her wider rational community (likely
her teachers and parents in this case) that the child recognizes that striking others with
whom one is angry is not, after all, a universalizable maxim. Therefore, by teaching
students to verbalize reasons for acting, children are inducted into the wider rational
community, and they become rational and social beings.
That Kant places such an emphasis on reasoning in one’s rational community
helps to explain why he places such a premium on honesty. While it is true that lying
violates the categorical imperative, lying also prevents one from participating in one’s
rational community. Whether someone lies to herself or to her community, she is not
really holding her true reasons up for examination. If she is hiding her true reasons for
acting, she can’t really determine if her actions could be legislated by all rational agents.
Therefore, there is no way to determine if her maxims are actually moral or not. When
someone is unable to determine this, she is unable consciously to choose moral decisions.
The ability to choose to make moral decisions or not is the basis for us forming our
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personality and character. Therefore, Kant argues that lying destroys our capacity for
character. If we don’t have character, we lack a coherent unified will, and therefore we
lack the ability to exert our will to resist immoral impulses. Thus, Kant suggests that
lying, by destroying our ability to develop our character, destroys our capacity to be
moral. Kant writes about the dangers of lying
But it is really through lying that a child degrades himself below the
dignity of man, since lying presupposes the power of thinking and of
communicating one’s thoughts to others. Lying makes a man the object of
common contempt, and is a means of robbing him of the respect for and
trust in himself that every man should have.95
That habituating one’s self to lying is such a perilous enterprise underscores why Kant
argues that training in truth telling must be one of the foundational aspects of moral
education. A lie, even if it is not known by others, “makes himself contemptible in his
own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person.”96 Kant’s emphasis on
honesty in conjunction to acting in ways that protect human dignity not only teaches
students to reason well, it teaches them early on that one of their primary goals is
socialness and participation in community.97 We have been examining thus far the way
educators cultivate a robust will bent towards the good. Educators do this by training
students consciously to form moral maxims and to tell the truth about these maxims to
others in their community. Now we must examine how the every-day, sensuous
conditions of the student are connected to moral decision-making. Kant argues that
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formal education, as much as possible, must create sensuous conditions which support
students’ ability to be rational, autonomous and moral.
§6—Sensuousness and Autonomy
With Kant’s emphasis on reasoning and morality, it might be tempting to think
that he is not that concerned with the sensuous conditions of students’ lives. The
tendency to think this about Kant’s pedagogy might also be strengthened by the many
times that Kant states, especially in the Groundwork, Critique of Pure Reason and
Metaphysics of Morals, that happiness and material incentives cannot ground morality.
However, the notion that Kant is not concerned with the material condition of students’
lives overlooks the many ways in which Kant implies a direct connection between
students’ physical and sensuous lives and moral autonomy. In his Lectures on Pedagogy,
as well as elsewhere, Kant suggests that careful attention to the sensuous conditions of
the student not only aids her in her moral development but also helps her to become more
sensitive to the way in which external sensuous conditions help or hinder other people’s
moral development.
In Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant states that “The best way of cultivating the mental
faculties is to do ourselves all that we wish to accomplish...the best way to understand is
to do.”98 We see this belief echoed in Kant’s concern that children of all ages develop
bodily strength and physical autonomy. He encourages that they engage in all manner of
games such as blindman’s bluff, swinging, spinning tops, and kite flying99 and physical
gymnastics. Students who become skilled physically have both the strength and the
ability to carry out their ends, an ability that is essential if children are to articulate their
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moral impulses in the world. Kant emphasizes the benefit of physical cultivation in
Metaphysics of Morals when he writes
Cultivating the powers of the body (gymnastics in the strict sense) is
looking after the basic stuff (the matter) in a human being, without which
he could not realize his ends. Hence the continuing and purposive
invigoration of the animal in him is an end of a human being that is a duty
to himself.100
Therefore, it seems that Kant believes that bodily autonomy is directly related to moral
autonomy.
Kant’s notions about joy and cheerfulness also reflect his concern about the
sensuous nature of the student. Kant is concerned that children not have too much
pressure on them and that they are allowed to be children. On the one hand, Kant believes
children must learn to work because they are naturally inclined to inaction, and working
gets them used to restraining this natural inclination.101 Kant suggests that physical
restraint is a type of practice for moral restraint. On the other hand, Kant is very
concerned that children’s natural vigor not be squashed. He writes “A lively boy will
sooner become a good man than a conceited and priggish lad.”102 Kant’s idea here seems
to be that a priggish lad is far more concerned about pleasing others than following his
own urge for freedom. Kant also notes that children should be released from school
pressure sometimes, lest they lose their natural joy and vigor:103
Children should sometimes be released from the narrow constraint of
school, otherwise their natural joyousness will soon be quenched. When the
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child is set free he soon recovers his natural elasticity. Those games in
which children, enjoying perfect freedom, are ever trying to outdo one
another, will serve this purpose best, and they will soon make their minds
bright and cheerful again.104
That Kant is so concerned that children maintain a joy which functions as a natural aid to
morality should not surprise us when we consider that Kant says we have a duty to work
for other people’s happiness because
Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to violate one’s duty. It
might therefore seem that prosperity, strength, health, and well-being in
general, which check the influence of these, could also be considered ends
that are duties, so that one has a duty to promote one’s own happiness and
not just the happiness of others.—But then the end is not the subject’s
happiness but his morality, and happiness is merely a means for removing
obstacles to his morality—a permitted means…105
So while our sensuous natures, which are directly related to our happiness, cannot rule us,
and while they are not pursued as an end in themselves, they can be arranged as an aid to
support our moral flourishing.
We see the idea that our sensuous natures can be an aid to morality reflected as
well in Kant’s notions of the potentially moral benefit of beauty. While there is not space
in this essay to explore Kant’s notions of beauty in depth, Kant argues that beauty is the
symbol of morality.106 He notes that “The beautiful is that which, without concepts, is
represented as the object of a universal satisfaction.”107 Kant suggests that when we
appreciate the beautiful, our appreciation is something that commands universally. We
appreciate the beautiful for its own sake and not for what it brings us. In this way, it is
like morality because morality commands us universally and categorically.
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While Kant does not mention beauty specifically in his educational treatise,
Kant’s argument that beauty is a symbol of morality, and cultivates an inner space in
which students are responsive to morality, suggests that teachers must cultivate an
appreciation for beauty in their students. It also suggests that beauty in the child’s
environment can be a propaedeutic to morality as well. This cultivation of an appreciation
of beauty allows students to develop a non-instrumental appreciation for something,
which allows them to respond to the moral law, simply for its own sake. 108 Kant’s
emphasis on the moral importance of beautify suggests that Kant would approve of
educational time spent in artistic endeavors and quiet reflection on beautiful artwork.
Furthermore, Kant’s notions about the importance of bodily autonomy suggests, among
other things, that he would consider activities such as recess and gym class essential, or at
the very least, a wise time investment and an aid moral training.
The emphasis that Kant places on the sensuousness nature of the student and its
connection to autonomy is not a tangential feature of Kant’s educational philosophy.
Rather, this emphasis accords well with Kant’s notions that our physical conditions—
especially as they pertain to our happiness—are directly related to our ability to be moral.
It is important to note, however, that if an important part of education is related to our
sensuous nature, and if everyone is to be involved in the process of education, this entails
that everyone must be concerned about the way the sensuous conditions of society either
support or discourage moral flourishing. Furthermore, given that a person’s ability to be
just is directly tied to her ability to be moral, Kant’s educational philosophy (as well as
his philosophy in general) suggests that anyone concerned with promoting justice must be
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concerned with the physical and material conditions of people in society. Kant suggests
that if these physical and material conditions are wretched, they make it extremely
difficult for people to be just. In line with this discussion, it would seem that wretched
material conditions have a deleterious educational effect. This is an idea we will return to
at a later point in this chapter.
It is important to note that Kant’s pedagogical strategies are indeed possible to
implement in a classroom setting. They do not require, such as Rousseau’s pedagogy
seems to require, that students be educated in a controlled rural environment under the
tutelage of an educator dedicated solely to their education.109 Kant’s educational theory
for young children is also insightful for it suggests a way in which students can be
cultivated so they understand their flourishing is inevitably connected with others. By
understanding this, it becomes evident to students that right conduct is a communal
endeavor of rational beings. It is an education that works with the grain of the student
(both with her inner awareness of conscience and her outer sensuous nature) that teaches
the child to honor her own dignity as a human being. As she does this, she recognizes this
same dignity in every other human being.
This early education is an important education, but it is not sufficient for students
to become morally autonomous people working for the good of humanity. This early
education is a propaedeutic to the education of young adults, an education which focuses
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specifically on cultivating autonomous thinking and judgment. The education of young
children is primarily negative in that it focuses on how one should not act—namely, one
should not act in a manner that destroys the dignity of human beings either in one’s self
or in other people. On the other hand, the education of the young adult is primarily
positive education that it focuses a great deal on how to act. Crucial to understanding how
to act is the art of judgment, the cultivation of moral feeling, and the cultivation of a
desire to enter into the ethical commonwealth.
§7—The Older Student: Learning to Judge Well
Although Kant emphasizes the importance of reason all throughout a students’
education, the type of reasoning emphasized with younger children is focused on
obedience to the rules of duty given by adults. The education of young adults, on the
other hand, focuses on doing what is right for the sake of duty, which means obeying
one’s own reason.”110 If students are to obey their own reason, this means they develop
the ability to judge. Kant’s heuristics such as the categorical imperative and his
description of our duties to ourselves and to others do not specifically tell us how to act in
each scenario. Rather, they outline general guiding rules for acting or not acting. Kant’s
heuristics tell us that we must act only on maxims that are universalizable, and he tells us
that we have duties to protect the dignity of ourselves and of others. He does not tell us
which specific actions in specific situations meet these criteria. In order to determine this,
students must learn to connect their particular situations with these rules. In other words,
they need to learn to judge properly.
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Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason that “the power of judgment is the
ability to subsume under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something does not does not
fall under a given rule (is or is not a casus datae legis).”111 Therefore, as students get
older, they have to figure out how to judge properly. Kant does not allow students the
option of letting people judge for them for the rest of their lives. Kant notes the
temptation to be a minor, to let others think for one’s self, perpetually:
It is because of laziness and cowardice that so great a part of humankind,
after nature has long since emancipated them from other people’s
direction…nevertheless gladly remains minors for life, and that it becomes
so easy for other to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so
comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book that understands for me, a
spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides upon
a regimen for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at all. I need not
think, if only I can pay; others will readily undertake the irksome business
for me.112
To become properly morally educated, one must learn how to judge. However, the
process by which older students learn to judge this way, once again, presents another
obstacle for education, for just like autonomy, the art of judgment cannot be taught.113
In fact, Kant writes that in order to figure out whether or not a sensible intuition
does or does not fall under a rule, we must once again have a rule to teach us how to do
this.114 However, to select the right rule to help us judge universals and particulars
correctly is also a matter of judgment (and an infinite regress ensues). Therefore, it would
seem that it is up to us to develop correct rules for practicing judgment, and this is a skill
“that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced.”115 Kant calls the power of
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judgment “the so-called mother wit, for whose lack no school can compensate.”116 While
judgment cannot be taught, the right kinds of skills and attitudes can be cultivated which
allow for good judgment to take root. This is where Kant’s discussion of catechism is
helpful.
Kant argues that “For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument
for teaching the doctrine of virtue is a moral catechism.”117 Kant does not envision his
catechism to be a mere tool of rote memorization. If it functioned this way, it seems that
it would perpetuate the regency of the teacher, rather than allowing the student to become
fully autonomous. Kant envisions the moral catechism as tool that helps students to
judge. Through catechizing the student, Kant suggests that the teacher presents her pupil
with certain moral casuistical cases. These cases allow the student to practice her ability
to use moral reasoning in concrete situations. Kant writes
For logic has not yet taken sufficiently to heart the challenge issued to it,
that it should also provide rules to direct one in searching for things, i.e., it
should not limit itself to giving rules for conclusive judgments but should
also provide rules for preliminary judgments (iudicia praevia), by which
one is led to thoughts.118
One of the things that Kant seems to be suggesting here is that careful moral catechizing
of students allows them to develop a set of internal preliminary rules which helps them to
come to conclusive moral judgments in different situations. That developing one’s own
internal set of rules is important should not surprise us when we recall Kant’s statements
in the Critique of Pure Reason that good judgment cannot be taught; it can only be
practiced. However, examples can prove a helpful tool for developing this type of
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judgment, and the casuistical examples presented in the catechism are just this type of
example.
It seems, too, that through the practice of catechism, which allows for
conversation between the student and the teacher, that students, once again, practice
publicizing their reasons behind their particular maxims. Through their process, they hold
their reasoning up for scrutiny to the rational community, and they discover whether or
not their maxims are indeed the maxims by which everyone could act and which could
indeed be declared universal law. In this way, the catechism for the older student serves a
similar purpose to the practice students have in making maxims when they are younger.
Younger children learn to act according to maxims, maxims which are strongly guided by
authority figures. Older children practice judging the most appropriate maxim for a given
situation. Both methods allow students to practice publicizing their reasons to members
of the rational community.
The process of students learning to obey their own reasoning and to think on their
own is so essential that Kant strongly criticizes some educational techniques that might
be considered fairly standard. For example, Kant criticizes the use, especially long-term,
of punishment, rewards and comparisons to encourage morality. Kant writes, “If we wish
to establish morality, we must abolish punishment.”119 The meaning behind this
somewhat starting claim becomes clearer when we realize that in trying to dissuade
students from acting badly by wielding the threat of punishment, we engender fear and
therefore heteronomous reasoning. Kant certainly understands that using punishment as a
propaedeutic to facilitate autonomous behavior is necessary sometimes. However, fear
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can never be a long-term motivator if the end goal is morality. Kant echoes this concern
that fear not be a long-term motivator for morality in his urging that morality be taught
first instead of theology. When morality is taught first, Kant argues, students learn to
heed the law that is already within them, which leads them to be moral for autonomous
reasons. If they learn theology first, they learn to be moral out of fear of God or eternal
punishment, and these are not suitable motivations for morality.
This is the same reason why Kant argues that students must not learn to act
morally for the sake of egoistic benefit, such as acting morally for the sake of achieving a
reward.120 When we act in order to obtain a reward, we are motivated by pleasure instead
of our dignity as a human being. Kant echoes this concern in Metaphysics of Morals
when he writes
For unless the dignity of virtue is exalted above everything else is actions, the
concept of duty itself vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts, since a
human being's consciousness of his nobility then disappears and he is for sale and
can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer him.121
Rewards are problematic because they teach students to sell his nobility for the sake of
the rewards it earns him. In addition, Kant cautions against educators using comparisons
to others to try to form moral reasoning, as comparison focus students’ attention on other
people’s behavior and distracts them from heeding the law and making it the primary
incentive:
As for the power of examples (good or bad) that can be held up to the
propensity for imitation or warning, what others give us can establish no
120
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maxim of virtue. For a maxim of virtue consists precisely in the subjective
autonomy of each human being’s practical reason and so implies that the
law itself, not the conduct of others human beings, must serve as our
incentive.122
It seems that using fear, egotistical thinking and envy to incentivize students to act
morally not only encourages heteronomy but also prevents students from thinking, which
prevents them from developing rules for good moral judgments. Kant further contrasts
these types of heteronomous incentives with thinking when he writes, “Moral culture
must be based upon ‘maxims’, not upon discipline.123 While possible rewards and the
example of other people’s conduct—both good and evil—can be helpful initially for
illumination, Kant argues that it is the method of moral decision-making, which comes
through forming maxims and acting on them, that allows students to think and develop
moral character. It is important to note that maxim-making is a method and not a habit:
“To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, through
frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination.”124 This is why using fear, reward
and comparisons as a long-term strategy for making students moral is not wise: it forms
the unthinking habit of looking outside one’s own reasoning for moral motivation. A
moral method, on the other hand, is a plan someone has to be autonomous. Kant’s strong
criticism of heteronomous incentives such as fear and rewards seems to be an extension
of his idea that our sensuous condition do, indeed, have a strong connection to our ability
to be moral and so educators and anyone else concerned with the cultivation of morality
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must be aware of the material conditions which both encourage and discourage autonomy
and morality.
§8—Moral Feeling and the Educative Use of Shame
While punishments, rewards and comparisons are generally unacceptable
discipline techniques because they encourage heteronomy, interestingly Kant does
believe that shame plays an important pedagogical role in the education of the older
child. Kant writes “It is the shamefulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent
himself), that must be emphasize above all.”125 It seems perplexing that the use of shame
as a moral incentive could escape the charge of heteronomy. After all, it seems that
shame is often considered to be an emotion which involves fear or embarrassment about
what other people think of us. It would seem initially then that Kant should be opposed to
using shame to motivate students because fear about the opinions of others is a
heteronomous motivation. Therefore, if Kant believes that shame is an appropriate moral
motivator, Kant’s definition of shame cannot entail a concern about others’ opinions.
Rather, Kant must have in mind a type of shame that refers to one’s own reasoning
processes alone.
Perhaps what Kant has in mind with shame is the feeling people have when they
realize they have acted in a completely counter-productive manner to their own most
cherished projects or goals. For instance, this kind of shame might be the feeling
someone has when he realizes that his actions are destroying the friendships that he most
cherishes or when someone realizes that she is completely undermining her goal for
financial dependency through profligate spending habits. While this type of feeling can
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refer to other people’s opinions or to consequences, it doesn’t necessarily reference these
things. Often this type of shame is a disgust with one’s own rational incoherence.
Perhaps this kind of shame is expressed in our moments when we say, “How could I
have been so stupid?” or “Dear God, what have I done?” These phrases suggest an
awareness of the incongruity of our current actions with our cherished ends. This seems
to be the kind of shame Kant has in mind. This feeling then is a type of moral feeling,
which Kant approves and says is “The susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure
merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of
duty."126
It seems like he is suggesting that when older children misbehave, we can point
out to them the incongruity of their actions with their worth as a human being. Kant
suggests that using this kind of shame with older students helps them to understand that
their actions are not worthy of their humanity and that they may be in fact undermining
their humanity, as well as their dignity. That Kant argues that shame cannot be used with
younger seems to reinforce this interpretation of his notion of shame as a moral incentive.
Young children often act in badly because they do not understand the full import of their
actions. Therefore, to try to point out to them how their actions undermine their dignity as
human beings (shaming them in this sense) is not effective. This is why young children
must be taught to obey rules of duty rather than figuring them all out themselves. It is
only when children are older and have a fuller sense of what their actions entail that
shame becomes an effective tool.
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Kant’s use of shame with older children also fits well with his idea that education
is a process of enlightenment from one’s own self-incurred minority, as Kant discusses in
his essay “What is Enlightenment”. Kant writes
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred
minority. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding
without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its
cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage
to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have courage to make
use of your own understanding! Is thus the motto of enlightenment.127
It is interesting here that Kant notes that “self-incurred minority” occurs when someone
lacks resolution and courage to use their own understanding. Young children often fail to
act virtuously because their understanding is underdeveloped. Older children have a more
developed understanding, but often lack the resolution and courage to use it properly.
Through shame, Kant suggests that we help students understand that they are failing to be
the boss of themselves—they are failing to be autonomous. In this way, Kant’s use of
shame can provide a strong emotional incentive that is still autonomous.
As older students obey their own reason and escape their minority, self-incurred
or otherwise, they increasingly make public use of their reason, which as we have noted
previously is the goal of education for Kant.128 Being able to make public use of one’s
reason is essential for developing “maxims of the common understanding” which are “1.
To think for oneself 2. To think in the position of everyone else 3. Always to think in
accord with oneself .”129 That Kant believes that these are maxims that we must develop
to use our understanding correctly makes sense when we recognize that to use our
understanding correctly implies that we use it morally. Using our understanding morally
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requires that we are autonomous (this pertains to the first maxim) and that we always act
on maxims we can universalize (this pertains to the second and third maxim). In other
words, using our understanding morally means that we form the consistent habit of
autonomously choosing actions that everyone could choose.
Through developing these maxims of thinking, we develop a sensus communis,
which Kant describes as “a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a
priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought.”130 In developing this sensus
communis, we achieve enlightenment because we free ourselves from prejudice, narrowminded and inconsistent thinking by learning to hold our judgment “up to human reason
as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that
could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on judgment.”131
Kant’s rules for thinking and his discussion about the sensus communis directly pertain to
developing good judgment. Developing sensus communis allows students to judge better
what everyone would judge as rational, rather than judging in a way that is chained more
to specific, localized, facts in the students’ life. Kant actually calls this type of
problematic thinking superstition. Good judgment and the ability to follow through on it
seem to be the end goal of a good education. Kant affirms this when he writes
The inferior faculties have no value in themselves; for instance, a man who
has a good memory, but no judgment. Such a man is merely a walking
dictionary. These beasts of burden of Parnassus are of some use, however,
for if they cannot do anything useful themselves, they at least furnish
material out of which others may produce something good. Intelligence
divorced from judgment produces nothing but foolishness. Understanding
is the knowledge of the general. Judgment is the application of the general
to the particular.132
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Kant’s pedagogical practices seem aimed at this very goal: cultivating the kinds of
attitudes and habits that make good judgment possible. And in exercising good judgment,
we consciously choose to join the rational human community.
§9—The Highest Good: Uniting Under a Common Purpose
It is important to draw our attention back to the fact that Kant believes that the
purpose of education is to further the development of all of humanity. Kant notes that
humanity is only partially developed and that its destiny is “to develop all of the germs of
goodness within [it].”133 He notes further that “it is through education by people who are
further down the road of autonomy that human nature is continually improved” and “this
opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race in the future.”134 In this way, the
primary goal of education is to prepare students to strive towards the highest good, the
unity of morality and happiness, and Kant clearly believes that stirring students’ passion
for the progress of humanity is an essential part of education. Kant underscores our
responsibility to work for the common good when he writes that we have existing in us
an idea and concern for “the progress of the world”135 and that “Children should be made
acquainted with this interest, so that it may give warmth to their hearts. They should learn
to rejoice at the world’s progress although it may not be to their own advantage or to that
of their country.”136 It seems likely that one of the reasons Kant suggests that students
must be encouraged to care for the progress of the world is because it helps them escape
the narrow interests of getting by in society or merely serving the states’ interests, which
Kant says are too often the goals of educators. However, there are other reasons it seems
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that Kant encourages this interest as well.
Kant’s injunction that students be encouraged to care about the progress of the
human race shows that while Kant is very concerned educationally about helping students
to become moral, his goal is not a solipsistic morality that leads to students living
isolated, moral lives. Rather, Kant envisions morality in the service of humanity. It may
seem initially that it is obvious that the moral person helps to bring about a moral and just
society. However, Kant does not believe this is necessarily true. Kant suggests that
people can be moral and just but can have such different purposes that they work at cross
purposes with each other. Kant writes
Under the present system man does not fully attain to the object of his
being; for in what various ways men live! Uniformity can only result
when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would
have to become with them a second nature.”137
So for Kant, the realization of the good of humanity comes about through more than
people merely being moral or just people. What is needed is for moral and just people to
unite themselves voluntarily under a common goal, namely the highest good. Kant’s
comments about the ethical commonwealth are helpful in understanding his concern in
this matter more clearly.
In the ethical commonwealth, Kant envisions people voluntarily uniting
themselves under the laws of virtue in order to work for the highest good.138 Kant argues
that people can have the best and even the most moral and just motives but still do harm
to each other and create problems in society because they are not united under a common
goal. Kant writes
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Human beings…mutually corrupt one another’s moral predisposition and,
even with the good will of each individual, because of the lack of a
principle which unites them, they deviate through their dissensions from
the common goal of goodness, as though they were instruments of evil,
and expose one another to the danger of falling once again under its
dominion.139
The story of Antigone and Creon seems to illustrate perfectly the type of problems Kant
has in mind in this quote. Antigone and Creon clash with one another, not because they
are immoral or unjust, but because they have not yet been able to unite themselves under
a common goal that allows for the joining of human morality and happiness. The story of
Antigone and Creon is an example we will return to later in the chapter on Hegel’s
educational philosophy. For now it is sufficient to note that Kant believes that while we
must be just and moral, we must also leave our ethical state of nature and join under the
common goal of the highest good. It is only when do this that the good of humanity,
which is the goal of education, can be pursued in earnest. Therefore, if education is to be
concerned about bringing about the progress of the human race, education must prepare
and motivate students to enter into the ethical commonwealth and seek the highest good.
§10—Education as the Duty of All: Becoming a Friend to Humanity
Given that the ethical commonwealth is devoted to pursuing the highest good of
humanity, everyone involved in the ethical commonwealth must be dedicated to
education. One of the ways that the ethical commonwealth promotes education is to make
the practice of education a study in itself. Kant argues that the work of education is to
mold a society that creates good educators.140 The goal is hopefully that an education
focused on improving the good of humanity and preparing students to be members of the
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ethical commonwealth prepares students to go beyond their parents and teachers, and
they do this by education becoming a study.141 Kant notes that the only way education
becomes a study is for the most enlightened people with the broadest interests in mind to
take an active role in education.142 It is especially important for education itself to
become a study because education involves judgment. This entails that what we judge to
be good educational methods are not actually in the end always good methods. Just as
skilled judgement in moral situations takes practice do develop, so does good judgement
in educational matters.
It requires thoughtful people reflecting on our educational methods, discussing
them, and experimenting with different techniques in experimental schools to allow the
institution of education to improve. For Kant, the study of education is not just an
interesting intellectual exercise. It is directly tied to our ability to progress as a human
race. This fact becomes more evident when we consider, as Kant points out, that
education depends on insight, but insight depends on education.143 In other words, as
Kant has already mentioned previously, we are what we are because of our education. If
our educators have poor reasoning and are bad practitioners of judgment, it is very likely
that we will carry forward the same flaws. Therefore, the study of education must be a
concern of the entire ethical commonwealth.
While Kant thinks that school is one of the primary places of education, it seems
that he also believes that everyone in the ethical commonwealth must be involved with
educational endeavors in one way or another, whether this means students becoming
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teachers themselves, being wise educators as parents, or supporting various educational
institutions in society. If education is the means by which we become human, and
everyone must be concerned with the dignity of humanity, it seems that Kant implies,
rather than directly states, that everyone has a duty to education. The implication that
education is everyone’s duty flows out of Kant’s claim that we have a duty to love others.
This love is a “(practical love) which results in beneficence.”144 Kant argues that our duty
to love others requires us “to make others’ ends my own (provided only that these are not
immoral).”145
If we are truly to make others’ ends our own, this means that we must act
practically in the world to promote these ends. Willing certain ends always requires that
we adopt the means to promote these ends. Therefore, if we are to make other’s ends our
own, this requires that we take an active stance of philanthropy towards others and that
we become a “friend to humanity”.146 Given the connection between education and the
development of human ends and potential in this chapter, it is clear that while a friend of
humanity might support many endeavors and institutions in society, schools are one of
the institutions he absolutely must support. Kant’s implication is clear: if you are to love
humanity, which is your duty, you must support education for everyone. Therefore,
commitment to education is a duty. That education is a duty implies many things. One of
the implications, however, is that a moral person cannot forsake the responsibility of
public education for society. This does not imply that a person cannot also be an advocate
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of private education. However, to fail to support the means for everyone to become
educated, it seems, is to fail in our duty to love humanity practically.
§11—The Ethical Commonwealth: Kant’s Unrealized Potential
In this chapter, I have I argued that Kant believes the goal of education is to
awaken students’ latent rational abilities and to apprentice students to the rational
community. In this way students may become members of the ethical commonwealth
which furthers the development of humanity towards the highest good. I have also argued
Kant implies that everyone has a duty to education, a duty which is implied by our duties
to love others and become a friend to humanity. In arguing for these points, Kant has
done an excellent job of building on Rousseau’s educational project and addressing some
of Rousseau’s lingering concerns. Kant agrees with Rousseau that society is a potentially
enslaving place for individuals, and he agrees with Rousseau that education must focus
on creating the type of environment which allows students to form a robust and free will.
Kant solves Rousseau’s educational worries because Kant embraces the conflict we face
in society as potentially educative and tied to our ability to develop our rationality and
capacities of morality and justice. Kant also shows that it is possible to educate students
in a way that respects the student and encourages moral autonomy. He further argues that
education can and must become the duty of everyone.
This is why the ethical commonwealth is crucial for Kant. It is only by uniting
ourselves under a common goal that we ensure that our actions are not only moral and
just but that they work for the good and happiness of everyone. It seems that Kant
believes that it is only through uniting in this ethical commonwealth that we are actually
able to bring about the final goal of humanity, as described in Kant’s Universal History
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essay. Given the importance of the ethical commonwealth, one might wonder how Kant
envisions us operating in ethical commonwealth and what specific attitudes or virtues or
dispositions are necessary to enable us to work for the highest good. I think Kant is aware
that these ideas are very important, and he begins to address some of them in his third
critique, but he is unable in his lifetime to fully develop the potential in his own
educational and political philosophy. One of the great contributions of Hegel’s
philosophy is that he develops some aspects of Kant’s philosophy that Kant was unable to
develop.
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Chapter Three: Hegel’s Extension of Kant
§1—Introduction: Hegel, Education and Justice
It may at first seem strange to include a chapter about Hegel in a study of
education or even to speak about such a thing as “Hegel’s educational philosophy”.
Unlike Rousseau, Kant, and the later educators I will address in this dissertation, Hegel
never wrote a book or an essay specifically devoted to the topic of education. However,
there are several key reasons I believe that Hegel’s educational philosophy is important to
consider when exploring the connection between education and justice. First, even
though Hegel did not write a specific book or essay about education, we will see shortly
that education is central to Hegel’s project and directly related to Hegel’s central
concerns. Education is also of key importance in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, his work
which details the working out of justice in society. Paragraph 187 in the Philosophy of
Right is an especially rich, although brief, discussion of education. I believe that this
paragraph expresses the core of Hegel’s educational philosophy. Hegel states explicitly in
this paragraph that “Education, in its absolute determination, is…liberation and work
towards a higher liberation.”147
This liberation Hegel speaks of, as we shall see, is certainly the liberation of the
individual from what Hegel describes as a natural state of immediacy. This immediacy is
a state in which the person is sunk into a type of barbarism that makes the full expression
of freedom impossible.148 However, as we shall also see, in liberating the individual,
education also helps to create a fully just society. Justice for Hegel is the full flourishing
of both individual freedom and the idea of freedom, and for the rest of my dissertation, I
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will also be using the term justice in this way. Hegel believes that education is directly
tied both to the ability of a person to achieve freedom and also for a society to achieve
justice. He argues that those two things are actually identical. Hegel’s era was an era
filled with a great passion for education and education’s connection to human flourishing
and justice. Given that he wrote about education and justice in such an era, his ideas
about education are significant in their own right.
However, there are other two other reasons why I believe it is important to study
Hegel’s ideas and the way in which they pertain to justice. First, Hegel’s philosophy is
important for this study because Hegel takes himself to be in conversation with both
Rousseau and Kant, whom he references throughout his philosophy. Therefore, if we are
to understand how the trajectory of Rousseau and Kant’s thought developed, specifically
in regards to education and justice, Hegel is an important heir to these ideas. Second, I
think Hegel is especially significant to the trajectory of thought in this dissertation
because of the way Hegel’s work was taken up by later educators, especially practitioners
of critical theory like Herbert Marcuse and Paulo Freire, on whom my later chapters will
focus. Hegel not only developed Rousseau’s and Kant’s ideas on education and justice,
but through these developments, introduced important philosophical ideas which
significantly influenced the educational projects of these thinkers. Therefore, in order to
understand the educational contributions of thinkers like Marcuse and Freire adequately,
it is important to grasp the unique philosophical contributions Hegel makes.
In this chapter, I argue that Hegel believes that education is a dialectical process
through which teachers cultivate a political disposition in students. This political
disposition entails the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation. I
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will also argue that Hegel’s notion of justice and education develops the potential in
Kant’s notion of education, specifically the potential in his notion of the ethical
commonwealth. In order to argue these things, I first explore the educational milieu of
Hegel’s day and the way in which Hegel took himself to be connected to Rousseau and
Kant’s project. Second, I examine important educational remarks Hegel makes in
Philosophy of Right. Specifically, I will point out the way in which the political
disposition is the end goal of education for Hegel. Third, I examine the way in which the
dialectic undergirds Hegel’s notion of education. I will also discuss the practices of
recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation that I believe are entailed in Hegel’s
political philosophy and therefore his educational philosophy. Lastly, I examine what I
believe are specific, concrete examples of Hegel’s educational philosophy. I suggest that
these educational insights are especially illuminated by the educational philosophy and
practices of John Dewey.
§2—The Educational Fervor of Hegel’s Day
The educational fervor present in Kant’s lifetime continued and even strengthened
during Hegel’s life. The cultural milieu of Hegel’s time was marked by a great hope that
education could bring about universal freedom and enlightenment. As we are about to
examine Hegel’s contribution to the discussion of education and justice, it is helpful to
take a moment to examine some of the educational ideas that were most influential during
his lifetime.
One of the most influential educators of Hegel’s era was Heinrich Pestalozzi, a
Swiss educator and admirer of Rousseau’s work whose educational method was
especially concerned with loving pupils and treating them with dignity. Pestalozzi’s
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schools were known for abolishing spanking and rote drill in the classroom and for
cultivating a loving and nurturing relationship between the student and the teacher. His
educational ideas were popular all over Europe, but they were especially popular in
Prussia, where Pestalozzi had several devoted disciples, such as the philosopher Fichte
who was a student of Kant’s philosophy and later influenced Hegel’s philosophy.
Fichte, a committed educator and philosopher, also contributed greatly to the educational
ideas of Hegel’s time. Fichte wrote in his Address to the German Nation on the
importance of education for achieving the freedom of the individual and the human
species as a whole. In this address, Fichte stresses the important of educating the human
will for freedom. Fichte argues that the goal of education is to fashion the will of the
students so that they so intimately identify the good with their own will, that they can will
nothing but the good, and their character becomes stable and fixed. Fichte critiques past
educational projects because he says they have
never succeeded in making its picture of a moral world order so vivid that
the pupil is seized by ardent love and longing for it, and by the glowing
emotion that impels him to represent it in life and before which selfishness
falls away like a withered leaf; that consequently this education has been a
long way from reaching down to the root of the real stirrings and motions
of life and cultivating it.149
Fichte argues further that the old kind of education has not at all been the “art of
cultivating humanity.”150 Fichte wants to create an educational system that shapes the
very will of students and creates a new kind of human being. Fichte writes, “All
education strives to bring forth a fixed, definite and permanent being [Sein], one that no
longer becomes but is and can be nothing else but what it is.”151 In order to accomplish

149

Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, pg. 18
Ibid, pg. 18
151
Ibid, pg. 23
150

73

such an education, Fichte argues that education must appeal to students’ rationality and
love and show them how the good is but their own rationality and good.152 By
introducing this love of the good and the rational early in students, Fichte argues that it
destroyed the possibility of immorality because students’ wills have become so bent
towards the good, that there is no room for the immoral.153
Fichte’s goal is certainly that this cultivated love for reason in the student will
eventually result in a changed society. Fichte further argues that previously, education
has failed because it has only focused on stirring students’ loves for their sensuous
conditions, and it has aimed at convincing students that by educating themselves, their
sensuous conditions would be improved.154 Fichte notes, however, that this kind of
education is fundamentally flawed because “with this method of education he who has
become outwardly a harmless or useful citizen remains inwardly a wicked person, for
wickedness consists precisely in loving only one’s sensuous well-being and being
motivated solely by hope and fear for that sensuous well-being”.155 In other words, this
type of education cultivates students who are whited sepulchers: they look good on the
outside but are decaying on the inside. Fichte argues that this previous type of education
must be replaced by an education that “aims directly at the good, simply and as such for
its own sake, and plants it in the minds of all those whom we wish to reckon among our
nation”.156 In this address, Fichte writes of the new education that it is conducted in such
a way that students see that educational principles are their very own principles—the
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laws of freedom and their own good.157 This rational good is the good of every rational
being. Therefore, as educators cultivate students in this manner, they cultivate the entire
human race.
In his work On the Vocation of the Scholar, Fichte echoes these ideas when he
emphasizes that the role of the scholar is to advance the whole human race. He writes to
these scholars
When I teach something to you, I am most probably teaching unborn
millions. Some among you may be well enough disposed toward me to
imagine that I sense the dignity of my own special vocation, that the
highest aim of my reflections and my teaching will be to contribute
towards advancing culture and elevating humanity in you and in all those
with whom you come into contact, and that I consider all philosophy and
science which do not aim at this goal to be worthless.158
In Fichte’s concern that education be primarily concerned with the furthering of the good
of humanity, we see both the influence Rousseau and Kant, both of whose writings Fichte
was very familiar with.159
Influenced by the ideas of educators and philosophers such as Rousseau,
Pestalozzi, Kant and Fichte, people increasingly believed that education was not just for
the elite but that it must be for everyone. They further believed that it was through
education that a nation was unified and the spirit of a nation was solidified. It was
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through education, the promise of equality and progress was realized. Furthermore,
people became increasingly concerned that teachers and schools honor the dignity and
rationality of the student, cultivating a the free will bent towards the good. Thus, Hegel
lived in a time in which it was not only the case that educational revolution was
underfoot, but the Prussia of Hegel’s day was actually one of the foremost nations
involved in the pursuit of educational revolution. When we understand this educational
climate, it helps to illuminate some of the primary concerns of Hegel’s educational
philosophy. We shall see shortly that Hegel believes that education has, simultaneously,
the interests of the individual and the State in mind and that for Hegel there is no
dichotomy between these two. We will also see that for Hegel, the good of the individual,
society, morality and justice are all intimately intertwined, and education is immediately
concerned with this good.
§3—Hegel in Connection with Rousseau and Kant
Before examining Hegel’s educational ideas more thoroughly, it is helpful to gain
an idea of the way in which Hegel takes himself to be in conversation with Rousseau and
Kant about matters of education and justice. Hegel agrees with Kant’s view of the state of
nature (and his critique of Rousseau), but Hegel also critiques Kant’s notion of morality
and justice. Gaining an understanding of this critique will help to clarify the goal Hegel is
trying to accomplish in the Philosophy of Right and the way in which education
specifically pertains to that goal.
Hegel, like Kant, believes that human beings can only become free in society and,
therefore, believes that education must prepare students to be good citizens and strive for
a fully just state. Like Kant, Hegel believes that the state of nature is not one of freedom
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because human beings are not free by nature, nor are they born free.160 Rather, Hegel
argues, freedom is something that must be won, and this winning of freedom is
accomplished “through an endless process involving the discipline of knowledge and
will.”161 Hegel argues that the state of nature is a “condition of injustice, of indolence, of
untamed natural drives, in human acts, and emotions.”162 It is a state in which the person
also has no volitional control over her life but is immersed in a kind of immediacy of
drives and passions, and so she can’t take up any particular orientation or responsibility
towards the world.
Hegel also agrees with Kant that it is in society with other people who present
challenges and opportunities to us that we have the chance to develop our natural
predispositions and to become fully ethical and free. For both Kant and Hegel, there is
ultimately no conflict between the fully realized ends of the individual and society. It is
not the case for Kant and Hegel that education must choose between the flourishing of
one or the other because they believe that when conducted rightly, education supports the
flourishing of both. In direct critique of Rousseau, Hegel writes
Those pedagogical experiments in removing people from the ordinary life
of the present and bringing them up in the country (cf. Rousseau’s Emile)
have been futile, because one cannot successfully isolate people from the
laws of the world…the individual attains his right only by becoming the
citizen of a good state.163
While Hegel agrees with Kant’s critique of Rousseau, Hegel also critiques Kant on
several points. I do not fully agree with Hegel’s critique of Kant, but I believe it is
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important to understand Hegel’s critique in order to understand why he develops his
political and educational project the way he does.
The first thing Hegel critiques Kant for is a supposed dichotomy between morality
and the material, sensuous world. As we have seen, Kant believes that our emotions and
sensuous conditions cannot be the grounding of morality or else this make morality
heteronomous and unstable. Hegel is concerned that this view unnecessarily
dichotomizes reason and sensuousness in a way that is ultimately undermining. Hegel
notes that Spirit cannot ultimately separate reason and sensuousness because the sensuous
world is where morality is actualized.164 Furthermore, Hegel argues that formal freedom
only has content in the subjects’ “Natural subjective existence—its needs, passions,
opinions, fancies, etc.” and that “the satisfaction of this content is welfare or
happiness”.165 Therefore, to try to separate the formal moral decision from its connection
with the sensuous world is to undermine the possibility of moral decision-making. Hegel
emphasizes the manner in which our humanity is necessarily connected to our moral
decision-making when he writes
The fact that [the person] is a living being is not contingent, however, but
in accordance with reason, and to that extent he has a right to make his
needs his end. There is nothing degrading about being alive, and we do not
have the alternative of existing in a higher spirituality. It is only by raising
what is present and given to a self-creating process that the higher sphere
of the good is attained (although this distinction does not imply that the
two aspects are incompatible.166
This quote indicates Hegel’s notion that morality and justice are not principles we obtain
a priori and then next apply to our sensuous conditions. Rather, they grow out of the very
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material of our day-to-day lives when we “[raise] what is present” and give it “to a selfcreating process.” We will soon see that education is the process by which people learn to
do this very thing.
Hegel’s second critique, a critique of the Kantian conception of justice, is related
to his critique of Kantian morality. We must recall that Kant clearly demarcates
morality—the inner realm of freedom—and justice—the external realm of freedom.
Hegel believes that this view of freedom focuses exclusively on the arbitrary will of the
individual rather than recognizing there is also a universal idea of freedom which is
“being in and for itself.” 167 Hegel argues that freedom is an Idea that works itself out in
objective existence and has necessary structures and relations in the world. A focus on
the individual and arbitrary freedom, however, completely overlooks freedom’s actual
existence as Idea. Hegel argues further that this view of the freedom is deficient and can
never lead to a fully just society that allows for complete human flourishing.
Furthermore, Hegel would certainly argue that an education based solely on a notion of
freedom as individual and arbitrary cannot hope to bring about a fully just society either.
I believe that Hegel’s critique of Kant fails to recognizes two important ideas in
Kant’s philosophy which we have already discussed. First, as I noted in the last chapter
on Kant, Kant certainly believes that our sensuousness conditions must support morality.
As we have seen, Kant clearly notes that wretched material conditions can make it very
hard for us to be moral. This is why he is so concerned in Lectures on Pedagogy that
teachers not make their students miserable. Second, although Kant does indeed carefully
demarcate the sphere of internal and external freedom, he certainly realizes as we have
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seen that in order for the highest good to be achieved, society must work together under a
common purpose in the ethical commonwealth to achieve this highest good. Kant is
aware of the types of concerns Hegel raises regarding our material conditions and the
expression of freedom in the world, but he does not work out fully in his own writings a
satisfactory resolution to these concerns.
Nevertheless, while I believe Hegel fails to recognize Kant’s awareness of these
concerns, I believe that Hegel’s perception of Kant’s failure, whether it is an accurate
perception or not, inspires him to craft a political philosophy that develops the potential
in Kant’s moral and political philosophy, especially Kant’s notion of the ethical
commonwealth. Furthermore, since Hegel’s educational philosophy is inspired by his
political philosophy, I believe Hegel’s educational philosophy is an important extension
of Kant’s educational philosophy. Specifically, I believe Hegel’s philosophy shows how
skilled moral judgment develops in the ethical commonwealth and the kind of practices
that allow it to develop. We will now examine key remarks Hegel makes about education
in Philosophy of Right.
§4—Hegel and Education
Paragraph 187 of Philosophy of Right contains a detailed look at Hegel’s
educational philosophy, so it is helpful to look at it to gain a clear understanding of
Hegel’s view of education. First it is helpful to understand why Hegel believes that
children need to be educated. Hegel views the young child much like someone in the state
of nature. The state of the young, uneducated child is a state of immediacy and
arbitrariness. Hegel notes that for the young child, reason (which is the essence of the
child as a human being) is only an inward and undeveloped potential. Because the child’s
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freedom is only this internal possibility, it is also external in that freedom must be
imposed upon the child through “the will of its parents, the learning of its teachers, and in
general the rational world that surrounds it.”168
In this state in which the child’s freedom is imposed upon him by external forces,
he is not living as a fully flourishing human being because the defining characteristic of
human beings is that they are self-determining and responsible, and young children are
not yet able to be self-determining and responsible. When humans determine themselves,
they (as free human beings) are present in everything they do. Hegel writes, contrasting
the educated and uneducated person, that
[The distinctive interest of a human] consists precisely in the fact that the
human being knows himself as absolute and determines himself. The
uncivilized human being lets everything be dictated to him by brute force
and by natural conditions; children have no moral will and allow
themselves to be determined by their parents…169
And he concludes with noting the type of consciousness that is the goal of every
person and all education: “but the cultivated and inwardly developing human
being wills that he should be present in everything he does.170 Since the child as a
rational being does have freedom as its concept but this freedom is merely an
inward possibility, the child must be educated. Hegel writes
The human being, in his immediate existence in himself, is a natural entity,
external to his concept; it is only through the development of his own body
and spirit, essentially by means of his self-consciousness comprehending
itself as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes his own
property as distinct from that of others.171
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When the student is educated so that her freedom is developed, she becomes what she
really is, and she is self-determining. Hegel says that she takes on an existence which is
“purely its own and free.”172
The means by which this pure and free existence is achieved is the process of a
person representing her drives and working with and through her sensuous conditions so
that her drives obtain a universal quality. This universal quality is a cultivated understanding about the proper way in which to order the drives as a system. In this way,
the drives aim for the sum total of happiness, rather than aiming for merely capricious
fancies. Hegel writes
When reflection applies itself to the drives, representing them, estimating
them, and comparing them with one another and then with the means they
employ, their consequences, etc., and with a sum total of satisfaction—i.e.
with happiness—it confers formal universality upon the material and
purifies it, in this external manner of its crudity and barbarity. This
cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute value of
education.173
At the beginning paragraph 187 in Philosophy of Right, Hegel explains the contrast
between the particular and universal will more thoroughly, as well as the way in which
this educative process of the drives occurs. He notes that individuals have their own end
which they work out in a universal way. This universal way is the means they adopt.174
However, individual ends are not isolated and arbitrary. Hegel notes that “They can attain
their end only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, volition, and
action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this continuum.”175
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Hegel suggests in this quote that there are ways of working out individual ends that are
recognized by general humanity as legitimate and purposeful. It is only by figuring out
and adopting these means of working out ends that people actually create a harmonious
and stable society that achieves the good for everyone.
Therefore, Hegel implies that as people work out their ends, this is not merely an
individualistic, isolated affair. While human ends are particular, they are also universal in
that there are only certain types of ends that can be recognized as legitimate human ends:
namely ends that allow the further expression of human will, rationality and freedom as a
universal experience. Once rationality is externalized in the world, it has an objectivity
that can be evaluated and recognized as valid or not. Therefore, the particular individual
is also universal in that it possesses human rationality and freedom. In addition, is has an
objective existence and is characterized by participating in necessary relationships with
others in order to express its freedom. These necessary relationships are the relationships
that naturally come about when human beings externalize their rationality and freedom in
ways that can be recognized by everyone. Therefore, human rationality to be free must be
worked out in certain ways. Kant has already suggested this, as I noted in the last chapter,
in his discussion of the connection of our sensuous conditions to our moral capacities.
Hegel extends Kant’s ideas by giving us a few more details about how freedom is
articulated fully in our sensuous conditions and the way our judgement develops to guide
this articulation.
Hegel notes that through individual actions, the Idea is worked out, and this Idea
“is the process whereby their individuality and naturalness are raised, both by natural
necessity and by their arbitrary needs to formal freedom and formal universality of
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knowledge and volition.” In this process, subjectivity is educated in its particularity.176
When people only focus on actualizing their own individual will, however, and forget
that there is a universal aspect to will, Hegel argues that they miss the “nature of spirit”
and the “end of reason.”177 In this they fail to understand the way in which rationality and
freedom is working itself out in the world.
It is the working out of this universal will and its objective existence in the world
with its necessary relationships that Hegel believes is the goal of education. He argues
further that this process is a liberating process. Hegel notes that education liberates Spirit
so that it can both impose finitude upon itself through its work in the world and by
working on this finitude, raise it to universality. In this way, Spirit finds itself in its world
and is at home there. This is a world where both the individual and the universal person is
free. He writes that
Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this
limitation and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the
continuum of this external necessity, and, in the very process of adapting
itself to these limitations, by overcoming them and gaining its objective
existence within them.178
The goal of education is neither to return to the state of nature nor to promote merely
individual pleasure. Rather the goal is to move from immediacy to universality and
understanding. Hegel writes about the goal that it is
to work to eliminate natural simplicity, whether as passive selflessness or
as barbarism of knowledge and volition—i.e. to eliminate the immediacy
and the individuality in which spirit is immersed, so that this externality
may take on the rationality of which it is capable, namely the form of
universality or of the understanding.”179
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Hegel argues that when Spirit does this, it is at home in its world because it is “at home
and with itself in externality as such”180 and “Spirit becomes for itself and has to do only
with what it has impressed its seal upon and produced itself.” Therefore, for Hegel,
education is a liberation from immediacy, individual arbitrariness, and caprice to genuine
being for self, a being that has necessary structure.181 He writes that “Education, in its
absolute determination is therefore liberation and work towards a higher liberation.”182
Hegel notes that the opposite of an educated will is a will that is driven by
capricious and arbitrary drives that pull a person this way and that and make its existence
contingent. This is irrational. Our drives need to be ordered so that they reflect a rational
and coherent system which is in line with our concept— that is the concept of a free and
rationally willing being. When the drives become “a rational system of the will’s
determinations”, then we grasp abstract property, morality and ethical substance, which is
what the science of right is.183
When the drives are purified in this way, human beings develop a second nature
in which their natural subjective will is purified and raised into a rational, ethical nature.
Education teaches students how a rationally ordered will can become their second nature,
a spiritual nature, so that pursuing their happiness and freedom in the world through
relationships with others is natural, easy and habitual for them.184 He writes that
education is
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the art of making human beings ethical; it considers them as natural beings
and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their original nature can
be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality
becomes habitual to them. In habit, the opposition between the natural and
the subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken;
to this extent, habit is part of ethics, just as it is part of philosophical
thought, since the latter requires that the mind should be trained to resist
arbitrary fancies and that these should be destroyed and overcome to clear
the way for rational thought.185
When humans develop this second ethical and rational nature, they fulfill the vocation of
man because they understand what good and evil is, and they are able to take
responsibility for their actions. Hegel writes
This is the seal of the absolutely high vocation of Man, that he or she
knows what is good and what is evil, and that is for him or her to will
either the good or the evil. It is the mark of the human, in other words, to
be capable of bearing such responsibility, not only for the evil but also for
the good; and responsibility not only for this, that, or another thing, but
responsibility for the good and evil stemming from his or her individual
freedom.186
As people are educated and learn to take responsibility for their own action and act in a
rational way, the universal will is worked out in the world in such a way that human
beings recognize themselves in the world and are at home both in it and their
relationships with other people. Ultimately, this process develops in people a political
disposition which allows them to forge a community of trust (and love as we shall later
see) in which they find individual fulfillment. Hegel says about this political disposition
that it is
patriotism in general...This disposition is in general one of trust or the
consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and
contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and in
the latter's relations to me as an individual. As a result, this other
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immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this,
I am free.187
I would like to suggest here that Hegel’s description of the political disposition, which is
his end goal of education, is almost identical to Kant’s notion of the goal of the ethical
commonwealth. We have seen in Kant’s ethical commonwealth that human beings unite
under the same goal of pursuing the highest good, and in doing so, they work out a
society in which happiness and morality are united. Everyone is treated as an end in
themselves, and people’s material world is arranged in such a way that is supports their
moral flourishing. Thus, if Kant’s goal for education is a commitment to the ethical
commonwealth and Hegel’s end goal of education is the political disposition, it appears
that Kant and Hegel’s end goal for education is one and the same. What is especially
helpful about Hegel’s philosophy in relation to Kant’s is that he describes how this
political disposition develops, and his description carries some important implications for
education. Hegel’s description of how the political disposition develops is related to the
practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation.
Before I move on to Hegel’s description of the way that the political disposition
develops, the four practices mentioned above and the implications it carries for Hegel’s
educational philosophy, I would like to focus on several claims Hegel makes about
education in paragraph 187. These are claims that will help us better understand Hegel’s
further description of how the political disposition develops. Hegel claims that there are
several goals of education:
(i)

Education cultivates students’ internal and external awareness of their
freedom.
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(ii)

Education cultivates this awareness by providing opportunities for
students to purify their drives in a way that their external expression of
these drives is recognized by others.

(iii)

As education cultivates students’ awareness in this way, it helps them to
develop a “a rational system of the will’s determinations” which allows
them to recognize themselves as free beings in their relationships with
other people who have gone through a similar process.

(iv)

When students recognize themselves and others in this manner, they have
cultivated a political disposition

I do not mean to suggest that these four implications of Hegel’s educational philosophy
are the only important implications. I do believe, however, that these four implications
are at the heart of Hegel’s educational philosophy. I believe further that these four
implications are directly tied to four other practices central to Hegel’s writing: the
practices188 of recognition, responsibility, right, and reconciliation. If it is true that these
key implications are tied to the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and
reconciliation, then any education that wishes to develop a just society must encourage
these practices. I will soon examine these practices and how they are tied to Hegel’s
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educational philosophy. But first it is important to examine Hegel’s notion of the dialectic
because the guiding notion of Hegel’s entire educational method is that it is a dialectical
process.
§5—The Dialectic
Hegel’s conception of the dialectic governs his understanding of the whole
process of education, and for Hegel the dialectical process is present in the reflection and
action of each individual. In all of Hegel’s works, Hegel notes that the process of the Idea
coming to its full fruition in the world is a process of development. It is not a state or end
goal that can be achieved all at once. Freedom does not spring forth fully formed from
the head of Zeus, or from the head of anyone for that matter. Rather, Hegel portrays
freedom as something that is won through a process that inevitably involves failed shapes
of consciousness and the difficult and sometimes tortuous movement towards more fully
concrete understanding. While the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right suggests
that the Idea is now fully embodied in the world in the State and Absolute Knowing, this
does not entail that Hegel believes that each person possesses a fully articulated
understanding of freedom themselves. Indeed, as we have already seen, Hegel believes
that people must be educated for the very reason that they lack this full understanding.
Hegel writes that
Freedom as an ideal dimension of original nature, does not exist as an
original and natural state. On the contrary, it must be achieved and won,
and indeed won through an endless process involving the discipline of
knowledge and will.189
That freedom is won through “an endless process involving discipline of knowledge and
will” suggests an educative process that continues throughout a person’s entire life. That
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this wining of freedom is a process of discipline suggests that it is dialectical, just as the
process of the Idea articulating itself in the world is dialectical. Indeed, Hegel himself
seems to conceptualize the education of the individual as a dialectical process. He writes
about the student that
He begins with Childhood—mind wrapt up in itself. His next step is the
full-developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is
still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his
immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world
which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of
the individual himself who is still short of independence and not fully
equipped for the part he has to play (youth). Thirdly, we see man in his
true relation to this environment, recognizing the objective necessity and
reasonableness of the world as the work which it collectively achieves to
afford the individual a place and a security of this performance. By this
share in this collective work he first is really somebody, gaining an
effective existence and an objective value.190
This quote conveys a dialectical process of the student striving to understand his world
originally as an abstract self; failing at first to reconcile himself to and to find himself in
his world; and then moving to more concrete levels of understanding and liberation. This
eventual liberation is a concrete liberation that reconciles the student with his world and
helps him, as we see in the quote above, “recognize the objective necessity and
reasonableness of the world.” The process, then, is a movement from abstract to concrete
understanding.
In order to understand how this process of concrete understanding develops for
Hegel, it is helpful to examine how the Idea comes to know itself in the Phenomenology
of Spirit.191 The Phenomenology can be viewed as the education of World Spirit and

190

Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, pg. 173
It is important to note that at the end of the Phenomenology, Hegel believes that Absolute Spirit is
realized, and reason is now at home in the world. Therefore, I am using interpretive license to suggest
that reason’s dialectical development in the Phenomenology is similar to the dialectical development of
the individual. I believe this interpretive move is legitimate as long as it is stipulated that individual

191

90

therefore, it sheds light on the process by which individuals become educated, although it
is not necessarily the case that individual people must pass through all of the shapes of
consciousness that Spirit experiences in the Phenomenology. When we examine the
tortuous process World Spirit goes through and the lessons it learns about its knowing in
the Phenomenology, this sheds light on educative experience of the individual’s
dialectical journey.
In the Phenomenology, Hegel describes the dialectical process as one of constant
trial and error in which spirit recognizes that our cognition of knowledge always changes
knowledge is some way and that we are not getting the whole truth.192 Given that our
grasping hold of knowledge always changes or distorts the truth, Hegel suggests that we
must revise our concept of error. If we refuse to act for fear of error, this fear actually
perpetuates error because it already presupposes that we are distinct from our
knowledge.193 Hegel writes
It presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is
surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby
what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as fear of truth. [italics mine] 194
Hegel argues that we become fixated on “getting it right” and in doing so, we cling
dogmatically to particular concepts that we believe fully capture the truth but that
actually fail to do so. Hegel suggests that the proper attitude to take in this dialectical
endeavor is skepticism towards our knowledge in that any knowledge we possess cannot
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similar process of grasping and error and learning, as is characterized by the dialectic in the
Phenomenology.
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be considered complete knowledge but only knowledge as it appears to us at the time.195
If we take this stance, then, we must in a way always be reaching beyond ourselves. We
must grasp knowledge and realize that in this grasping we are grasping a knowledge that
will soon lead to new ways of knowing.
Once again, it is important to note that in at the Phenomenology, it appears that
Hegel believes Absolute Knowing has overcome the separation between itself and the
world and that it is now at home in the world. Nevertheless, even if Absolute Knowing
has reached this stage, this does not entail that people are born into a world with a
perfect, dialectically complete knowledge of their world. If we consider this way of
viewing knowledge in relation to the individual’s educative process, it seems likely that
Hegel does not envision students coming to a final and complete stage of knowing such
as the end achieved by Absolute Knowing. Rather, the knowing of an individual is a
knowing that has rid itself of abstractions and that understands the world in its
concreteness and connection. It has therefore reconciled itself to the world by
overcoming its seeming irrationality.
What is important to note about this dialectic process, as has been mentioned, is
that it is an understanding that must be won through attempts and failures. This failure is
an inherently necessary part of the nature of finite human beings who must win their
knowledge and freedom by proceeding from an abstract understanding to an increasingly
concrete understanding of knowledge and freedom. Because every person’s educational
process is necessarily dialectical, and because people’s educational processes also entail a
development of the practices of recognition, responsibility, and right, it is now important
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to investigate the role these practices play in Hegel’s philosophy in general. In doing this,
we will then be in a good position to see how they play a role in Hegel’s educational
philosophy and how they are developed dialectically in education.
§6—The Practices of Recognition, Responsibility and Right
While Hegel does not explore pedagogical techniques in depth, I believe he gives
us quite a few clues about the type of pedagogy that cultivates the political disposition in
students. He discusses at great length the process by which the will develops into its full
expression of freedom. Therefore, by examining Hegel’s description of the full
development of the political disposition, we will gain some important insights into
possible pedagogical practices that would bring about the full development of freedom.
Two of the most integral concepts to the Hegelian notion of the political
disposition are the notions of recognition and the notion of responsibility which is
intimately connected to recognition. In his description of the political disposition which
we examined earlier in the chapter, Hegel notes that it is a disposition in which I find my
interests preserved in another’s interests, and at this moment, the other person ceases to
be an other for me. Rather, we recognize that in our actions together in the world, we are
creating a world which reflects our humanity and freedom. Recognition for Hegel is tied
to our ability to honor and respect each other’s freedom both in a moment of internal
understanding and also through our everyday actions in the world.
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes how recognition first develops.
Self-consciousness emerges as people become aware of how their subjectivity is
inextricably bound up in this process of cognizing the world. In this awareness of
subjectivity, self-consciousness is troubled over how to close the gap between what it
perceives and what actually is. Self-consciousness then is a desire to close the gap
93

between appearance and reality.196 It is through this desire that self-consciousness
becomes sensitive to norms and reasons that would confirm what it takes to be true. It is
our relationships with other people, Hegel suggests, and their recognition of us, that
actually allows us to take up commitments and responsibility. We cannot make
commitments to objects because objects cannot provide a challenge to us which allows us
to know our commitments as commitments. Challenges from other people allow us to
realize that our commitments are not just biological imperatives. In the moment of
realizing that we have commitments, we become aware of ourselves as achieving selfconsciousness.197
In both the Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right, Hegel suggests that a
consistent and stable consciousness of ourselves and our freedom only occurs through the
recognition of others.198 Furthermore, Hegel argues that recognition is present at each
moment of the state because each moment requires that people take responsibility
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through their commitments, and this is only something people can do within recognitive
relationships with other people. We must note here, however, that the practice of
recognition alone does not yet lead to a political disposition. For the political disposition
to form fully, we need the practices of responsibility and right and reconciliation. So I
will now examine these.
The practice of responsibility, the second practice of the political disposition is
directly tied to recognition. I have already discussed the importance of responsibility in
my discussion of recognition, but it is important to discuss it a little further at this point.
Hegel locates the Idea of freedom in self-consciousness’ ability to reflect upon itself and
to be responsible in the attempt to forge a home in the world. Recall that we have already
seen that Hegel says that “It is the mark of the human, in other words, to be capable of
bearing such responsibility...responsibility for the good and evil stemming from his or her
individual freedom.”199 We must note here that until a person actually articulates her will
in the external world, her will is abstract and not a fully-expressed or developed will. The
will that is not externalized is not actually taking up commitments or responsibility, as
both entail action. In order for will to become fully expressed in the world, it must
externalize itself, but the only way it can do this is to have a network of social
relationships to give it a stable framework. Will must be able to take responsibility in a
way that is stable and able to be recognized by others. The need for this network of social
relationships leads to the third integral practice associated with the political disposition:
right.
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Hegel argues that the system of property and social arrangements that allows the
full expression of the will, both particular and individual, is the system of right (or recht),
which for Hegel is the system that allows for the full expression of freedom.200 Hegel
argues, then, that the notion of right and freedom finds its full articulation in the State in
which the individual subjective will, with its unique and individual passions, harmonizes
with the universal will in the structure of the State. Hegel writes, “The State is the
externally existing, genuinely ethical life. It is the union of the universal essential will
with the subjective will—and this is ethics.201 Hegel says that the state is the reality
wherein the individual has and enjoys his freedom—but only insofar as he knows,
believes and wills the universal.”202 This universal is the rational quality of a will that is
educated so that it loses its completely particular character. In fact, Hegel writes that
educated people are people who
…do everything as others do it and who do not flaunt their particular
characteristics, whereas it is precisely these characteristics which the
uneducated display, since their behavior is not guided by the universal
aspects of its object.203
Since the universal will is the will that does “everything as others do it” and is a will that
does not “flaunt [its] particular characteristics”, the universality of will has a necessarily
social and communal quality to it. Therefore, Hegel believes that it is only in a fully
articulated society, the State, that people become fully human. In fact, the State and the
full actualization of human beings for Hegel is inseparable. He writes
We must understand, further, that all the value that human beings possess,
all of their spiritual reality, they have through the State alone. Their
spiritual reality consists in the fact that their essence—rationality—is
200
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objectively there for them as knowers, and that rationality has an
immediate objective existence for them. Only in that way is man a
consciousness, with an ethical way of life, the legal and ethical life of the
State.204
Hegel’s notion that freedom develops fully in the State is a continuation of Kant’s notion
that freedom must be worked out fully in society. Hegel develops this ideas, however,
because he argues that the development of freedom in the state happens through the full
development of the idea of right or freedom and that a fully developed concept of right
contains the moments of abstract right, morality and ethics: “The content of this science
of right can be expounded with reference to all its individual moments such as right,
property, morality…the state, etc.”205 I would like to examine each of these moments
briefly because they will soon play an important role in my explanation of Hegel’s
educational philosophy as it is applied in a concrete educational setting.206
The science of right, as Hegel has described it above entails both external and
internal expression. For example, the first moment of right is the moment of abstract
property in which people externalize their freedom in property and other people’s
recognition of my freedom as expressed in my property.207 This ownership of property is
an externalization of my will, but my will is not yet an internal reality. Hegel argues that
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it is only as I realize I can refuse to recognize other’s people’s property that I develop this
inner sense of my freedom and the concept of morality as the inner expression of freedom
develops. In the moment of morality, I develop an inner sense of my will and realize that
my particular will is different from the universal will. At the same time, I gain an
awareness that my particular will ought to be in line with the universal will, for this is the
only way that I can tell that it has a type of legitimacy and is truly free.
If I am to harmonize my particular will with the universal will, however, this
desire must be expressed externally into actions in the world, and (as we have seen) these
actions must be recognized by other people. In other words, if my moral actions do not
count in other people’s eyes as moral actions it is difficult for me to be free. Hegel
writes,
The concrete person who, as a particular person, as a totality of needs and
a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness, is his own end, is one
principle of civil society. But this particular person stands essentially in
relation to other similar particulars, and their relation is such that each
asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the others, and thus at the same
time through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality.208
Therefore, the external moment of abstract property, and the internal moment of morality
call for a third moment—the moment of ethical substance—in which I take responsibility
to externalize my will in a way in which my personal, particular will aligns with the
universal will. My will is articulated in such a way that society can interpret my actions
as moral and rational actions.
The actions that articulate both the internal and external moment of freedom
become necessary actions or duties. My duty is that which works for the welfare of both
myself and humanity universal. Hegel writes, “What is duty? For this definition, all that
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is available so far is this: to do right, and to promote welfare, one’s own welfare and the
welfare in its universal determination, the welfare of others.”209 Hegel continues that my
duty is to work for the good, which is the whole aim and end of ethical substance. Hegel
writes, “Ethical life is the Idea of freedom as the living good which has its knowledge
and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action.”210
Hegel notes that “Ethical life is accordingly the concept of freedom which has become
the existing world211 and the nature of self-consciousness.”212
We must note here that the emphasis that Hegel’s system of right places on
responsibility that proceeds from responsible reflection and action in recognitive
relationships with other people. Freedom is only developed by people actively engaging
with their world and purposefully taking up commitments that align with the universal
will, a will which is reflected in society’s recognition of these actions as legitimate. It is
when people take responsibility in a system of right through recognitive relationships
with others that the political disposition to develop. This is because they truly see their
own interests reflected in the interests of others, and other people are no longer alien to
them.
Thus far I have discussed three practices of the political disposition: recognition,
responsibility and right. I would now like to discuss the fourth practice: reconciliation. At
first it seems as though Hegel does not discuss the practice of reconciliation as in depth as
he does the practices of recognition, responsibility and right. However, I believe that the
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practice of reconciliation undergirds Hegel’s entire educational project because
reconciliation is connected to the dialectic which undergirds Hegel’s entire educational
project.
§7—Reconciliation
We have already examined the way in which the individual’s process of
development is necessary dialectical. We have also seen that because this process is
dialectical, it marked by necessary error and failure. It is important to note here that if
error and failure is a necessary part of human being’s development, then error and failure
will also necessarily mark people’s relationships with one another as they work to
develop a free society and the political disposition. That these necessary errors in our
relationships with one another often lead to tragedy seems inevitable. By tragedy, I mean
an inevitable collision of wills that occur when people have two different and competing
conceptions of the good which they are unable to relinquish. These conflicts often lead to
tragedy.
We see such moments of failure, transgression and tragedy in the Phenomenology
in the master and slave dialectic, the story of Antigone and Creon and the moment of the
Beautiful Soul and forgiveness. In each of these moments of consciousness’ journey in
the Phenomenology, conflict erupts between individuals, and it is a type of conflict that
results necessarily from the particular defective shape of consciousness that Spirit
experiences. In the master and slave dialectic, consciousness only knows how to maintain
a sense of itself by initiating a fight to the death with another consciousness, a fight that
ends with a master and slave relationship which institutionalizes alienated will and labor.
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It is through this defective shape of consciousness that the slave comes to a full
awareness of its own freedom, and Spirit moves into another shape of consciousness.
In the story of Antigone and Creon, we see two individuals locked in a deadly
struggle that ensues because Antigone and Creon hold two equally legitimate and
diametrically-opposed conceptions of the good. The particular shape of consciousness in
which Antigone and Creon operate, ancient ethical life, cannot accommodate both of
these conceptions of the good and, therefore, Antigone is destroyed. Nevertheless, the
tragedy and pain of this moment propels Spirit into a higher stage of understanding and
liberation. After experiencing several more troubling and even disastrous shapes of
consciousness, Spirit adopts the stance of the Beautiful Soul. In this moment, selfconsciousness, wearied by the continual failed attempts of Spirit to articulate itself
retreats into itself and refuses to act.213 Spirit relishes communing with beautiful ideas.
The Beautiful Soul makes judgments on other people’s actions but refuses to act herself.
Eventually, other people realize their fallibility and ask for forgiveness of the
Beautiful Soul. At first the Beautiful Soul refuses; however, as other people ask the
Beautiful Soul for forgiveness, the Beautiful Soul realizes that they achieve a moral
purity equivalent to herself and eventually her hard heart melts. The Beautiful Soul
forgives and asks for forgiveness as well.214 She is reconciled with the other in her world.
In the Phenomenology, it is this moment of forgiveness and reconciliation that paves the
way for ethical substance to become a reality.
The moment of forgiveness and reconciliation is essential because it shows that
Hegel believes that we only become at home in the world when we are reconciled with
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one another and recognize ourselves in the other. This reconciliation seems inherent in
the political disposition which Hegel describes in Philosophy of Right which, once again,
is
in general one of trust or the consciousness that my substantial and
particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest an end of an
other (in this case, the state), and in the latter's relations to me as an
individual. As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me,
and in my consciousness of this, I am free.
In Philosophy of Right, Hegel gives us a further clue to this political disposition when he
characterizes it as love. Hegel writes
The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person
in my own right and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete.
The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain
recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is
therefore the most immense contradiction; the understanding cannot
resolve it, because there is nothing more intractable than this
punctiliousness of the self-consciousness which is negated and which I
ought nevertheless to possess as affirmative. Love is both the production
and the resolution of this contradiction. As its resolution, it is ethical
unity.”215
In love, I find myself incomplete in my independent state and both gain and give
recognition in relationship with another. I find myself in another and am therefore both
present with myself and present in the world as well. This loving relationship with others
that marks the political disposition then is what allows me to be at home in my world. If
our goal is the political disposition that is an ethical unity marked by love and
recognition, and if the process of achieving this unity is a dialectical process marked by
necessary errors and transgressions, this suggests that educators must cultivate in their
students the practice of reconciliation, a practice that allows the political disposition to be
maintained despite the inevitable error and transgression that occurs through the
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dialectical development of our understanding. Reconciliation is the practice which
allows the maintaining of this disposition.
The practice of reconciliation is not just a nice and generous gesture for Hegel; it
is a necessary practice that allows us to be free. We can only achieve freedom in our
recognitive relationships with other people. Therefore, to remain forever estranged from
each other because of the tragedies and transgressions we experience together is to refuse
to recognize the will and freedom of whole groups of people in society and to remain
estranged from ourselves. Reconciliation is the only possibility we have of cultivating
our political disposition and preventing ourselves from perpetuating further forms of
alienation.
It is important to note that the moment of reconciliation in the Phenomenology
cannot be a moment in which we merely excuse and dismiss wrongdoing. Hegel believes,
as we will soon see, that we must militate against all forms of alienation in society. Hegel
also certainly believes that people can do evil and that one of the purposes of education is
to help them adopt good rather than evil practices. To do evil, for Hegel, is to promote
one’s particular, arbitrary will as the universal216, a practice which inevitably leads people
to destroy others’ freedom and lives. That Hegel believes we should militate against all
forms of alienation and evil suggests to us that his concept of reconciliation cannot entail
the dismissal of injustice.
Rather Hegel’s emphasis on reconciliation suggests that sometimes tragedy
occurs because there is always an inevitably a gap between our abstract understanding of
a matter and its concrete realization in the world. Hegel suggests this when he writes
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The autonomously acting will, in the ends which it pursues in relation to
the existence...it has before it, has an idea of the circumstances which that
existence involves. But since, on account of this presupposition, the will
is finite, the objective phenomenon is contingent for it, and may contain
something other than what was present in the will’s idea of it.
In Hegel’s description of the acting will, we can imagine examples of government
policies that on paper sounded efficient and beneficial but when applied in real life,
become inefficient and harmful to the people involved. Hegel writes about the way
intentions can go awry when articulated in the world:
But the action, as the end translated into the external world, is at the same
time exposed to external forces which attach to it things quite different
from what it is for itself, and impel it onto remote and alien
consequences.217
We readily acknowledge the way in which our own particular actions often pick up
“remote and alien consequences” as we articulate them in the world. We often pardon
ourselves for the pain these remote and alien consequences cause others. We less readily
excuse the remote and alien consequences that attach to others’ intentions, especially
when they cause us pain. Hegel’s practice of reconciliation is a practice of freedom
because it offers us a way to forgive by understanding the moments of tragedy that stem
from the dialectical way our understanding develops. Reconciliation also acknowledges
the finite stance from which we attempt to articulate our will in the world.
The practice of reconciliation allows freedom to continue flourishing. It reminds
us that we must figure out how to live together because we can only be free together. The
practice of reconciliation, then, is an awareness of the finitude of human understanding. It
is an awareness of the tragedy and pain that sometimes inevitably ensues from such
finitude. It is a determination to figure how to make space in universality for particular
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freedom, even if this requires tragedy and forgiveness. I think Hannah Arendt illuminates
Hegel’s notion of forgiveness beautifully in The Human Condition when she writes (and I
think is valuable to quote at length)
The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being
unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have
known what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for
unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in
the faculty to make and keep promises. The two faculties belong together
in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past,
whose “sins” hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation; and
the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean
of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, island so security without
which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be
possible in the relationships between men.218
In this quote, I think Arendt beautifully illuminates the idea captured in Hegel’s notion of
reconciliation. Through reconciliation, we are able to recognize that tragedy is often a
necessary aspect of our finite condition. Through reconciliation we find a way to
recognize our humanity in each other and take responsibility. It allows us to work anew
for the preservation of our political disposition.
Having examined Hegel’s notion of the dialectic as well as the practices of
recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation, the question now is how education
can reflect these practices. I will now attempt to answer this question. In doing so, I will
first discuss a problem that Hegel believes education must guard against. Then I will
suggest concrete ways Hegel’s education can be developed in the classroom. To do this, I
will draw on the work of educator and philosopher John Dewey.
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§8—Problems of Alienation
Given our discussion of Hegel’s notion of will and freedom, one of the first things
we must realize is that educational practices which alienate and dominate the will must be
militated against in any educational system that aspires for Hegelian educational ideals.
Hegel certainly implies that militating against alienation is an important part of
education. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes the process by which the essence
of humans—their rationality and reason—become alienated. It is important to note that
for Hegel, alienation is the process by which either the external or the internal moment of
right is blocked or seized from us in some way. We will see in a moment that the
blocking of the external and internal moment of right can happen in a wide variety of
different ways. What is essential to understand about alienation, however, is that when
alienation occurs in any form, it prevents people from being able to fully articulate their
freedom in the world. When people cannot do this, they cannot be fully at home in the
world with themselves or with others. Hegel suggests, rather than implies directly, that
alienation like this can lead to further problems with each other and society such as
domination and violence. Hegel writes about alienation
The alienation of intelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and
religion is encountered in superstition, when power and authority are
granted to others to determine and prescribe what actions I should
perform…or how I should interpret the dictates of conscience, religious
truth, etc.219
While Hegel does not specifically mention educators in this quote, the implication is clear
that educators who attempt to dictate all of students’ actions and beliefs alienate their
students’ will. They fail to recognize their students’ essence which is to be free and
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responsible. Therefore, it seems that a pedagogy in line with Hegel’s educational
philosophy would suggest that while a teacher must act as a strong external force in a
child’s early years, the teacher must increasingly become less of an external controller
and more of a facilitator who helps students take responsibility for their freedom in
relationships with other students in the classroom, in the school community, and in
society at large.
Hegel’s philosophy suggests that a teacher who constantly exercises pervasive
external control, dictating every aspect of students’ beliefs and opinions alienates the
students’ freedom. Hegel’s educational philosophy also suggests that alienation occurs
when students are forced constantly to be passive in the classroom, since will can only be
properly exercised through making choices. Alienation also occurs when education is
conducted in such a way that it does not allow students opportunities to externalize their
freedom into property (such as tangible projects on which they are working) or to reflect
on this externalization and discuss it with others. Recognition, responsibility and right
entail both internal and external expression, so both of these types of expression must
also be present in education.
Hegel’s educational theory suggests that educators must always be on guard
against perpetrating practices of alienation against their students, but his theory also
suggests that educators must educate students to recognize patterns of alienation in their
relationships with others and in the larger society as a whole. Hegel says that “Examples
of the alienation of personality included slavery, serfdom, disqualification from owning
property, restrictions on freedom of ownership, etc.”220 Since alienation can still occur in
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society, it is likely that Hegel would consider it important to help students identify
alienation in the larger society. This would entail very likely that studies of history would
focus on themes of human freedom, will and alienation. These studies would help
students critique the way in which the Idea has been alienated or cultivated in the past
and the way it is still alienated in society today. In this way, students understand how
alienation can be overcome in society as a whole.
One of the best ways that educators militate against alienation in the classroom is
by honoring the dialectical nature of students’ educational development. Therefore, I will
now examine the types of educational practices that honor the dialectic.
§9—Education and the Dialectic
One of the foremost educational implications of the dialectical nature of human
understanding is that it suggests that educators must rethink how they present knowledge
to the student. One traditional view of the classroom is it is a place in which teachers
impart knowledge to their students through concepts which the students then reproduces
on tests or in papers. Hegel would not completely eschew this type of educational
practice. After all, in order for people to come to know, they must have some kind of
starting point, even if that starting point is abstract and ultimately insufficient, as we have
already seen in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Spirit must move through a series of
abstract and inadequate shapes of consciousness. The failure of each shape propels it
towards a more increasingly concrete and adequate shape of knowing.
While Hegel believes that education does entail moments of abstraction, he would
criticize education that remains forever locked in the moment of abstraction. Hegel
suggests that education must enable students to move beyond the moment of passive
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abstract understanding to an active, concrete understanding of their world. In his essay
“Who Thinks Abstractly”, Hegel gives an example of such concrete understanding. He
gives the example of a murderer who is led to the gallows. The uneducated person, Hegel
says, only thinks of the criminal abstractly—purely as a murderer. The educated person,
however, is
One who knows men and traces the development of the criminal's mind:
he finds in his history, in his education, a bad family relationship between
his father and mother, some tremendous harshness after this human being
had done some minor wrong, so he became embittered against the social
order — a first reaction to this that in effect expelled him and henceforth
did not make it possible for him to preserve himself except through
crime.221
If the uneducated think in an abstract manner, then an education that wishes to cultivate
the student, even if it starts with abstraction must move beyond this and allow students to
work out these abstract concepts into concretion. This implies among other things that
students must have a thorough understanding of at least some concepts so that they can
have a thorough knowledge of the concrete connection of their knowledge. It also implies
that for at least some of the things learned in school, students must be able to experience
how these concepts play out in the actual world.
While learning abstract concepts from a book or from lectures can be extremely
helpful, especially initially, an awareness of the concrete connections of things in the
world cannot come about except by actually working on this knowledge in the world. For
example, it is one thing to learn about mathematics abstractly through a textbook. It is
quite another thing to use mathematical knowledge to try to do work such as growing a
garden or developing a budget for a class project. It is one thing to learn about the
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mechanisms and procedures of the government. It is quite another thing to hold a mock
congress in the class, have the students take on the roles of senators and congressmen,
and have them deliberate on laws that could actually affect the class or school. The latter
scenario in both of these cases allows students to gain a concrete understanding of
abstract concepts by understanding their connections in concrete existence.
It is important to note at this point that an education that takes the concrete
seriously must make room for trial and error and periods of inefficiency. We have already
seen that the dialectic, which is the necessary movement of our understanding, is a
process by which consciousness moves form an abstract to a concrete understanding, and
it is a process that takes many trials and failures. It also often entails that people make
serious errors in their attempt to grasp ahold of truth. Thus, knowing is a messy process
that involves trial, error, and sometimes serious error. This entails that education must
allow for mistakes, error and reconciliation.
Having discussion general Hegelian educational ideas pertaining to alienation and
the dialectic, I would now like to explore some particular pedagogical insights implied by
Hegel’s emphasis on recognition, responsibility, right, and reconciliation. To do this, I
would like to draw on John Dewey’s educational insights.
§10—John Dewey: An Example of Hegelian Educational Philosophy in Action
Hegel’s philosophy is often considered one of the most difficult and opaque
philosophical systems of the western tradition. Because of this, it is tempting to wonder if
his ideas could be implemented in any consistent and meaningful way in the classroom.
Interestingly, Hegel had a strong influence on John Dewey, one of the most famous and
influential educators in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. John
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Dewey was born (1859) about twenty years after Hegel’s death (1831). Hegel’s ideas
were very influential in the United States for many years during Dewey’s life, and Dewey
was especially influenced by a group of group of philosophers called the St. Louis
Hegelians who were committed to working out Hegel’s philosophical insights,
specifically as they pertained to society and education.222 The St. Louis Hegelians
organized and published the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, a journal in which John
Dewey published several articles.223
Dewey was a student of Hegel’s work and mentions Hegel frequently throughout
his various educational works such as Democracy and Education. In his work on ethics,
Dewey explicitly acknowledged that Hegel had an indelible influence on his thinking.224
While Dewey is sometimes critical of Hegel’s thought, Hegel’s influence on Dewey is
clear in Dewey’s works, especially in Democracy in Education and Experience in
Education, two works which I will explore briefly here. I will first explore why Dewey is
critical of Hegel, as well as Dewey’s basic philosophy of education. I actually take
Dewey’s educational ideas to be an expression of Hegel’s educational philosophy,
whether Dewey realized they were or not. I will then discuss the way Dewey practically
applies his educational philosophy and note the similarities with Hegel’s philosophy.
In Democracy in Education, Dewey is critical of Hegel because Dewey argues
that Hegel’s educational philosophy is too focused on the unfolding of Absolute Spirit, a
philosophy which minimizes the individual at the expense of the absolute and
community. Dewey further argues that Hegel’s educational philosophy leads to a
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situation in which the individual is swallowed up in the state, the state reflecting the true
expression of freedom and absolute expression. This leads to a static and fixed state
affairs in which the state’s mandates are the truest expression of freedom, and the
individual’s job is to conform to the state. Education’s job, then, is to facilitate the
realization of absolute spirit. But once again, Dewey believes that this conception of
education undermines the importance of the individual.
As opposing this idea of education, Dewey advocates the notion of philosophy as
a process of social formation. Dewey writes in Democracy and Education that human life
is a constant process of renewal.225 “It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in
being. Since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals, life is a selfrenewing process.”226 Individuals are in a constant state of renewal, and because humans
are inevitably surrounded with other people in society, Dewey argues, social groups are
also in a state of constant renewal together. Dewey writes “A being connected with other
beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into
account.”227 Dewey writes further, “We have seen that a community or social group
sustains itself through continuous self-renewal, and that this renewal takes place by
means of the educational growth of the immature members of the group.”228
Dewey argues that living together in society is generally a beneficial thing for
humans because “It enlarges and enlightens experience; it stimulates and enriches
imagination; it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and
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thought.”229 However, community can only be beneficial for folks if the people in it are
engaged in a constant process of renewal, and if they are united under a purpose. Dewey
writes that if people “were cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that
they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community.”230
This renewal and shared purpose comes through communication. Dewey writes, “Society
not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said
to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the
words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of
the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they
come to possess things in common.”231 Dewey continues, “The communication which
insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional
and intellectual dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and
requirements.”232 He writes further of communication that “Communication is a process
of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession. It modifies the disposition of
both the parties who partake in it.233
What we have noted here thus far then is that Dewey believes that to live, human
beings must continually renew themselves as they interact with life, and since humans
live with others, communities must continually renew themselves to stay free and vibrant.
But it is only in communicating about what they share in common that communities
become true communities. This communication is a process of education. Dewey writes,

229

Ibid, pg. 6
Dewey, Democracy in Education, pg. 5
231
Ibid, pg. 4
232
Ibid
233
Ibid, pg. 9
230

113

“By various agencies, unintentional and designed, a society transforms uninitiated and
seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals.”234 Dewey
describes this process of formation when he writes
The particular medium in which an individual exists leads him to see and
feel one thing rather than another; it leads him to have certain plans in
order that he may act successfully with others; it strengthens some beliefs
and weakens other as a condition of wining the approval of others. Thus it
gradually produces in him a certain system of behavior, a certain
disposition of action.235
School strives to “reenforce [sic] the power of the best” and “weeding out what is
undesirable” in a society.236 Therefore, for Dewey, education is a process by which
people grow and are prepared for greater growth, and it is also a process of a social
formation, whereby people are empowered to continually grow in their community.
While Dewey takes his notion of social formation to be different from Hegel’s
notion of unfolding, I think Dewey is missing how close his notion of education actually
is to Hegel’s. As we have seen already, Hegel’s is concerned with the actualization of
both individual freedom and the actualization of freedom the Idea. The two are tied
together for Hegel because as people actualize their freedom, they create the network of
relationships and ideas that become the state. And it is the state that provides the structure
for individual freedom to be realized fully. Therefore, there is really no conflict between
individual freedom and the idea of freedom, and both are realized together. Furthermore,
if we consider Dewey’s notion of education as growth and social formation, we will see
that it harmonizes very well with the elements of Hegel’s educational philosophy that I
have been emphasizing in this chapter—recognition, right, responsibility and
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reconciliation. Dewey’s emphasis on our necessary communal nature and his emphasis
on education as social formation entails that students recognize each other as
autonomous, continually growing human beings; that students take an activity role in
reflection and externalization of these commitments; and that students take responsibility
for them in their own process of growth.
Lastly, while Dewey does not mention the word reconciliation in his works that I
am exploring here, the notion of reconciliation is implicit in his works. As we have seen,
Dewey thinks that (i) The defining characteristic of human life is constant growth and
renewal; (ii) For human beings that this constant growth and renewal happens necessarily
with others and happens best in a community; and (iii) That communities form when
people share common purposes. These three point’s from Dewey’s pedagogy suggest that
humans grow best when they continually work to forge a common purpose with other
people and to order their individual and social growth together. Forging a common
purpose entails that people are able to move past differences to reconcile with one
another. Therefore, I think that while Dewey believes that a different aim underlies his
and Dewey’s philosophy, they are actually quite similar in their aim. This similarity
becomes even more apparent when we examine the practical implication of Dewey’s
educational philosophy.
It is important to note how Dewey’s entire philosophy is centered around helping
students to take active responsibility by cultivating internal understanding and external
expression, goals that are completely in line with Hegel’s educational goals. In
Experience and Education, Dewey criticizes the “non-social character of the traditional
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school”237 He says that traditional school “erected silence into one of its prime virtues”238
and that it was an artificial education that emphasized “seeming before being”239 Dewey
emphasizes the importance of thoughtful education that cultivates an intelligence that is
free and adopting worthwhile purposes. He writes, “The only freedom that is of enduring
importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of
judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile.”240 Here we
see Dewey’s reflection of Hegel’s notion that the goal of education is to allow students to
take responsibility in the world and exercise their freedom in it in order to cultivate a
world that is meaningful and a suitable home.
We also see reflections of Hegel’s universal will and the political disposition in
Dewey’s notion of the way in which school must cultivate a society so that people are
united together for the common good. Dewey writes
If we took instances of co-operative activities in which all members of a
group take part, as for example in well-ordered family life in which there
is mutual confidence, the point would be even clearer. In all such cases it
is not the will or desire of any one person which establishes order but the
moving spirit of the whole group. The control is social, but individuals are
parts of a community, not outside it.241
For Dewey, just as for Hegel, in a just society there is no conflict between the individual
and the state because the spirit of the society, while instills a type of control, is a spirit of
the entire group. Dewey emphasizes this point when he writes
The authority in question when exercised in a well-regulated household or
other community group is not a manifestation of merely personal will; the
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parent or teacher exercises it as the representative and agent of the
interests of the groups as a whole.242
The purpose of education for Dewey is to help students cultivate the kind of rationality
and dispositions that allow them to construct a society organized by the interests of the
group as a whole.
We see Dewey’s purpose expressed in his notion of how teachers should act.
Teachers in a well-ordered school do not engage in acts of power merely for the sake of
exercising power. Dewey writes, “When it is necessary…to speak and act firmly, it is
done in behalf of the interest of the group, not as an exhibition of personal power.”243 He
contrasts the kind of exercise of power in the old and new model of school. With the old
model of schooling he writes, “The school was not a group or a community held together
by participation in common activities” so the teacher just had to enforce arbitrary
control.244 In news schools, on the other hand, “the primary source of social control
resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals
have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility.”245 Therefore, this
school is a genuine community, and “A genuine community life has its ground in this
natural sociability.”246
That school should be a genuine community influences the kinds of activities
done in the school. Dewey writes
Community life does not organize itself in an enduring way purely
spontaneously. It requires knowledge of subject-matter that will enable
activities to be selected which lend themselves to social organization, an
organization in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute
242
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something, and in which the activities in which all participate are the chief
carrier of control.247
Dewey suggests here that a school that is truly a community takes careful planning that
allows particular students to express themselves together in a universal manner with
others in a community. This kind of community, it seems, facilitates and maintains the
responsibility and recognition of its individual participants.
Dewey argues that the pedagogical activities in this school must also pay close
attention to the particular needs of the student, rather than imposing a completely external
and arbitrarily homogenous curriculum on students. This way students are able to
cultivate their individual will and reason. Dewey emphasizes that teachers must tailor
their lesson plans to the individual “capacities and needs”248 of her particular class. These
capacities and needs are to provide the subject-matter of the classroom, and he writes that
The planning must be flexible enough to permit free play for individuality
of experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous
development of power.249
These particular and universal activities must also allow for both external action
and reflection, as these are the practices that allow students to take responsibility
for their actions. Dewey writes.
There should be brief intervals of time for quiet reflection provided for
even the young. But they are periods of genuine reflection only when they
follow after times of more overt action and are used to organize what has
been gained in periods of activity in which the hands and other parts of the
body beside the brain are used.250

247

Ibid
Dewey, Experience and Education, pg. 58
249
Ibid
250
Ibid, pg. 63
248

118

It is in this combination of both action and reflection that students become aware of their
own freedom externally in the world but cultivate an internal awareness of it as well. This
reflects Hegel’s notion that freedom must have both external and internal expression.
Dewey seems to further emphasize the importance of cultivating both an internal and
external awareness of freedom when he writes that a merely abstract understanding of
freedom
turns freedom which should be positive into something negative. For
freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized only as a means
to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to
evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon
them power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into
operation.251
We hear echoed almost perfectly in this quote Hegel’s notion that the purpose of
education is to raise students from immediacy so that they can weigh and consider their
different drives and impulses and organize them responsibly into a system that allows for
the fulfillment of societal happiness.
While the purpose of this dissertation is not to trace out in detail Dewey’s full
connection to Hegel, it is important to note that Dewey was self-consciously influenced
by Hegel and that his educational philosophy at least in part fleshed out the worthwhile
ideas he found in Hegel’s philosophy. His educational philosophy emphasizes building a
school that was a community of individuals specifically attuned both to the particularity
of the school environment and the students in it but also the pursuit of a universal goal:
the working out of a free and flourishing society together. An environment like this
becomes not only liberating to students but to teachers as well. Educators and
philosophers alike who are concerned with cultivating liberating educational practices
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such as those suggested by Hegel can take inspiration from Dewey as well as educators
like Marcuse and Freire whom I will discuss in later chapters.
§11—Conclusion
Hegel’s notion of dialectical education marked by practices of recognition,
responsibility, right and reconciliation develop the potential in Kant’s educational
philosophy. Hegel’s notion of the political disposition reflects the same goal present in
Kant’s ethical commonwealth, and Hegel’s educational philosophy suggest to us the way
this ethical commonwealth develops. Hegel’s educational philosophy also suggests
practices that facilitate the end-goal of the ethical commonwealth, which for Hegel is the
political disposition. John Dewey’s educational philosophy suggests how Hegel’s
educational philosophy can be implemented in a classroom setting.
In closing, one obvious matter that must be acknowledged in examining Hegel’s
philosophy of education is that it seems that the goal Hegel wrote so enthusiastically
about has not yet been accomplished. Here we are, hundreds of years after Hegel first
wrote his ideas, and we still do not seem to have a fully just society in which the majority
of people in society display a consistently political disposition. People are certainly not
yet fully at home with themselves in their relationships with one another and in the state.
The seeming failure of right to realize itself fully in the world causes us to wonder if
Hegel’s political, and therefore his educational, philosophy is flawed in some major way.
In the next two chapters, I will examine Herbert Marcuse and Paulo Freire’s political and
educational philosophy and the way in which their philosophy extends Hegel’s
philosophy.
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These philosophers are significant for the project of education and justice for two
specific reasons. First, both Marcuse and Freire consciously take up Hegel’s project and
extend his ideas in their views of education and society. Therefore, they can be viewed as
modern practitioners of the Hegelian political and educational project. Secondly, both
Marcuse and Freire write within the tradition of critical theory and, therefore, are very
concerned about the way in which modern society has failed to achieve a fully free and
flourishing society. In the following chapters, both Marcuse and Freire suggest that the
fact that we have not yet achieved a fully free and flourishing world is due to specific
practices that alienate the freedom and will of people. These philosophers argue that these
alienating practices are present both in society as a whole and schools.
For both of these philosophers, education is a powerful tool that disrupts the
practices of alienation and allows the working out of freedom to continue. If it is the case
that modern society is marked by significant practices of alienation, then our failure to
achieve freedom does not signal a failure of Hegel’s philosophy. Rather, it shows the
strength of his concepts of freedom, will and recognition. I suggest in the following
chapters that it is through studying the way Marcuse and Freire extend Hegel’s project
that we will gain a clearer picture of how Hegel’s political and educational goals can be
accomplished.
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Chapter Four—Marcuse and Education: Cultivating a New Sensibility
§1—After Hegel: Now What? Justice and Education in Contemporary Society
Hegel’s political philosophy seems to have a decidedly optimistic view of the
actualization of human freedom in the state. As we have seen, in the Philosophy of Right,
Hegel details the way in which human rationality and freedom become increasingly more
complete and concrete in the world and the way it is fully realized in the State. The
question is how we are to interpret Hegel’s philosophy given that human reason and
freedom has yet to actualize itself fully in the world. After all, despite the almost
ubiquitous nature of the State in contemporary society, and despite the ways in which it is
an efficient and productive State, it seems that the problem of unfreedom is still with us.
In fact, it can be argued that rather than people recognizing themselves in their
relationships with one another and cultivating a political disposition marked by patriotism
and love for their fellow citizens, people increasingly figure out new and ingenious ways
to destroy, dominate and oppress each other. Most shockingly of all, it seems that when
we examine many modern instances in which people were systematically oppressed and
even destroyed by each other or the State252, large portions of that society or the state
justified the oppression rationally, at least at the time it was perpetrated, as necessary for
freedom and flourishing. Given that modern society has failed to become fully free, and
given that we have instances of such profound oppression in modern society, we might
wonder if Hegel was entirely wrong in his belief that society is the site of human freedom
and flourishing and that the Idea of freedom is realizing itself in the world. In fact, the
failure of freedom to realize itself in the world, coupled with the frequent rationalization
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of oppression in the state, once again raises Rousseau’s worries that society is inevitably
a site of dehumanization. Furthermore, we wonder whether education in such a society
inevitably corrupts its students.
Marcuse is an ideal philosopher to examine after Hegel in regards to matters of
justice and education, specifically in regards to some of the lingering concerns we have
about Hegel’s philosophy. Marcuse was a dedicated and thorough student of Hegel’s
writings, exploring Hegel’s philosophy thoroughly in his books Hegel’s Ontology and
Theory of Historicity and Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. In
addition, as a member of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse is concerned that society be a
place hospitable to human flourishing, and his main concern is to analyze the type of
societal influences that impede the ability of humanity fully to express their freedom in
society. What is especially important about Marcuse’s philosophy in relation to Hegel is
that Marcuse describes specific external forces that prevent freedom from becoming fully
actualized in the world.
Marcuse’s philosophy develops Hegel’s notions of alienation in modern society
and suggests the forces that arrest the progress of freedom in our world. Marcuse is also
very interested in education and, like the other philosophers covered in previous chapters,
argues that education has a very specific and important role to play in promoting a free
society. He argues that the goal of education is to cultivate a New Sensibility which
allows the development dialectical thinking and an aesthetic disposition towards the
world, both of which disrupt diseased forces in society and prevent the progress of
freedom. The purpose of education then is to cultivate the sensibilities that allow for
freedom to flourish in society. The New Sensibility, as we shall see, is an aesthetic
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sensibility which draws on the liberating capacities of imagination, art and beauty to
create an erotic society in which people no longer relate to each other and their world in a
violent and purely instrumentalizing manner. Rather, the New Sensibility enables people
to enjoy each other and their world receptively, as ends in themselves. It is important to
note that Marcuse suggests that this New, erotic Sensibility is a new kind of ethic, the
practice of which allows freedom to fully flourish in society. In this way, Marcuse’s
erotic society resembles Kant’s kingdom of ends. For Marcuse, the goal of education is to
enable students to think dialectically and to cultivate the New Sensibility which will
enable people to build the erotic society together. Marcuse then is an important synthesis
and complement to both Kant and Hegel’s pedagogical ideas. He both suggests the way
in which the dialectical development of freedom is blocked and also suggests the way
both the sensuous and transcendent elements of our existence can become tools of
liberation.
§2—Marcuse’s Notion of Education
In order to understand Marcuse’s notion of education and the New Sensibility, it
is helpful to examine two educational addresses he made It is also important to
understand the problems that Marcuse believes are present in society and how education
can be a solution to these problems. Marcuse is clear in his essay “Lecture on Higher
Education and Politics” that education cannot be a neutral enterprise but must strive for
the liberation of people in society so that a new society and a qualitatively different kind
of person can be molded and shaped through this educational process. Marcuse believes
that education must actively strive to liberate students because he believes that the current
society is not a place hospitable to human flourishing. Modern society, Marcuse argues,
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is sick and diseased and, therefore, that human instincts are being deformed by this
diseased society. The danger of such a society is that any education that occurs in it253
actually ends up inculcating and perpetuating this sickness. In his Essay on Liberation,
Herbert Marcuse raises such a worry when he writes
The danger is that the educational establishment will be absorbed by the
larger Establishment, and a whole generation will be educated in the
knowledge and goals of a sick society, permeated with aggression,
violence, hypocrisy and indifference.”254
In “Lectures on Higher Education and Politics”, Marcuse notes that one the one hand it is
true that “we cannot change the goals of education without changing the society which
sets the goals.”255 On the other hand, he argues that “we cannot wait for the revolution to
become human beings”256 Therefore, Marcuse calls for a change to come from within the
system. This change will create an entirely new person that can resist the sickness present
in the society. This New Sensibility is not just a sensibility of resistance, however. It is a
sensibility which cultivates an erotic257 and aesthetic relationship to the world that allows
human beings to understanding how society must be arranged in order for freedom to
become fully present in it. In order to understand this New Sensibility better we must first
examine exactly why Marcuse views society as being sick and deforming to people’s
instincts. In the next section, I will examine the problems of one-dimensional thinking
and surplus repression. After I examine these problems, I will then return to Marcuse’s
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educational philosophy in order to explore how he thinks education can and must address
these issues.
§3--Positivistic Thinking and One-Dimensionality
We will better be able to understand Marcuse’s diagnosis of our societal sickness
if we recall Hegel’s account of alienation in Philosophy of Right. In the last chapter, we
explored Hegel’s notion that freedom must have both an external moment of expression
and an internal moment of realization. Therefore, if either of these moments are blocked,
humans become alienated from their freedom, and it cannot be fully actualized. As we
noted in the last chapter, a person’s external freedom is blocked through scenarios such
as “the alienation of personality included slavery, serfdom, disqualification from owning
property, restrictions on freedom of ownership, etc.”258 Hegel also noted instances of
when someone’s internal moment of freedom is blocked. Hegel writes that
alienation of intelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is
encountered in superstition, when power and authority are granted to
others to determine and prescribe what actions I should perform…or how I
should interpret the dictates of conscience, religious truth, etc.259
I take it that it is this second type of alienation—alienation of one’s “intelligent
rationality”—that Marcuse’s project is most concerned with.260 One of the most
significant problems of modern society, Marcuse argues, is the problem of onedimensional thinking. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse suggests that one dimensional
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thought is thinking in which inner freedom and the “private space in which man may
become and remain ‘himself’” is lost.261 As this inner space disappears, a person’s
thinking is increasingly marked by “immediate, automatic identification” with society
and all of its structures, institutions and practices.262 The immediacy which onedimensional thinking cultivates is a deformed type of thinking because “in the process,
the ‘inner’ dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is
whittled down.”263 In other words, when people lose the ability to oppose the status quo,
they lose their ability to imagine a free or better society. In this way, they lose their
rationality. This is a type of thinking that enforces the notion that the only possible
society is the current society, no matter how unfree or dehumanizing it is. Marcuse writes
that this type of thinking “turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the
dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life.”264 With
its complete submission to facts, one-dimensional thinking blocks any development of
freedom in the world. Marcuse’s account of one-dimensional thinking, then, suggests to
us one possible reasons why Hegel’s account of the Idea of freedom being actualized in
the world has not yet come to fruition.
If we want to understand clearly how one-dimensional thinking developed in our
society, a good place to start is Marcuse’s account of positivism. Marcuse’s account of
positivism, which occurs in his book Reason and Revolution, is especially helpful to
examine after our discussion about Hegel’s views of justice and education. Positivism
arose in response to Hegel’s philosophy, and its goal was to correct perceived
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deficiencies in Hegel’s philosophy. As we will see, Marcuse believes that the way in
which positivism contradicted Hegel’s project led to modern problems of alienation and
dehumanization.265
Marcuse notes the reaction to Hegel that developed after the French Revolution
and describes the way in which positivists such as Auguste Comte reacted against the
critical and negative philosophy of Hegel.266 They viewed Hegel’s system as purely
negative because the system led Hegel ‘to a critique of everything that was hitherto held
to be the objective truth.267 Positivists suggested that Hegel tried “for the potentialities of
things, but [was] incapable of knowing their reality.”268 Therefore, positivism argues that
negative philosophy “denies to the given the dignity of the real’.”269 As positive
philosophy developed as response to negative philosophy, Marcuse notes that its goal
was “to overcome negative philosophy in its entirely, that is, to abolish any subordinating
of reality to transcendental reason, and its goal further was to teach men to view and
study the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid
laws.”270 In order to study the world as neutral objects, the goal of positive philosophy is
to study “the social realities after the pattern of nature and under the aspect of objective
necessity.”271 By studying nature with an objective stance, this restored “to facts the
dignity of the positive.”272 Thus, with rise of positive philosophy, we saw a demotion of
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critical (and negating) reason and a decline in the tendency to measure reality against the
standards of reason.
As reason was dethroned, neutral observation and the acceptance of the given
took its place. With the rise of positivism, Marcuse notes that we see the rising tendency
to make philosophical observation of society adopt the procedures of the sciences. For
example, Hegel notes that the purpose of Comte’s positive sociology was “to concern
itself with the investigation of facts instead of transcendental illusions, with useful
knowledge instead of leisured contemplation, certainty instead of doubt and indecision,
organization instead of negation and destruction.” 273 Marcuse argues that because
positivist theory like Comte’s advocates the neutral observation of society according to
fixed, scientific laws, it “bears the seeds of a philosophic justification of
authoritarianism.”274 This authoritarianism blocks the inner moment of freedom, or the
ability to recognize that we can defy the system or status quo. Therefore, it is a type of
alienation such as the kind Hegel discusses in Philosophy of Right.
Marcuse believes that this justification of authoritarianism was a result of
“defamation of reason in positive philosophy.”275 This is because positive philosophy is
not concerned with human reason but more concerned with “predominantly receptive
functions.”276 In emphasizing receptive functions, Comte and other positivists directly or
indirectly advocate a resignation to the status quo. Quoting Comte, Marcuse notes that
“True resignation, that is, a disposition to endure necessary evils steadfastly and without
any hope of compensation therefore, can result only from a profound feeling for the
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invariable laws that govern the variety of natural phenomena.”277 With Comte’s
positivism, there is no longer any room for critiquing the evils enduring in society as an
example of the irrational and unreasonable organization of society. There is only room
for accepting society as it is, directed as it is by immutable laws.
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse argues that the particularly insidious nature of
the positivistic mindset which leads to one-dimensional thinking is that people learn to
accept cheerfully and “freely” their society as the best and the only possible society, even
if it is a very unfree society. Marcuse notes that modern society delivers the goods well
and has allows the progress of people to a certain extent extremely efficiently. However,
the effective management of the modern society becomes the end of society and its
citizens, enamored as they are with the goods the society delivers and managed so
thoroughly that there is no longer an inner space for resistance, forget that life could be
qualitatively different and better. Worse yet, people in society are so thoroughly managed
that they can no longer imagine a qualitatively different way of life. In fact, it does not
even occur to them that there could be a legitimate qualitatively different way of life.
Marcuse explains how this society functions efficiently and comfortably to such a degree
that people are lulled into a tranquil acceptance of unfreedom which alienates their
individuality:
A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in
advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress. Indeed,
what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality in the
mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances; the
concentration of individual enterprises in more effective, more productive
corporations; the regulation of free competition among unequally
equipped economic subjects; the curtailment of prerogatives and national
sovereignties which impede the international organization of resources.
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That this technological order also involves a political and intellectual
coordination may be a regrettable and yet promising development.278
Marcuse notes that this system is so efficient in delivering satisfaction and comforts to
individuals that “non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially useless.”279
In fact, non-conformity or resistance to the status quo can actually appear dangerous or
hostile if “it entails tangible economic and political disadvantages and threatens the
smooth operation of the whole.”280 Ironically, in such a system, when people strive for
their own full actualization and fulfillment, they seemingly become a threat to freedom
and prosperity because the smooth-running system, which appears to deliver freedom and
prosperity, only functions well through the total suppression and alienation of the
individual.
However, as Marcuse notes, as efficient and productive as this society seems to
be, it is far from free. It is a society that in “satisfying [people’s needs], perpetuates [their
servitude].281 It is a society that demands a “debilitating competition for social survival
and advancement.”282 In this society, Marcuse argues, a person must continually “prove
himself on the market”283 in order to survive. It is a society in which “commodity
production and productive exploitation—join and permeate all dimensions of private and
public existence.”284 This society creates false needs in people, “needs which perpetuate
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toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice.”285 Marcuse notes that these false needs286 are
needs that when met, bring great delight and satisfaction to the individual but in so doing
“arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the
whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease.”287 These needs would be, among
other things, needs that cause people to consume resources at an increasingly alarming
rate without concern about the sustainability of such consumption. They would also be
needs that encourage us to instrumentalize one another so that we are only able to relate
to one another in terms of ranking ourselves or using each other for our own ends.
One of the most insidious things about false288 needs, Marcuse suggests, is that
they are almost entirely heteronomous. They are not the actual needs of people but rather
needs created by society. Marcuse writes of these false, heteronomous needs
Such needs have a societal content and function which are determined by
external powers over which the individual has no control; the development
and satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much
such needs may have become the individual’s own, reproduced and
fortified by the conditions of his existence; no matter how much he
identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they
continue to be what they were from the beginning—products of society
whose dominant interest demands repression.
This repression Marcuse speaks of is a repression of the real and actual needs of free
human beings—needs of the life impulse, or the erotic impulse, and of autonomy which
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enables people to pursue their flourishing in society with others. Marcuse refers to this
type of society which represses the actual needs of its citizens in order to perpetuate false
needs as an “obscene”289 society. He writes
This society is obscene in producing and indecently exposing a stifling
abundance of wares while depriving its victims abroad of the necessities
of life, obscene in stuffing itself and its garbage cans while poisoning and
burning the scarce foodstuffs in the fields of its aggression.290
Marcuse notes that in this society only “The systematic increase in waste, destruction,
and management keeps the system going.”291 It is a society that promotes aggression,
brutality and ugliness, as people and environments are exploited to feed the increasingly
insatiable demands of the machine (the machine in this case being the efficient and
smooth running state). Marcuse notes that if people were to be freed from having to
prove themselves on the marketplace and, therefore, freed from having to try to survive in
an aggressive and brutal society, then this would “release individual energy into a yet
uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity.”292 With energy released in this way, he
argues
the very structure of human existence would be altered; the individual
would be liberated from the work world’s imposing upon him alien needs
and possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a
life that would be his own.293
This liberation of human beings would allow for human freedom to develop fully
in the world and to presence itself in the development of a fully free society: in
other words, the goal of Hegel’s project, as we discussed in the last chapter,
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would be realized. We will see shortly that Marcuse believes education plays a
pivotal role in this liberation. Before we explore the way education aids in this
liberation, we must better understand the way in which true and autonomous
needs of human beings are repressed in a one-dimensional society.
§4--Repression and the Obscene Society: The Repression of Eros
The inability to critique the status quo and to imagine a qualitatively different way
of life which occurs in one-dimensional thinking is always problematic in itself because it
distorts thinking and alienates us from our human essence, which is the ability to think
freely. It becomes an especially acute problem, however, when the society is a sick,
diseased society. This is the very problem, indeed, that afflicts us, Marcuse argues. We
have already seen the way in which a society which encourages the pursuit and
satisfaction of false needs fosters brutalization and aggressiveness. However, Marcuse
believes that modern society is marked by another significant pathology: surplus
repression. In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse, explains how repression which was
originally necessary for the formation of society and the survival of the species294 became
excessive and the interest of dominating powers while destructive to the average
members of society. Marcuse argues that in the early stages of society, repression of our
basic instincts—I will specifically focus on eros, or our pleasure and life instinct, here—
is necessary for our survival and for our ability to overcome scarcity. Because eros is
primarily a pleasure instinct, when it is left unstructured, it does not allow us to build a
society that allows for full human flourishing. Therefore, we must repress our basic
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instincts like eros so that we bring ourselves to do the necessary alienating work that
initially allows us to build society.
Marcuse argues that as our erotic instinct became repressed and subordinated in
service of civilization, it underwent a deformation whereby it become primarily genitalia
focused and in the service of reproduction.295 That is, as our whole person became
subordinated to productivity, every part of our person, including our erotic instinct,
became subordinated to productivity—in this case, reproduction. In this deformation, our
bodies are transformed into instruments of labor, rather than of pleasure.296 Marcuse
paints a clear picture of what life is like in this repression of eros:
Life is experienced as a struggle with one’s self and the environment; it is
suffered and won by conquests. Its substance is unpleasure, not pleasure. Happiness
is a reward, relaxation, coincidence, a moment—in any case, not the goal of
existence.297
In a condition of repression, labor, rather than happiness, becomes our goal, and our labor
is essentially alienated labor.298 As civilization progresses, however, the initial necessary
deformation of eros becomes unnecessary and irrational. While eros originally had to be
placed under stricture for us to make civilization and ensure our survival, Marcuse argues
that we have now achieved such a production of wealth and have achieved such advances
in science and technology that we no longer need to fear scarcity. We have produced
enough for everyone to have their basic survival needs met, and we can now invest our
energy in creating a qualitatively different way of life—a life in which we no longer need
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to repress eros so severely;299 we no longer need to engage in constant alienating labor,
and we can regain a free enjoyment of our lives. Marcuse notes, however, that we are not
creating a new and liberating society. Rather, our culture is increasingly marked by
surplus repression.300
As I have suggested already, in societies of surplus repression, work is measured
solely in quantitative terms—productivity and efficiency—rather in terms of how the
work qualitatively benefits humans and makes them more free.301 But as the value of our
work has become increasingly measured in terms of productivity, we have lost the ability
to ask the question “Productivity for the sake of what?” In other words, we have lost the
ability to question why, in the midst of so much abundance and technological
capabilities, we must keep increasing our productivity, especially when it requires so
much repression and alienation. We have lost the ability to recognize an inherent irony in
our lives--that the very repression which allowed us to achieve the goods that we have
also prohibits us from fully enjoying them or even enjoying them at all.302
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If education in this society, then, is to be truly liberating, it is clear, according to
Marcuse that one of the primary goals of education should be to liberate students from
one-dimensional thinking and surplus repression. It will also have to create a New
Sensibility and new person with markedly different instincts and drives. We will now
examine what this kind of person might look like, according to Marcuse and what an
education that creates this kind of person looks like.
§5—Dialectical Thinking: Freeing Thought, Freeing Society
If society is to become free again then it is clear, given Marcuse’s account of
diseased society, that one-dimensional thought must be disrupted, and people must be
able to develop a healthy kind of thought that enables them to imagine a qualitatively
different type of society. In his essay “A Note on the Dialectic”, Marcuse describes what
this healthy kind of thinking looks like. It is dialectic and negative thinking. The
‘negative’ in this context refers to the ability of human beings to negate the status quo
and to envision all of the potentialities of human beings and their society that are not yet
fully realized in a given society. Marcuse characterizes this type of thinking as negative
because it contradicts the given organization of society and is in fact excluded by the
‘positive’, i.e. that which has been achieved so far. Negative thinking, in this sense,
would be the opposite of positivism because rather than merely observing and accepting
the status quo, it would focus on the possibilities presently excluded by the status quo and
critiquing the given state of affairs. Negative thinking is essential for progress, Marcuse
argues, because progress requires “recognition of the negative as a force and as a
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reality.”303 In other words, progress requires that we recognize that other possible ways of
living (the negative) can actually come about.
Marcuse also notes that dialectical thought is thought that corresponds to reality
because it recognizes contradiction.304 Reality, which is a constant state of becoming
(entailing moments of being and nothingness) is marked by constant contradiction.305
Therefore, dialectical or negative thinking is the truest type of thinking. To illuminate
further this contradictory nature of reality, Marcuse argues that the given reality that we
posit—the world of common sense and science—denies this contradiction in order to
pose concepts and systems for attempting to organize and penetrate this society:
“Common sense and science purge themselves from this contradiction.”306 Philosophical
thought, on the other hand, does just the opposite, according to Marcuse. It recognizes
and traces these contradictions as they develop. Marcuse writes
Philosophical thought begins with the recognition that the facts do not
correspond to the concepts imposed by common sense and scientific
reason—in short, with the refusal to accept them. To the extent that these
concepts disregard the fatal contradictions of which make up reality, they
abstract from the very process of reality.307
Because posited reality focuses on what is posited and denies its opposite, Marcuse notes
that “negative thinking is always examining this world…in order to notice ‘terms of its
internal inadequacy’.”308 The dialectic recognizes that “all facts are stages of a single
process—a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined
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only within the subject-object totality.”309 Because the dialectic recognizes that all facts
are “stages of a single process”, the dialectic recognizes that any given facts are in
themselves insufficient in terms of how they represent total reality and that they
necessarily exclude some aspects of it. Therefore, the given facts only ever represent
things as they are at that present moment, rather than representing things as they always
must be or as they are in totality.
Therefore, given that dialectical thought recognizes that given facts are but a
moment in the process of the joining of subject and object, dialectical thought contradicts
any type of mindset that merely accepts the given as the given and as the totality of
reality because this type of thinking denies the process-oriented nature of thinking.
Thinking that only recognizes the given state of affairs is, Marcuse argues, is unfree
because it is an incomplete and frozen way of thinking. Therefore, Marcuse argues,
dialectical thought starts with the assumption that “the world is unfree; that is, to say,
man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as ‘other than they are’.”310 For
Marcuse, thought can only become free when it “transforms reality by comprehending its
contradictory structure.”311 Therefore, dialectical thought demands that the given state of
affairs change because thought becomes “negative in itself,”312 pointing out the
contradiction and inadequacies of the given state of affairs. The purpose of the dialectic,
Marcuse notes, is to undermine our over-confidence in our facile ability to comprehend
reality. Its purpose
is to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common
sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of
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facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core things that the
development of their internal contradiction leads necessarily to qualitative
change: the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs.313
Marcuse notes that the dialectic is especially concerned with what is excluded from the
current status quo.”314 In this way, dialectical and negative function as the Great Refusal,
which is the refusal to “accept the rules of a game in which the dice are loaded” 315 and
thinking in which “The absent must be made present316 because the greater part of the
truth is in that which is absent.” 317
Negative thinking is a healthy and free type of thinking, and it is only through the
ability to engage in this type of thinking that individuals are enable to envision a different
kind of society together. Therefore, it is clear that Marcuse would argue that any
education which hopes to liberate its students must encourage dialectical thinking, an
educational idea to which we will return later. Not only, however, is dialectical thinking
required for this change; Marcuse also argues that a New Sensibility rooted in a new
biology is requisite as well. It seems from Marcuse’s writing that dialectical thinking and
this new sensibility are intertwined. That is, it seems that dialectical thinking creates the
space for the New Sensibility to develop, and as it develops, it fosters greater dialectical
thinking. We will now examine what this new sensibility looks like.
§6—Cultivating the New Sensibility—The New Person
For Marcuse, cultivating a new type of sensibility is essential because, as we have
seen, people in the current repressive conditions of contemporary society, motivated by
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their current repressed and distorted drives and needs, not only harm one another but they
also harm themselves. Marcuse writes
What is now at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the question
is no longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs without hurting
others, but rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself
without reproducing through his aspirations and satisfaction, his
dependence on an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs,
perpetuate his servitude?318
In order for people to stop hurting themselves or others, the new type of person has to be
liberated from repressive and distorted instincts and needs. It is important to explore what
this new person with a new biology would look like for Marcuse.
The new type of person would be freed, Marcuse argues, but it would be a
wholly new type of freedom—one that breaks with the previous status quo. Marcuse
writes of this new type of freedom that it would
become the environment of an organism which is no longer capable of
adapting to the competitive performances required for well-being under
domination, no longer capable of tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality,
and ugliness of the established way of life.319
Marcuse believes that in order for this new person to be educated, their rebellion “would
then have taken root in the very nature, the ‘biology’ of the individual”320, and once this
rebellion and revolution in biology had taken place, it would then become the driving
force in the creation of a new society.321
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If people’s biology is to change, this will entail, Marcuse argues, that they will no
longer tolerate “aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness” of an excessively repressive
society, a society that aggressively distorts and brutalizes the human psyche in order to
make it fit for alienated and excessively productive labor.322 Therefore, the needs of the
new man and the New Sensibility would be very different. Marcuse notes that these
people would be “men who would speak a different language, have different gestures,
follow different impulses; men who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty,
brutality, ugliness.”323 He states further that these new people would be “men and women
who have the good conscience of being human, tender, sensuous, who are no longer
ashamed to be themselves.” 324 They would be people with a “new sensibility” that
“expresses life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt…”325 and “who are physiologically
and psychologically able to experience things, and each other, outside the context of
violence and exploitation.”326
In this society people are able, in Kant’s terms, to appreciate and treat each other
as ends in themselves and not merely as means to their own ends.327 They would be
bringing about Kant’s kingdom of ends or Hegel’s political disposition—a disposition in
which people recognize themselves and their freedom in one another. Marcuse notes that
once this shift at the biological level appears, there would also occur a radical, societallytransformative revolution, a revolution
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which would be driven by the vital need to be free from the administered
comforts and the destructive revolution which, by virtue of this
‘biological” foundation, would have the change of turning quantitative
technical progress into qualitatively different ways of life—precisely
because it would be a revolution occurring at a high level of material and
intellectual development, one which would enable man to conquer scarcity
and poverty.328
The New Sensibility necessarily transforms society because it is a “negation of the entire
Establishment, its morality, culture.” 329 The new sensibility finally lets go of false needs
by negating the society that perpetuates them, and in negating this culture, it is expresses
an “affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil
terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful
become forms of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.”330 Marcuse is right
to characterize the New Sensibility in this way. If the status quo is focused on
performance, productivity, aggressiveness, and competition, then the New Sensibility
must negate this status quo. That is why it must reintroduce and be marked by “the
sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful”, elements which are almost entirely
missing from the current status quo, including its educational institutions.
This New Sensibility, Marcuse argues, will transform every facet of society. For
example, science and technology would change radically and would “have to be
reconstructed in accord with a New Sensibility—the demands of the life instincts.”331
Technology would focus on “global elimination of poverty and toil.”332 Furthermore a
change in focus in technology could lead to a significant “transformation of the working
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day.” 333 This would be a change, Marcuse argues, in which “the stupefying, enervating,
pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist progress would be abolished.”334 And because
workers would be free from stupefying and enervating labor, their new sensibility and
liberated consciousness “would foster on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of
injustice and misery and would shape the further evolution of the ‘standard of living’.”335
Furthermore, the new liberated consciousness “would promote the development
of a science and technology free to realize the protection and gratification of life.” 336
With this new aim of life, there would be no dichotomy between technique and art or
imagination and reason. Marcuse writes, “the opposition between imagination and
reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated.”337
Art, imagination and reason would all become vehicles through which individuals would
pursue an increasingly free society, one in which human beings are valued for their own
sake. They would become the foundation for the New Sensibility rather than being
subjugated to the reality principle and in the service of constant, quantitatively measured
production. Marcuse believes that education must have a clear role in cultivating the New
Sensibility. The question is how it is that education can play this emancipatory role.
Cultivating the New Sensibility is no easy matter given that, as we have seen, it requires a
marked break from a repressive society and yet all of the educators and students involved
in the endeavor of education are a part of the very culture from which they are trying to
make a break.
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§7—Marcusean Education: A Dialectical Education
In his two essays on education, Marcuse does not write a great deal about the
specific pedagogical techniques he believes that teachers should use to create the New
Sensibility, but throughout his works, three important ideas emerge that suggest the types
of educational endeavors that would need to occur in order for the New Sensibility to be
cultivated in students and in society at large. These educational endeavors would be
marked by imagination, beauty and art.338
Before discussing the way that imagination, beauty and art play an important role
in Marcuse’s educational theory, it is important to note that any education that claims to
draw inspiration from Marcuse must be a dialectical education. As we have already seen
in this chapter, Marcuse believes that a society cannot become free unless it is able to
engage in dialectical or negative thinking which allows people to imagine or to think
about elements of existence that are not currently represented in the status quo, a thinking
that enables them to contradict the current state of affairs. If it is true that society cannot
be free without this kind of thinking, this certainly entails that education must cultivate
dialectical thinking in its students.
Therefore, as we examine how Marcuse believes that imagination, beauty and art
play an important role in education, we should keep in mind that Marcuse likely believes
these educational aids are important because there is some way in which they foster
dialectical thinking. However, it seems important to note that there are pedagogical
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activities that either encourage or discourage dialectical. For instance, it is important to
note that an education that wishes to cultivate dialectical thinking must certainly permit
extended times for analysis, reflection and discussion. The only way that students can
learn to imagine realities that contradict the status quo is if they are given opportunities to
reflect on and analyze the status quo and discuss different possibilities.
This entails, among other things, that any education which preempts reflection or
discussion or which attempts to present the status quo as the only possibility, curtails
dialectical thinking and likely contributes to one-dimensional thinking. For example, an
education that is so rushed and packed full of activities that it does not allow students to
cultivate any inner space of reflection would be an example of the type of education that
hinders dialectical thinking. We will return to the importance of cultivating dialectical
thinking in the next chapter on Paulo Freire, especially in Freire’s critique of something
he calls the banking model of education. At this point, however, it is important to
examine the pedagogical role that imagination, art and beauty plays in education.
Marcuse argues that there is an “Inner connection between pleasure, sensuousness,
beauty, truth, art, and freedom.” All of these aspects of life are connected through an
“aesthetic” sensibility.339 Therefore, Marcuse implies in his writings that any education
that wishes to liberate its students will tend carefully to the cultivation of imagination, art
and beauty.
§8—Imagination and the Dialectical Education
In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse discusses the importance of imagination for
cultivating the New Sensibility. He especially focuses on the importance of phantasy and
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imagination for cultivating a mindset amenable to a new order. Marcuse writes that in a
repressive society, especially one marked by a positivist mentality, imagination is
repressed, and there is a strong emphasis in passive receptivity that is only “free to
become practical, i.e., to transform reality only within the general framework of
repression.” 340 Imagination in a repressive society is not free and spontaneous. It
operates, much like one-dimensional thought, within already carefully established social
parameters.
On the other hand, Marcuse notes that in this repressive society, imagination
that breaks from the status quo and portrays a radically different reality is a “violation of
taboos of social morality, [is] perversion and subversion”.341 Marcuse notes that
imagination must be unleashed to disrupt the previously repressive society before a new
society can be created. This is where phantasy becomes important. Marcuse notes that
phantasy calls forth “the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual
memory, the tabooed images of freedom.”342 Rather than being overwhelmed by the
reality principle, phantasy “continues to speak the language of the pleasure principle, of
freedom from repression, of uninhibited desire and gratification...”343 and 344 phantasy is
the form of the Great Refusal: “it refuses to accept as final the limitations imposed upon

340

Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 25
Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 25
342
Marcuse, Eros & Civilization, pg. 140-141
343
Ibid, pg. 142
344
In his “Lecture on Higher Education and Politics, Berkeley, 1975”, Marcuse reminds us that “Classconsciousness is mediated by individual consciousness” (41). The mediation of individual consciousness
allows people to take up their individual existence in a manner than is different from one another or the
manner in which society dictates is the aspect of human existence that allows imagination to occur.
Drawing on Schiller’s Aesthetic Education of Man, Marcuse notes that it is in our play drive—the drive that
mediates our sensuous and transcendent conditions and that expresses itself in beauty and is the path to
autonomous freedom.
341

147

freedom and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forget what can be…”345
Therefore the imagination exercised through phantasy
“envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization,
of happiness with reason.”346 In other words, imagination is in itself dialectical in that it
calls to attention what is taboo and exiled from a certain society and seeks to understand
how these missing elements can be integrated into a harmonious whole.
The erotic element in phantasy goes beyond the perverted expressions we might
normally associate with liberated eros. Marcuse reminds us that it is only in the
repressive society that eros has a primary association with genitalia. Therefore, liberated
eros in this kind of society does indeed lead to all sorts of perversion and even sexual
barbarisms. However, eros in the liberated society aims at an ‘erotic reality’ where the
life instincts would come to rest in fulfillment without repression.”347 In this type of
society, the erotic instinct is no longer merely associated with genitalia but is spread over
the entire body and psyche so that the entire person becomes a site for pleasure. In other
words, every aspect of a person—all parts of her body and all of her senses and her
intellect are able to experience intense pleasure and wholeness. Marcuse notes that “The
biological drive becomes a cultural drive,”348 and so eros in the non-repressive society in
this way aims towards building greater unities and lending itself more towards
developing the receptivity and flourishing of all human capacities. Recalling the
discussion of eros in Plato’s Symposium, Marcuse notes that “Spiritual ‘procreation’ is
just as much the work of eros as is corporeal procreation, and the right and true order of
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the polis is just as much erotic as is the right and true order of love.”349 Therefore in a
non-repressive society, “sexuality is neither deflected from nor blocked in its objective;
rather, in attaining its objective, it transcends it to others, searching for fuller
gratification.”350
In this society all aspects of humans are fully actualized and experiencing all of
the pleasure of which they are capable, and they achieve this in a unified, holistic manner.
Marcuse, referring back to Freud, describes this type of feeling as an “oceanic feeling”,
or “a limitless extension and oneness with the universe.”351 This suggests that in our
imagination, we are able to imagine a reality that would cultivate a fully actualized
society. Marcuse notes that the “The images of phantasy could refer to the unconquered
future of mankind rather than to its (badly) conquered past”352 and thus can pave the way
for the imagination. Imagination can then lead us to the eventual creation of a new reality
in which humanity is fully flourishing, happy, harmonious with others and at home in its
world—the very goal that Kant and Hegel believed should drive society and education.353
It seems clear that if phantasy and imagination are to be a regular part of
educational experience, then students of all ages must have access to activities in which
they become autonomously creative and acting agents, rather than having every moment
of their educational experience managed, programmed and dictated. This would certainly
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mean that school would include activities like recess and art with a lot of time given for
students’ free creation.354 These types of experiences seem to foster directly the kinds of
imagination and phantasy that Marcuse believes can be revolutionary. However, it also
seems that any subject can become a medium for imagination and phantasy when it
allows students to manipulate or explore the subject in ways in which their free
imagination dictates. In this way, every class—whether it be mathematics, physics,
computer science or American government—can become a space in which educators
cultivate students’ imagination and their ability to build realities different from the status
quo. Marcuse notes that the goal is not to abolish the various disciplines within
elementary and secondary school and the academy; rather, the goal is to infuse these
subjects with a dialectical and imaginative spirit. Marcuse writes
We need history because we need to know how it came about that
civilization is what it is today: where it went wrong. And we need history
not only of the victors, but also of the victims. We need a sociology which
can show us where the real power is that shapes the social structure. We
need economics which are not “sublimated” to mathematics. We need
science in order to reduce toil, pain, disease, and to restore nature.355
Although every subject matter can become a vehicle for phantasy and imagination,
Marcuse implies that the arts and humanities indeed have a special and perhaps primary
place in the cultivation of the New Sensibility. This is because, as Marcuse writes, “The
truths of imagination are first realized when phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a
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universe of perception and comprehension…this occurs in art.”356 Thus, art is one of the
primary expressions for imagination, and it is also one of the primary places in which
imagination is kindled. Therefore, we will now take some time to explore the importance
of the arts and humanities in a dialectical education.
§9—Art and the Dialectical Education
Marcuse’s notions of phantasy and imagination naturally lead into his ideas of art
which he takes to have an inherently revolutionary potential. While Marcuse doesn’t
specifically state it, he indirectly implies that art, in its various expressions, must be a part
of any type of education that intends to create a New Sensibility. Art is able to cultivate
this New Sensibility because of its inherently revolutionary capacity which is directly tied
to the way in which art invokes imagination. Marcuse defines revolutionary art as art that
“represents, in the exemplary fate of individuals, the prevailing unfreedom and the
rebelling forces, thus breaking through the mystified (and petrified) social reality, and
opening the horizon of change (liberation).”357 We have seen that a one-dimensional
society presents the current state affairs as the only possible state of affairs. The power of
art, Marcuse argues, lies in its ability to disrupt the idea this reality is the only reality. Its
power, like the power of phantasy and play, lies in “the effort to break the power of facts
over the word, and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish,
enforce, and benefit from the facts. 358 Therefore, when art is a central focus of education,
art cultivates the ability in students to see past the given facts of the current state of
reality and to imagine different realities.
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This ability of art to see past the given facts is especially crucial for students in a
one-dimensional society, as in these societies, Marcuse writes “the power of the given
facts tends to become totalitarian, to absorb all opposition and to define the entire
universe of discourse.”359 Art has radical potential, Marcuse argues, because “art
transcends its social determination and emancipates itself from the given universe of
discourse and behavior while preserving its over-whelming presence.”360 In emancipating
itself from the given universe of discourse, art creates a space in which dialectical and
negative thinking can emerge because the world of art is “is given a reality which is
suppressed and distorted in the given reality.”361 This new reality opened up by the work
of art is an extreme picture of the given situation “which explodes the given reality in the
name of a truth normally denied or unheard.”362
In exploding the given reality, Marcuse notes that art makes a space for “the
emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defies the rationality and
sensibility incorporated in the dominate social institutions.”363 Marcuse notes that this
emergence of a different kind of reason “shatters the reified objectivity of established
social relations.” 364 In doing this people and society can experience a “rebirth of the
rebellious subjectivity.”365 In other words, when art is a large part of education, education
liberates students’ subjectivity, a liberation which enables them to create a society
governed by a new and free sensibility.
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It seems clear, then, given the revolutionary capacity of art, an education which
desires to help students and societies become free must build a strong humanities
curriculum. Therefore, not only should students be encouraged and given time to do art
(such as drawing and painting and other hand crafts) in school; they should also be given
plenty of time to appreciate art through other mediums such as literature, music, drama,
manual art (such as woodworking, cooking, gardening) and dance. Marcuse certainly
argues that any school that drastically curtails the arts is very likely engaged, whether
purposefully or not, in constricting the space for free thought and imagination and, as a
result, perpetuating one-dimensional thinking and an oppressive society.
It turns out that art helps to create this very New Sensibility Marcuse says must
come about. Marcuse writes that “Art liberates sensibility from performance and
instrumentality” 366 and that art specifically helps to cultivate this new sensibility because
the beauty of art “has the power to check aggression.”367 Aggression in this case is the
aggression that tries to repress any type of negative or erotic thinking. Because of these
aspects of beauty and art, Marcuse writes that “The beautiful has the ‘biological value’ of
that which is ‘useful, beneficial, enhancing life’.”368 Beauty, because it is an end in itself,
cultivates the ability in student to appreciate non-instrumental thinking, a kind of thinking
that is essential for a free society. It turns out for Marcuse that the New Sensibility he
wishes to cultivate in students is actually an aesthetic sensibility that is nourished and
developed by an immersion in and sensitivity to beauty.

366

Ibid, pg. 9
Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 24
368
Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 24
367

153

§10—Aesthetics (Beauty) and Receptive Reason in the Dialectical Education
While Marcuse focuses primarily on the revolutionary power art, he also mentions
the importance of beauty in general. One of the most important things about a cultivated
aesthetic sensibility for Marcuse is that it is a sensibility capable of receptivity, and it is
averse to domination. Marcuse notes that a one-dimensional society is a society that seeks
to dominate both the people in it and also nature as well, for it is only in this domination
that the one-dimensional society can function smoothly and efficiently and continue to
increase its delivery of new and exciting comforts. Marcuse writes that “Productivity thus
designates the degree of the mastery and transformation of nature: the progressive
replacement of an uncontrolled natural environment by a controlled technological
environment.”369 And “In a repressive society, “man is evaluated according to his ability
to make, augment, and improve socially useful things.”370
In a society that values productivity above everything, both nature and people
must be dominated so that they can become manageable and serviceable to the overall
machine of society. Non-managed nature and people become a threat to the smooth
running of society. The aesthetic sensibility, then, cultivates an attitude in us that works
against our societally-fostered tendencies to dominate and exploit both nature and each
other, and in doing so this sensibility creates a space in which we can enjoy both nature
and each other in a receptive, peaceful and non-instrumental manner. The aesthetic
sensibility allows us to appreciate both nature and other people as ends in themselves.371
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Marcuse refers back to something we have already explored in the Kant chapter—
namely that Kant believes that beauty can be a symbol for morality and that our sensuous
conditions, if they are attended to properly, can ameliorate our ability to be moral.
Marcuse refers to this idea of Kant’s philosophy when he writes, “We found that, in
Kant’s philosophy, the aesthetic dimension occupies the central position between
sensuousness and morality—the two poles of the human existence. If this is the case, then
the aesthetic dimension must contain principles valid for both realms.”372 In other words,
our aesthetic sensibilities need to inform how we structure and govern our material
conditions because they are the mediating sensibility between the sensual and
transcendent aspects of our existence.
When the aesthetic sensibility is cultivated, Marcuse argues, people no
longer must dominate nature and one another in order to gain enjoyment through
forced productivity and efficiency. Rather, people are able to engage in receptive
enjoyment of others and the world. Marcuse writes, “Nature, the objective world,
would then be experienced primarily neither as dominating man (as in primitive
society) nor as being dominated by man (as in the established civilization), but
rather as an object of ‘contemplation’.”373 We would cultivate an entirely different
attitude towards nature and begin to view it “not as an object of domination and
exploitation, but as a ‘garden’ which can grow while making human beings
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grow.”374 In addition, we would be able to cultivate relationships with each other
in which we experience each other purely as free human beings pursuing a free
and aesthetic society together, rather than experiencing each other in relationships
aimed at domination, competition, or forced productivity. These are relationships
that are “no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive
exploitation or unfree societies.”375 Marcuse notes that in a non-repressive
society, the way we relate to each other in work and society qualitatively changes:
“The emergence of a non-repressive reality principle would alter rather than
destroy the social organization of labor: the liberation of Eros could create new
and durable work relations.”376
In a repressive society, “man is evaluated according to his ability to make,
augment, and improve socially useful things,”377 but in a non-repressive order,
“lasting erotic relations among mature individuals”378 that build society and build
institutions that allow for human flourishing can occur. This aesthetic sensibility
in addition cultivates “a sensitivity free from the repressive satisfactions of the
unfree societies; a sensitivity receptive to forms and modes of reality which thus
far have been projected only by the aesthetic imagination.”379
Since the aesthetic sensibility frees us from heteronomous needs and dominating
dispositions and allows us to experience the world in each other in open and receptive
ways, Marcuse notes that an awareness of the aesthetic dimension can help us measure

374

Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pg. 216
Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 24
376
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, pg. 155
377
Ibid, pg. 155
378
Ibid, pg. 199
379
Marcuse, Essay on Liberation, pg. 24
375

156

how free our society actually is.380 When a society becomes infused with the aesthetic
sensibility, there will be external changes in this society as well. Marcuse writes
For the aesthetic needs have their own social content: they are the claims
of the human organism, mind and body, for a dimension of fulfillment
which can be created only in the struggle against the institutions which, by
their very functioning, deny and violate these claims.381
If these aesthetic needs were to become the predominant needs of people, it would
radically change society. Marcuse writes, “they would critically weaken the economic,
political, and cultural pressure and power groups which have a vested interest in
preserving the environment and ecology of profitable merchandizing.”382 Furthermore,
the awakening of the aesthetic dimension of people, namely through education, would
invoke “the sensuous power of the imagination.” 383
When students and people in general become infused with an aesthetic sensibility
and the sensuous power of imagination, Marcuse notes that at some point, repressive
reality becomes “utterly regressive.”384 When this happens, people demand change in
their external lives: “The political action which insists on a new morality and a new
sensibility as preconditions and results of social change”385 erupts. When this new
morality and new sensibility begin to emerge, a society governed by new relationships
and a new-found harmony between previously dichotomous elements emerges. In this
new society,
[there] now appears the prospect for a new relationship between sensibility
and reason, namely, the harmony between sensibility and radical
consciousness…rational faculties and capable of projecting and defining
380
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the objective (material) conditions of freedom, its rationality of
domination, the sensibility would be guided by the imagination, mediating
between the rational faculties and the sensuous needs.”386
This new morality and New Sensibility is the morality and sensibility that allow for the
full development and liberation of “faculties of freedom.” 387 Marcuse calls the world this
new morality and New Sensibility creates the “aesthetic universe” and points out that it is
essential for the liberation of the faculties of freedom. There are specific and necessary
elements that must be present for freedom to develop, and certain societal factors most
certain destroy the ability for freedom to develop. Marcuse notes that the faculties of
freedom
cannot develop in an environment shaped by and for aggressive impulses,
nor can they be envisaged as the mere effect of a new set of social
institutions. They can emerge only in the collective practice of creating an
environment: level by level, step by step---in the material and intellectual
production, an environment in which the non-aggressive, erotic, receptive
faculties of man, in harmony with the consciousness of freedom, strive for
the pacification of man and nature, in the reconstruction of society for the
attainment of this goal, reality altogether would assume a Form expressive
of the new goal. 388
We notice in this quote that Marcuse emphasizes that the aesthetic sensibility demands
change at each level of society—relationships, the external world and the environment.
Therefore, a society that has had this new sensibility cultivated in them requires certain
and specific changes in its concrete articulation in the external world. For instance the
society requires thing like
the harmless drive for better zoning regulations and a modicum of
protection from noise and dirt to the pressure for closing of whole city
areas to automobiles, prohibition of transistor radios in all public places,
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decommercialization of nature, total urban reconstruction, control of the
birth rate.389
Marcuse suggest that the requirements of a society governed by the aesthetic principle
end up being rational and necessary requirements for the full aesthetic flourishing of
humanity. Marcuse emphasizes the necessary and rational development of the New
Sensibility again when he writes in Eros and Civilization that a society that is governed
by the aesthetic sensibility
generates its own projects of realization: the abolition of toil, the
amelioration of the environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the
creation of luxury. All these activities flow directly from the pleasure
principle, and, at the same time, they constitute work which associates
individuals to “greater unities.390
This should remind us of Hegel’s State in which the State that develops is actually the
totality of necessary relationships for freedom to presence itself in the world.
Marcuse’s ideas of the aesthetic sensibility illustrates that a cultivation of the
aesthetic sensibility inevitably results in the demand for external change in our
relationships both with the world and with each other. The New Sensibility demands that
our relationships with each other become free, receptive, non-aggressive and marked by
play and leisure rather than excessive performance, competition and productivity. If this
is true, then as schools cultivate an aesthetic sensibility, this should certainly result in
changes in relationships between faculty and students, and between students themselves.
It should also result in changes in the school environment. For example, schools infused
with an aesthetic sensibility would decrease or stop activities that focus primarily on
competition, ranking and domination. This would certainly affect the way we handle
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common school activities like grading, class rankings, athletic events and other events
whose purpose is almost solely competition. It would also most certainly affect the way
in which teachers discipline their classes and structure their class lessons. Furthermore, a
school infused with an aesthetic sensibility would certainly pay attention to the beauty of
the school, both inside the school itself and in the way its grounds are ornamented and
maintained. It also seems reasonable that students who have had an aesthetic sensibility
cultivated in them would both desire and be expected to participate in beautifying their
school internally and externally.
§11—Marcuse, Kant and Hegel
Having examined Marcuse’s view of education and the role it plays in society, we
are now in an ideal position to examine the way that Marcuse extends and complements
both Kant and Hegel’s philosophy in significant ways. We saw in an earlier chapter that
Kant was specifically concerned that education develop a student with a robust,
autonomous will who joins the ethical commonwealth in order to strive for the continued
advancement of humanity. Kant was especially concerned that teachers avoid using
heteronomous incentives like fear and comparisons to discipline students, and he was
especially concerned that students’ sensuous conditions support and ameliorate their
moral training. Hegel extends Kant’s educational view by explaining how the ethical
commonwealth develops through dialectical moments of abstract property, morality and
the State rooted in recognitive relationships. Hegel also suggest that this working out of
the Idea of freedom is a necessary unfolding of human subjectivity in the world
throughout history, and can be realized in the world. However, he also suggests that this

160

process continues unless it is blocked by forms of alienation. Education is the process
that allows the Idea of freedom to unfold in individuals and, therefore, society as a whole.
Marcuse’s educational ideas build on both Kant and Hegel’s notions of education.
Marcuse extends Hegel’s idea of the dialectic and shows how the dialectical move
towards freedom becomes blocked in modern society through one-dimensional thinking
and surplus repression, which are modern forms of alienation. Marcuse suggests how
these modern forms of alienation can infect both society and the educational system in
such a way that education becomes an apprenticeship into disease rather than liberation.
Furthermore, Marcuse draws on Kant’s ideas of autonomy and the way in which beauty
and our sensuous conditions enhance our capacity to be free to suggest the way in which
a new sensibility which is an aesthetic sensibility can cultivate imagination, art and
beauty in schools to liberate students to create a new society.
In this new society, all human capacities are free to develop fully, and humans are
able to enjoy both the world in each other as ends in themselves. This is Marcuse’s erotic
society, and it is the Kingdom of Ends that Kant envisions—a free, non-instrumental
society in which people work for the realization of the highest good. In the next chapter, I
examine Paulo Freire’s pedagogy and the way in he further illuminates the way that onedimensional thinking infects the classroom, which he explores this through his notion of
banking education. I also examine the techniques that Freire advocates to encourage
dialectical thinking in the classroom (Freire calls this dialogical education), and the way
in which educators can help this dialectical thinking extend into the world beyond the
classroom. In their commitment to dialectical education and social transformation, Freire
and Marcuse make excellent pedagogical companions, and Freire provides a capstone to
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the problem of education introduced by Rousseau and developed by Kant, Hegel and
Marcuse.

Copyright ©Shelly J. Johnson, 2016

162

Chapter Five—Freire
§1—An Introduction to Paulo Freire
Paulo Freire is the last major educator I will discuss in this project. Freire situates
himself firmly in the German Idealist and critical theory traditions. Because of this, Freire
is very concerned with the political and educational issues discussed by each of the
philosophers I have covered thus far. I will argue in this chapter that Freire makes a
valuable contribution to this discussion that both ties together the concerns of the
previous philosophers and also makes an important contribution: Freire argues that
classrooms must become dialogical spaces of conscientization which cultivate specific
liberatory virtues such as love, humanizing rebellion and hope. I believe that Freire’s
notion of classrooms as dialogical spaces of conscientization develops important aspects
of Marcuse’s educational philosophy by detailing a broad heuristic that allows us to
discover the forces which block freedom.
I also believe that Freire’s notion of liberatory virtues is a unique contribution that
he makes, and I believe it is also a contribution that needs to be developed in more depth.
In in my final chapter, I will suggest how I believe this might be done. In order to
illuminate Freire’s contributions to this project, it is important to get an overall grounding
of Freire’s philosophy as a whole. To do this, I will first give a little background
information on Freire’s life. Next I will explain Freire’s concept of humanization and
dehumanization in general. Then I will examine how Freire describes a humanizing and
dehumanizing classroom. It is in this part of the chapter that I will explain Freire’s notion
of the classroom as a dialogical space of conscientization. I will also discuss Freire’s
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notion of liberatory virtues and why I believe this idea is a significant contribution to the
discussion of education and justice.
§2—Freire’s Biography
Paulo Freire was a Brazilian educator and philosopher who had first-hand
experience with dehumanizing politics, an experience which solidified his commitment to
justice and education. Freire was born in 1921 in Recife Brazil, which during the Great
Depression became “The center of one of the most extreme situations of poverty and
underdevelopment in the Third World…”391 Freire grew up in a middle class family in
Recife Brazil, and his family was hit especially hard by the Great Depression—so much
so that for a period of time, Freire was constantly hungry, and his school work began to
suffer because of his hunger. Freire often found himself unable to compete his work or
even concentrate in class, not because he lacked intelligence, but because he was
chronically and acutely hungry. In the introduction to Freire’s most famous work,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Richard Shaull writes “As the economic crisis in 1929 in the
United States began to affect Brazil, the precarious stability of Freire’s middle-class
family gave way and he found himself sharing the plight of the ‘wretched of the earth.”392
Although circumstances later improved for his family, Freire’s experience of
suffering and hunger never left him. Shaull writes about the experience that “This had a
profound influence on his life as he came to know the gnawing pangs of hunger and feel
behind in school because of the listlessness it produced; it also led him to make a vow; at
age eleven, to dedicate his life to the struggle against hunger, so that other children would
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not have to know the agony he was then experiencing.”393 Paulo Freire went on to earn
his doctoral degree in education, and his focus in his research was specifically on
educational philosophy.394 In his research, he was heavily influenced by philosophers like
Hegel and Marx and critical theorists such as Marcuse and Erich Fromm.395 He also
began programs working to educate illiterate people in Recife, especially the Brazilian
farm workers.396
As Freire worked with the poor, he came to recognize what he termed a “culture
of silence.” That is, “He came to realize that the ignorance and lethargy of the famers was
the direct product of the whole situation of economic, social, and political domination—
and of paternalism—of which they were victims.”397 Because of his writings and
teachings, Freire eventually came under suspicion by Brazilian authorities, and he was
“jailed after a military coup in 1964.”398 He was in prison for seventy days, and
afterwards he was strongly encouraged by those in power to leave Brazil. 399 Freire lived
and worked in Chile for a time, working with UNESCO and adult education in the
Chilean Institute for Agrarian reform.400 Freire also visited the United Sates and taught
classes at Harvard in the School of Education.401 In 1980, he was able to return to
Brazil.402 Patrick Clark writes of Freire that “Paulo has been and remains a light in the
darkness—the darkness of ideological determinism, fatalism; and organized
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hopelessness. It is a light that neither persecution, exile, nor unjust criticism has been able
to extinguish.”403
We will find in this chapter that Freire’s notions of pedagogy and liberation are
especially rich, immersed as they are in philosophy and critical theory. We will also find
that they provide a culmination to the trajectory of educational philosophy started by
Rousseau and solved by Kant with help from Hegel and Marcuse. Freire continues a train
of thought began by Marcuse. Like Marcuse, Freire is concerned about the types of
social behaviors and structures which block the advance of human freedom. His work is
especially helpful because he specifically provides a broader heuristic for determining
societal forces that block freedom. Furthermore, he specifically examines how hindrances
to human freedom arise in the classroom, and his pedagogy is specifically centered
around disrupting these blocks.
§3—Our Vocation of Humanization and Education’s Relationship to this Goal
In order to understand Freire’s view of pedagogy, it is essential to understand his
view of humanity and humanization. One of Freire arguments, in his seminal work
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, is that the vocation of human beings is humanization, and we
will see that Freire believes that education is intimately tied to this views. When Freire
speaks of humanization, he means a state in which human beings are able to exercise all
of their capacities and are fully free to reflect on their world and act on that reflection.
This is the notion of praxis, which we will examine shortly. For Freire, humanization is a
liberation from being solely immersed in and imprisoned by materiality. If humans
remain in this condition of immersion and material imprisonment, they would be
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subservient to their materiality instead of having any option to transform their materiality
in a way that could support their humanity and allow the full range of human capacities to
emerge. Freire argues that humans have “the seat of their decisions located in themselves
and in their relations with the world and with others.” 404 Because of this, humans are able
to infuse “the world with their creative presence by means of the transformation they
effect upon it.” 405 Humans do this specifically, Freire argues, because they are tridimensional beings who relate to themselves and the world in terms of their “past,
present, and their future”.406 This tri-dimensional way of relating to the world specifically
creates the human capacity to transform the world because it provides human beings with
a historical sense of themselves and their environment. It allows them to understand the
human ability to intervene and transform their world for better or worse. And because
human beings realize they have the capacity to transform their world, human beings, both
individuals and the human race are unfinished. What they will be is not set in stone.
Freire writes, “In fact, this unfinishedness is essential to our human condition.”407
Because of their unfinishedness, the goal of human beings, both individually and as a
species, is to pursue the full development of humans and all of their capacities; again, this
what Freire means by humanization. This notion of humanization harmonizes with Kant’s
ideas of the summum bonum, Hegel’s notion of recht, and Marcuse’s notion of the erotic,
liberated society.
It is important to note that for Freire, the process of humanization must be active,
and it is one education must be directly involved in. Freire notes that if human beings are
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unfinished, then their lives as individuals and as a human race are continually open to
greater and fuller life and more freedom. To resign one’s self fatalistically to the way
things are, then, is deadening and dehumanizing. Freire argues that the current status of
the world, rather than being some fixed, external reality, is actually a product of human
intervention and transformation in the world. When we transform the world for a fuller
expression of freedom, humanization has occurred. Therefore, when humans are acting
most like humans, they are continually intervening in and transforming their world. The
primary role of education is to facilitate students’ ability to become agents who
continually do this work. Very shortly, we will examine how Freire envisions education
facilitating students’ ability to transform their world. At this point, it is important to note
that not all human intervention in the world transforms the world towards greater
humanization. Therefore, to understand how humans do this, it is important to understand
Freire’s concept of humans as ethical and political beings, an idea closely related to
humans’ transformative capacity.
§4—The Political and Ethical Human: Beings Who Spiritualize the World
Freire ties humanization directly to the human ability to be political and ethical,
an ability rooted in the human capacity to spiritualize their world through their language.
Freire’s account of the relationship between human ethical capacities and language is not
a brand new idea. Aristotle argues a similar point in the Politics.408 What is unique about
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Freire’s description of this relationship is the way in which he relates it to liberating
pedagogical practices in this classroom and the liberatory virtues educators must
cultivate. Therefore, we must examine Freire’s human being’s political and ethical
capacities in order to understand how they are related to each other and to the process of
humanization and education.
Freire centers our ethical and political nature in our use of language.
Language facilitates humans’ awareness of existence. In the process of
becoming aware of existence, human beings objectify their world through the use
of language. Freire argues, “The invention of ‘existence’ necessarily involves the
emergence of language, culture, and communication at levels of complexity much
greater than that which obtains at the level of survival, self-defense and selfpreservation.409 Freire refers to this ability to consider existence people’s ability to
“spiritualize” their world. As we have seen previously, Freire means that humans
have the ability to create a multi-dimensional reality that includes not only the
material dimension but an emotional dimension in which we relate to our present,
our past, and our future. In this tri-dimensional space, people compare and
consider, comprehending actions that are better or worse, less beautiful or more
beautiful, more free or less free. It is this tri-dimensional relation to our world in
which people are able to move beyond their materiality and basic survival needs,
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and they are able to consider their emotions, dreams, goals and hopes. Their
subjectivity, which Freire refers to here as spirituality, emerges. This subjectivity,
in all of its dimensions, then, is an essential part of human freedom for Freire.
This emergence of subjectivity enables humans to understand themselves
as individuals who have the ability to opt, as opposed to animals who cannot
really distinguish themselves as individuals distinct from the species.410 Once
human beings can name their world in terms of things that are bad and good and
just and unjust, human beings realize that they can intervene personally in the
current state of affairs. They realize that they make the world better or worse
through their commitments. This realization is the moment when ethical
capabilities emerge. Freire argues
What makes men and women ethical is their capacity to ‘spiritualize’ the
world, to make it either beautiful or ugly. Their capacity to intervene, to
compare, to judge, to decide, to choose, to desist, makes them capable of
acts of greatness, of dignity, and, at the same time, of the unthinkable in
terms of indignity.411
It is this ability to be ethical that leads people to be able to contemplate the
difference between good and evil. Freire argues
…Human existence is, in fact, a radical and profound tension between
good and evil, between dignity and indignity, between decency and
indecency, between the beauty and ugliness of the world.
Because humans have the capacity to understand these tensions, they have the
capacity to be political. They can contemplate the current state of affairs
surrounding them and consider how they may be changed for the better. Freire
argues
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In other words, it was becoming simultaneously clear that human
existence is, in fact, a radical and profound tension between good and evil,
between dignity and indignity, between decency and indecency, between
the beauty and the ugliness of the world. In other words, it was becoming
clear that it is impossible to humanly exist without assuming the right and
the duty to opt, to decide to struggle, to be political.412
This human ability is not just some intellectual characteristic of human beings. Rather,
Freire argues, it is a condition that touches on every aspect of existence. Freire argues
Consciousness about the world, which implies consciousness about myself
in the world, with it and with others, which also implies our ability to
realize the world, to understand it, is not limited to a rationalistic
experience. This consciousness is a totality—reason feelings, emotions,
desires; my body, conscious of the world and myself, seizes the world
toward which it has an intention.413
As we shall soon see, Freire argues that education that is humanizing facilitates the
ethical and political characteristics of students that are the very foundation of their
humanity. Furthermore, Freire argues that education which ignores these aspects is a
dehumanizing education. It is an education, in fact, that treats students as objects to be
manipulated, rather than subjective, free beings with ethical and political capacities. I
have thus far emphasized the way in which human capacities for language enable human
beings to develop capacities for ethical and political action. Freire writes of our language
capacities specifically in his discussion of the authentic word, praxis, and dialogical
relationships with others. These ideas are directly related to Freire’s ethical and political
ideas which are foundational to his educational philosophy. Therefore, I will now
examine these ideas in greater detail.
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§5—The Authentic Word and Praxis: The Necessity for Dialogical Relationships
In order to understand Freire’s concepts of humanization and dehumanization
more fully, we must first understand his idea of the word. When Freire speaks of the
word, he is certainly referring to our language capacities which lead to our spiritual
understanding of the world. But he also means something more than this. When Freire
refers to the word, he is speaking of our ability to name the world we see around us and
in doing so, our word contains both reflection and action.414 In the process of reflection
and action, our word become praxis. Therefore, Freire’s notion of the word pertains
directly to his notion of praxis. Praxis is our ethical and political capacity to reflect on the
world and act on that reflection to transform the world for greater humanization. Freire
writes “There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus to speak a true
word is to transform the world.”415
Freire is pointing out here that in order for humans to act on their political and
ethical capacities, they must name their world authentically and act on their word. For
example, if I name an environment as dangerous, this entails that I must act in a way to
protect myself by erecting a protective shelter, or taking up weapons or fleeing from
danger. When I speak the word that someone is a friend, this entails that I act with
friendliness and warmth, not enmity and aloofness. And this acting with friendliness and
warmth transforms certain aspects of my environment. Freire’s point is than an authentic
word always implies actions which transform one’s environment. An inauthentic word,
however, cannot transform. On the other hand, inauthentic words perpetuate
dehumanization. Freire argues that with an inauthentic word, there is a dichotomy
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between reflection and acting. With this dichotomy, the word becomes an alienating and
empty word. Because it is alienating and empty, this word can’t denounce the
dehumanizing elements of the world, and so it can’t transform it.416
Freire’s emphasis on speaking the authentic word is not merely a description of
the way in which our subjectivity emerges and operates. His emphasis on speaking the
authentic word actually implies that political and educational dialogue is essential. The
more one speaks the authentic word, the more one moves towards humanization.
Therefore, speaking the authentic word is the responsibility and the right of everyone, as
the humanization of the species cannot be accomplished by one individual. If everyone
has the right and responsibility to speak the authentic word, this requires that we dialogue
with one another in order to transform our world towards greater humanization. If human
beings must engage in praxis, it entails that they must engage in dialogue as well. Human
beings inevitably see the world differently, which means they name it differently, and this
difference in naming inevitably leads to tension. Freire describes this tension and its
results. He argues
Confronted by this ‘universe of thees’ in dialectical contradiction, persons
take equally contradictory positions: some work to maintain the structures,
others to change them. As antagonism deepens between themes which are
the expression of reality, there is a tendency for the themes and for reality
itself to be mythicized, establishing a climate of irrationality and
sectarianism.417
Freire’s description of social tension recalls to us Kant’s notion of unsocial
sociability and Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Freire suggests here that as we
name the world, inevitably some people name certain aspects of the world as
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humanizing, while others will name them as dehumanizing. The problem arises
when people become entrenched in their particular way of naming the world and
are unable to recognize others’ rights to naming reality, too. In refusing to
recognize this right, and in retreating solely into one’s own praxis, Freire notes
above that people establish a climate of “irrationality and sectarianism”. This
irrationality, I believe, is caused by a refusal and inability to listen to how other
people name reality, which leads to the speaking of inauthentic words which can
no longer transform reality.
It is only through sincere dialogue with other people that our words are
authentic and life-giving. Freire explains further why dialogue is a necessity.
“Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words but
only by true words, with which men and women transform the world together.”418
Freire goes on to explain what he means by dialogue: Dialogue is the encounter
between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world.419 It is through
sincere dialogue that humans are able to transform their world towards a greater
expression of freedom. Because of this, Freire argues that dialogue is how “people
achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential
necessity.”420 Freire believes that that dialogue is an imperative not only in
politics but in education as well. He argues that an education that prohibits
dialogue and crushes students’ ability to name their world authentically and
transform it is a dehumanizing education.
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It is important to note that much of Paulo Freire’s life was dedicated to
teaching illiterate farmers in Recife, Brazil (and other places) how to read. Freire
believed that in giving the farmers the gift of reading and writing, he helped them
develop their ability to name the world so they could transform it in order to make
it more humane for them. It is no wonder that Freire was exiled by Brazilian
authorities for this seemingly excellent endeavor. It was much better for those
who profited from the farmer’s cheap labor that these same farmers viewed their
condition as static, immutable, and fixed. Now we must examine how Freire’s
ideas of dialogue and our ethical and political capacities pertain specifically to the
classroom.
§6— Teaching Must Be a Dialogical Practice Rooted in Our Shared Ethical and
Political Capacities
As mentioned before, Freire certainly believes that the goal of education is
humanization. Freire shows us that to treat students humanely our teaching must be
marked by specific characteristics: namely, our teaching must cultivate an environment in
which the teacher and the students engage in dialogue together in which both are allowed
to engage in authentic praxis. When teachers engage in dialogical practice with their
students, they are actually acting as co-liberators for each other, and in doing so, they are
better able to transform their environment together and to work for greater humanization
in the world.
If dialogical practice must undergird humanizing teaching practices, this suggests
several pedagogical implications. First, it implies, as Freire realized, that student literacy
is of primary importance. But even when literacy is achieved for students, teachers must
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continually work to cultivate students’ ability to speak their own word and engage in
praxis, for this is the only way students can become ethical and political. This implies
several things. First it seems that writing and dialogue must be a consistent component of
class. This also suggests that as students master basic literacy skills, education in the
classroom should increasingly become a partnership between the students and the
teachers.
Second, class writing and dialogue must allow students to speak authentic words,
which means there must be space for them to name their world authentically in a way that
reflects their current understanding of the world. This does not entail that students are
allowed to say anything they want and that there is no content that must be taught. In
teaching the Brazilian farmers literacy, Freire certainly had content to his teaching plans
which included teaching the Brazilian farmers phonetic structures and knowledge.
However, Freire’s literacy method began with an exhaustive first-hand research into the
lives of the farmers through observation and discussion. In doing this, Freire learned the
key words that were important to the farmers. Freire built literacy lessons around these
themes so that even when he was presenting a specific content to the farmers, the way the
content was presented was centered around the words the famers themselves had spoken
about their existence. It is important to note that empowering students to name their
world does not entail that students are allowed to say anything they wish. It would seem
that certain words—words that demean groups of individuals, specifically—are words
that hinder other people from speaking their words. Freire would certainly argue that
these types of words cannot be permitted in the class because they are dehumanizing.
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Towards the end of this chapter, I present several examples of classrooms and
schools which use Freirean pedagogy to teach in a rich, nuanced and humanizing manner.
I would like to mention briefly here that I recently attempted to employ Freirean
pedagogy in a political philosophy class I teach. One of the dangers of writing about
education and justice is that one becomes acutely aware of the ways in which one’s
pedagogy falls short of the mark. After studying Freire’s work in depth, I became
concerned that I was doing too much talking and directing in class, and that I was not
allowing students to do enough of this. One of my goals as a teacher is to create a more
collaborative classroom environment that is still content-rich. It will take me several
years to fully accomplish the plans I have to make my classroom more collaborative.
However, I took a small step in the right direction this semester when I allowed students
to come up with a list of problems we would be discussing this semester.421
On one of the first days of class, I had students write reflectively about why
politics is such a contentious issues in society, and I also had the students discuss this
question with one another. Then, after we had discussed this question, I had students
reflect silently again and generate a list of questions concerning politics related to the
issues we had just discussed in class together. After a few moments of reflective writing,
we generated a list of questions together. For instance, students asked questions like
“What is justice?” and “How do we balance the tension between individual and
community rights?” I wrote down these questions, and after each several philosophers we
discuss in class, I will revisit the students’ questions with them to explore how the
various philosophers we are studying answer these questions. While this step is one small
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step I have taken to implement Freirean pedagogy in my classroom, it is a step that I
believe allows students to engage in more consistent praxis which is aimed towards
transforming the world.
It is important to note that for Freire, authentic praxis is always aimed at the
transformation of the world towards greater humanization. This implies that whenever we
teach, we must empower students to see how the information learned could be potentially
transformative to the world around us. This means that it is essential that our teaching is
connected with students’ lives and with them as multi-dimensional individuals with
intellect, emotions, a past and a future. With this description, Freire tells us that
education must always be a dialogue between the teacher and student. He confirms this
when he writes
Authentic education is not carried on by ‘A’ for ‘B or by ‘A’ about ‘B’,
but rather by ‘A’ with ‘B’ mediated by the world—a world which
impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to view or opinions
about it. These view, impregnated with anxieties, doubts, hopes, or
hopelessness, imply significant themes on the basis of which the program
content of education can be built.422
It may seem difficult to understand how Freire’s ideas could translate into a
classroom in the United States. I think that it is much more important that a teacher bring
a dialogical humanizing attitude to a classroom than it is that a teacher adopt practices
that look exactly like Freire’s. Once again, at the end of this chapter, I will provide some
specific examples of some practices that I believe exemplify Freire’s humanizing
pedagogical spirit. At this point, however, it is important to explore the types of
educational practices that are dehumanizing, rather than humanizing: for this is one of
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Freire’s primary educational concerns which he addresses at length in Pedagogy of the
Oppressed.
§7—The Spectre of Dehumanization
In the previous account of the development of our capacity to spiritualize
the world, Freire has presented a phenomenological account of how our ethical
and political capacities are rooted in our ability to name the world in dialogue
with one another. It is through this dialogue that we are able to accomplish our
vocation of humanization. It is important to note, however, that while
humanization is our vocation, dehumanization is always a possibility. Freire
argues
While both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the
first is the people’s vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is
affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation,
oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning
of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover
their lost humanity.423
We must now examine more in depth what Freire means by dehumanization, and in
doing so, we will better understand what
dehumanization looks like in the classroom.
If humanization occurs when people dialogue authentically together and engage in
transformative praxis, then dehumanization occurs when people are deprived of their
ability to dialogue and engage in praxis. Freire argues that a dehumanizing state of affairs
is “Any situation in which “A” objectively exploits “B” or hinders his and her pursuit of
self-affirmation.”424 If we recall that our ability to affirm ourselves as human in the world
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and take responsibility implies our ability to engage in praxis, then for Freire
dehumanization occurs when people are denied their ability to engage in praxis. The
question is how people are denied this right. Freire believes this process of
dehumanization can happen both politically and educationally.
We have already noted earlier in this chapter that conflict inevitably arises in the
human process of naming the world when “confronted by this ‘universe of thees’ in
dialectical contradiction, persons take equally contradictory positions: some work to
maintain the structures, others to change them.”425 If people can remain in dialogue
through this tension, then they are able to gain a clear and more accurate view of their
world, which allows them to transform it together. Unfortunately, as Freire notes, people
often retreat into isolation and dogmatism when they encounter this tension. Again, Freire
notes this when he writes, “As antagonism deepens between themes which are the
expression of reality, there is a tendency for the themes and for reality itself to be
mythicized, establishing a climate of irrationality and sectarianism.426
To understand why dehumanization does occur in these confrontations, it is
helpful to refer back to Hegel’s master and slave dialectic. In this dialectic, which Freire
references in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, two self-consciousnesses facing each other in
the world stage a fight to the death. It seems like the only way they can figure out how to
negotiate their freedom is through violence, rather than dialogue. In the ensuing fight, one
consciousness capitulates, becoming the slave, and the other becomes the master. The
master, for a while, becomes the dominant consciousness and requires the slave to
conform to his consciousness. The slave is not allowed to have his own “Consciousness
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intent upon the world"427. He is not allowed to inquire into the world himself and develop
his own praxis. He is dominated by the master and required to carry out the master’s
praxis.
Freire argues that this same violence perpetrated by the master against the slave is
a violence that is repeated in everyday life. He argues, “Any situation in which some
individual prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence.”428
Destroying people’s ability to engage in praxis or dialogue is an act of dehumanization.
Freire notes that there are many ways this dehumanization can occurs. Dehumanization
occurs when someone tries to force someone else to accept her naming of the world. In
this process, the oppressor tries to deposit her praxis into someone else, rather than
dialoguing with people and allowing them to exercise their own praxis. Freire argues
“Dialogue can never be an act of deposit or consuming.429 This type of depositing in
others is domination, and dialogue is an act of creation, not instrument of domination.430
Freire also argues that any kind of “Propaganda, management, manipulation—all arms of
domination—cannot be the instruments of their rehumanization.”431
Freire argues that the oppressor consciousness wishes “to transform everything
surrounding it into an object of domination.” This suggests that the oppressor
consciousness is motivated by a need to control and to make people manageable,
predictable and immediately useful. However, in order to turn people into objects that can
be easily managed, one must take away people’s freedom, for it is their freedom that
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make them unmanageable, unpredictable and hard to control. Freire underscores the
objectifying nature of dehumanization when he argues, “Violence is initiated by those
who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons—not by those who are
oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized. It is not the unloved who initiate disaffection,
but those who cannot love because they love only themselves.432
Freire argues, however, that in dehumanizing others, the oppressors dehumanize
themselves as well. This is because in the very act of dehumanizing others, the oppressors
now practice an inauthentic praxis. In the act of treating human beings as objects, they
have inauthentically named the world: namely, they have named some human beings as
objects rather than as people. Through this inauthentic praxis, they are no longer able to
transform the world towards greater levels of humanization. This is why Freire argues
that “Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but
also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation of
becoming more fully human.”433
Freire urges us to recognize that just as the authentic word transforms the world
towards humanization, domination reshapes the world towards dehumanization. Freire
argues, “Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders
an entire way of life and behavior of those caught up in it—oppressors and oppressed
alike. Both are submerged in this situation, and both bear the marks of oppression.”434
This act of violence can engender an entire environment of violence. It does this because
the act of violence deeply affects the consciousness of both the oppressed and the
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oppressors. It creates a view of the world in which some people are ostensibly free, and
some people are objects to be manipulated. Those objectified people are prohibited from
speaking their words, and they absorb the words of the oppressors, an process in which
the objectified are domesticated. They are domesticated into the domus, the house—the
mindset—of the oppressor.435
Freire adds that once this dehumanizing situation is cultivated, the
oppressors become entrenched in their position as possessors of the world, which,
Freire implies, is also a position of being possessors of the word. Freire argues
Analysis of existential situation of oppression reveals that their inception
lay in an act of violence—initiated by those with power. This violence, as
a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors, who
become its heirs and are shaped in its climate. This climate creates in the
oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness—
possessive of the world and of men and women.436
It seems clear at this point that not only is dehumanization always possible
historically, it very easy for it to occur. And in fact, given Freire’s account of
dehumanization as a process that occurs whenever someone’s ability to engage in
praxis is denied, it seems clear that both small and larger instances of
dehumanization occur daily. Certainly we see instances of dehumanization
through laws and actions in society that either overtly or covertly deny people the
right to dialogue in political life or engage in praxis. However, Freire is especially
concerned with how dehumanization occurs in the classroom in a method he
refers to as the banking model of education.
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§8—Dehumanization in the Classroom
The banking model of education, a dehumanizing pedagogy, is one of Freire’s
primary concerns in the Pedagogy of the Oppressed. This type of education is the
opposite of education that cultivates praxis. Rather than cultivating ability to name and
act on that naming, the banking model encourages the passive reception of other people’s
word concerning how one should act. In the banking method of education, Freire argues,
“the educator’s role is to regulate the way the world ‘enters into’ the students.”437 Freire
adds that “Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between
human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with
others; the individual is spectator, not re-creator.”438 Freire argues that in this model of
education, the teachers acts solely as the expert439 who has pre-determined knowledge to
deposit into the students’ minds, students who are passive recipients. Freire writes,
“Banking education inhibits creativity and domesticates (although it cannot completely
destroy) the intentionality of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world,
thereby denying people their ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully
human.”440
We should recall that Freire is not advocating a content-less education or an
education in which the students decide every aspect of the curriculum and pedagogy.

437

Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pg. 76
Ibid, pg. 75
439
Freire certainly believes that teachers have a type of expertise they share with their students. A
problem arises, however, when the teacher acts solely in the role of expert and fails to recognize the
knowledge students bring to an experience. When teachers do this, the speak they fail to recognize
students as beings of praxis, and in doing so, they create a dehumanizing situation.
440
Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, pg. 84
438

184

What is important to understand here is that the banking model of education is not
marked fundamentally by a specific type of content or lack of content, although these
could play a role in dehumanization. Rather, the banking model of education is
dehumanizing because the teacher is completely directive and non-dialogical.
One of the primary ways that teachers perpetuate the banking model of education,
Freire argues, is through myth-depositing. In myth-depositing, the teacher give herself the
sole right to name the world and decide now things are. She communicates that her
interpretation of the world is the right interpretation, and the myth is then deposited into
the students. These myths could be particular interpretations of society or of history or a
rigid interpretation of any subject that does not allow for inquiry or questioning.
Because this myth is incontrovertible, it does not allow students to engage in
transformative praxis. The question now is how Freire envisions a classroom that
liberates students from dehumanization towards greater humanization. I will now
discussion how Freire believes that humanizing classrooms become dialogical
spaces of conscientization through the practice of problem-posing and the
cultivation of liberatory virtues.
§9—Liberating Teaching Cultivates the Classroom as a Dialogical Spaces of
Conscientization Through Problem-Posing
Freire gives us many clues about the type of pedagogy that disrupts
dehumanization in the classroom and society at large. We have already seen that
humanizing pedagogy must be dialogical. Dialogue not only allows students and teachers
to pursue further humanization. Dialogue also disrupts forces of dehumanization. In order
to be liberating, however, this dialogue must be a specific sort of dialogue: one which
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focuses on problems and leads to conscientization, a word Freire uses to describe the
process in which students become aware of dehumanizing practices in the world.
Freire notes that in order for the situation of dehumanization to end, that
students must first become aware of the dehumanizing situation. This is the
process of conscientization, and it is a process that occurs through dialogue. Freire
argues about the process of conscientization and the dehumanizing situation, “To
no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can
be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order
to transform it.”441 Freire ties humanization and dialogue directly with
conscientization which is a type of critical thinking marked by critical
consciousness that arises through the attention to and resolution of problems.
Freire writes, “Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in
critical thinking—thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the
world and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them---thinking which
does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality
without fear of the risks involved.”442 We see here that Freire emphasizes that
conscientization cannot separate humans from the world, as though the world is
just something human beings find themselves in. Rather, critical consciousness
continually emphasizes that the world is a product of human reflection and action
in the world.
Freire goes on to emphasize the difference between critical thinking and
its opposite: naïve thinking. He writes, “Critical thinking contrasts with naïve
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thinking, which sees historical time as a weight, a stratification of the acquisitions
and experiences of the past, from which the present should emerge normalized
and ‘well-behaved’. For the naïve thinker, the important thing is accommodation
to the normalized ‘today’.”443 Freire argues further that “For naïve thinking, the
goal is precisely to hold fast to this guaranteed space and adjust to it.444 By thus
denying temporality, it denies itself as well.”445 Freire’s contrast between critical
and naïve thinking is illuminating because it suggests that critical thinking is not
just an academic skill, removed from life, which is only practiced in a few classes
such as logic or philosophy. Rather, since critical thinking is a way we view life,
history and our place in both of these, critical thinking must be carried out in
every subject and in all parts of life.
Furthermore, since critical thinking and conscientization are directly related to our
attunement to and resolution of problems, it suggests that it is important for educators to
organize disciplines around the resolution of problems. Since our goal is humanization,
and we have not reached fully humanization yet, the reality we have created contains
inherent contradictions that must be resolved. The implication that our reality is marked
by problems that need to be resolved suggests that if the material and subjects students
study in school are truly reflective of life, they should be focused on problems, the very
nature of which can become a catalyst for conscientization, dialogue, and praxis.
Therefore, by presenting reality as a fixed state of affairs but rather a problem that
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presents clues to how we transform it towards greater humanization, the teacher
automatically invites her students to be co-participants in this transformative process.
I would like to present an example of problem-posing education from two
episodes in my educational career. Before coming to graduate school, I was a middle and
high school teacher, primarily in a school with a curriculum that emphasized debate and
student-led discussions based on critical thinking questions co-generated by the teacher
and class. Before I taught in this school, I taught in a school that had a more typical
curriculum which communicated knowledge primarily through the banking model of
education. I primarily communicated information through lecture, and the students
primarily learned through taking notes, memorizing information, and producing it on a
test. When I started teaching at my second school which emphasized debate and
discussions co-led by teachers and students, I was amazing at how energized my students
became during these discussions.
My favorite memories of this type of pedagogy include an eighth grade debate
over whether the United States should have dropped the atomic debate on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki; a seventh grade teacher/student discussion over the emotional and
psychological capabilities of the faerie Ariel in Shakespeare’s Tempest; and an eleventh
grade discussion over the parallel between Dr. Frankenstein’s moral irresponsibility in
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein with some contemporary scientific and environmental
irresponsibility. In retrospect, I realize now that the energy the students invested into
these debates and discussions specifically grew out of the way they were focused on
problems that students were invited to solve, along with me (the teacher). Furthermore,
these problems were problems that had specific implications for the students’ lives.
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Therefore, by actively engaging in solving these problems, students gained experience in
praxis and felt more empowered to change their world.
It wasn’t until I left middle and high school teaching and began teaching at the
college level that I actually read Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and in his account
of problem-posing education, I recognized what I was doing when I invited students to
participate in debates and critical discussions with me in my previous teaching
experiences. Although, I already had a tendency to use problem-posing in the philosophy
courses I was teaching at the university level, I began to center all of my classes around
the solution of problems such as the problem of the good, the problem of moral action,
the problem of free will and determinism, and the problem of justice.
At the beginning of each semester, I pose a set of problems to my students, and
we discuss why exactly it is that these issues are problems for us individually and as a
society. I suggest to them that our goal together as a class is to develop a set of plausible
solutions to these problems. I further explain that we will do so by dialoguing with each
other, as well as a variety of philosophers who hold very different views on these matters.
One of my primary goals for each semester is to help students develop a personal solution
to these problems, and the papers that we write are directly focused on these solutions. I
really enjoy discussing these problems with students throughout the semester, as they are
problems that are very important to me. I often find that our classroom discussions help
me to solve certain aspects of the problem that have been perplexing. I am also very
pleased that students often write on their evaluations that our class discussions have
helped them understand how they can apply the things they are learning in class to their
lives.
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It is examples like the ones that I have shared above and will share at the end of
the chapter that suggest that Freire is absolutely right to characterize dialogue as an
existential necessity. But is conscientization and problem-solving alone enough to
motivate students to work for humanization? I believe Freire suggests that something
more is needed, and that is the cultivation of liberatory virtues. I will now discuss Freire’s
notion of liberatory virtues.
§10—Humanizing Teaching Cultivates a Liberatory Ethic: An Important
Complement to Marcuse’s Pedagogical Vision
I believe that Freire’s unique contribution to the discussion of education and
liberation is that he suggests that in order for humanization to occur, teachers and
students must cultivate together liberatory ethics grounded in liberatory virtues. I want to
note that while Freire certainly discusses the notion of ethics at length, he does not
specifically call his ethics libertatory ethics. This is in interpretive movie I am making,
but I believe it is an appropriate interpretive move, given that Freire repeatedly states, as
we have seen previously, that the goal of our shared ethical and political life is to liberate
humans from all forms of dehumanization. Freire argues that ethics contains a set of
virtues, and some of the integral virtues he refers to directly or indirectly are love,
humanizing rebellion, and hope.
It is also important to note while Freire discusses ethics specifically in Pedagogy
of Freedom, he does so only briefly even though the subtitle of Pedagogy of Freedom is
Ethics, Democracy and Civic Courage. I believe there is a very a plausible reason why
Freire speaks only briefly about ethics, even though it is an integral idea in his
philosophy. Freire’s primary concern was to challenge the dehumanizing elements,
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specifically banking education, that he saw in the education and lives of the Brazilian
farmers he was so passionately concerned with. At that particular time in history, the
most serious threat to the farmers was this banking model of education that permeated
both the education and politics of Brazil, and so Freire wrote most comprehensively
about this problem. However, I believe that Freire’s notion of liberatory ethics is integral
to his idea of humanization and the disruption of the banking model of education. While
Freire is very concerned about critiquing dehumanizing practices in education and
society, he is obviously concerned about humanizing praxis, a notion which is positive,
active and creative. Therefore, it only makes sense that in addition to his insightful
critique on the banking model of education, Freire is also concerned with the type of
ethical practices that allow for humanizing praxis. Furthermore, I believe that Freire’s
notion of liberatory ethics is an important complement to and development of Marcuse’s
notion of a liberated, erotic society. For these reasons, I believe it is important to explore
and develop Freire’s account of liberatory ethics. To do this, I will first explain what
Freire says about ethics and virtue in general. Then I will explore three virtues that I
believe Freire emphasizes, either directly or indirectly, that are an integral part of this
kind of ethics. Lastly, I will explain how I believe Freire’s notion of liberatory ethics
complements and develops important ideas in Marcuse’s philosophy.
§11—Freire and Ethics
We have already discussed in this chapter that Freire argues that humans naturally
possess an ethical disposition. Early I noted Freire’s argument that, “What makes men
and women ethical is their capacity to ‘spiritualize’ the world, to make it either beautiful
or ugly. Their capacity to intervene, to compare, to judge, to decide, to choose, to desist,
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makes them capable of acts of greatness, of dignity, and, at the same time, of the
unthinkable in terms of indignity.446 Freire has argued that this ethical capacity stems
from the human ability for praxis which is a natural outgrowth of their language
capacities. Because ethics is integrally related to the human capacity for praxis, and
because praxis results in humanization and liberation, then ethics rightly understood
should be a practice of liberation and humanization. Freire argues as much in Pedagogy
of Freedom when he writes, “It is in our becoming that we constitute our being so.
Because the condition of becoming is the condition of being. In addition, it is not
possible to imagine the human condition disconnected from the ethical condition.447
Because ethics and ethical practice is integral to our human nature, Freire argues that
educators who wish to work for humanization and justice must be concerned with ethics.
Freire argues, “If we have any serious regard for what it means to be human, the teaching
of contents cannot be separated from the moral formation of the learners. To educate is
essentially to form.”448 In fact, Freire suggests that any teaching is in itself an ethical
activity because teaching is a form of praxis. As such, it is either a humanizing, authentic
praxis, or it is a process of speaking false words about the world, about students and
about one’s self. Freire gives examples of the speaking of false words in the classroom
when he writes
To deify or demonize technology or science is an extremely negative way
of thinking incorrectly. To act in front of students as if the truth belongs
only to the teacher is not only preposterous but also false. To think
correctly demands profundity and not superficiality in the comprehension
and interpretation of the fact. It presupposes an openness that allows for
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the revision of conclusions; it recognizes not only the possibility of
making a new choice or a new evaluation but also the right to do so.449
Freire’s point here is not to make a list of the types of subjects a liberating and
humanizing teacher must cover in her classroom. Rather, his point is that there can be no
dichotomy between right thinking and right action. A commitment to humanization
always requires certain actions.450 Freire writes, “To claim the right to change requires a
coherence that makes a difference. There is no point in making such a claim and
continuing as if nothing had changed.”451
The natural response to these ideas is to wonder what humanizing action looks
like. Certainly it cannot be reduced to a prescribed set of behaviors. For example,
humanizing action may look quite a bit different in the United States than it does in
Brazil because the different environments, populations, and manifestations of
dehumanization require different praxis. Nevertheless, although humanizing action may
look different in different contexts, perhaps there are certain commitments or virtues or
attitudes that mark the type of ethics that Freire is discussing. Freire suggests as much.
For example, Freire argues “This critical evaluation of one’s practice reveals the
necessity for a series of attitudes or virtues452 without which not true evaluation or true
respect of the student can exist.”453 Freire continues in this vein,
These attitudes or virtues454—absolutely indispensable for putting into
practice the kind of knowledge that leads to respect of the autonomy,
dignity, and identity of the students—are the result of a constructive effort
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that we impose on ourselves so as to diminish the distance between what
we say and what we do.455
As a specific example of these attitudes or virtues, Freire continues the previous
quote with a discussion of a virtue he calls coherence. Freire writes, “In fact, this
diminution of the distance between discourse and practice constitutes an
indispensable virtue, namely that of coherence. How, for example can I continue
to speak of respect of the dignity of the student if I discriminate, inhibit, or speak
ironically form the height of my own arrogance?456 I believe that Freire’s
suggestion that liberatory teaching requires a certain set of attitudes or virtues is
promising.
The project of becoming a humanizing teacher can seem like a daunting
and vague goal. Furthermore, the complicated nature of practicing a humanizing
education becomes more pronounced if we imagine a scenario in which an
educator inquires, “How exactly do I practice a humanizing education?” Someone
might respond to this question by discussions dialogical education or
conscientization—some of the aspects of Freirean education we have discussed
already. However, the educator might inquire further, “Well, how do I know that I
am truly practicing dialogical education or conscientization?” After all, it seems
possible to conduct activities that look like dialogical education and
conscientization but that are really just a perpetuation of a banking type of
education. This seems to indicate that Freirean pedagogical techniques like
dialogical education and conscientization must be practiced with a certain type of
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virtuous disposition or commitment. If these virtues could be identified and a
proper understanding of them could be developed, it would help educators
understand specific steps they can take to cultivate a liberating classroom and
pedagogy. As we shall soon see, the virtues which Freire discusses are not so
much emotions. Rather, they are types of attitudes, habits and practices that a
teacher commits to which, over time, may be accompanied by certain emotions.
In addition, while Freire does not discuss this at length, these virtues are certainly
virtues teachers must cultivate in herself, but they are also virtues which must be
cultivated in students, and they are virtues which must eventually permeate
society as a whole in order for humanization to occur on a wide scale.
By emphasizing the importance of virtues in the pursuit of liberation,
Freire builds on important ideas present in both Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, as
well as Marcuse’s writings such as his Essay on Liberation. In Philosophy of
Right, Hegel argues that virtues are “the ethical in its particular
application,”457and he argues that Aristotle’s notion of the mean is indeed
necessary for understanding the nature of virtue.458 This is because since the
virtues are the “ethical in its particular application”, and since each particular
application has a largely and an inevitably subjective element, we cannot speak of
the virtues in terms of exactly what kinds of actions should occur in a certain
situation or how much virtue exactly should be applied in a certain situation.
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Rather, Hegel argues “Discussion of them will therefore involve those defects or
vices which are opposed to them, as in Aristotle…”459
Hegel also argues that “Virtue consists…in ethical virtuosity”460 and that a
person is only ethical if the virtuous mode of conduct “is a constant feature of his
character.”461 Hegel’s notion of virtues as they relate to ethics harmonizes well
with Freire’s idea that the human ethical capacities relate to the human ability to
judge their environment and determine what makes it more beautiful or ugly or
just or unjust or good or bad and to transform it for greater human liberation.
Freire implies or directly states in all of his works that a person with a strong and
proper ethical capacity consistently engages in praxis that transforms the
environment in favor of beauty, justice and good. Therefore, it seems that Hegel
and Freire share a consistent vision of what virtue is and its connection to ethics.
Not only is Hegel concerned about virtue and liberation in relation to
ethics, Marcuse is as well. In his Essay on Liberation, Marcuse argues that a
critique of the oppressive aspects of society must be accompanied by “new
categories: moral, political and aesthetic.”462 He further argues that “sociological
and political vocabulary must be radically reshaped: it must be stripped of its false
neutrality; it must be methodically and provocatively ‘moralized’ in terms of the
Refusal.”463 Marcuse provides the example of obscenity which he refers to as a
“moral concept”.464 He argues that this term can either be abused in the service of
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repressive ideologies, or it can be appropriated by liberating mindsets to
authentically point to oppressive elements of society. To explain this, Marcuse
argues, “Obscene is not the picture of a naked woman who exposes her pubic hair
but that of a fully clad general who exposes his medals in rewarded in a war of
aggression.”465
Marcuse further argues that discussions of morality in a repressive and
oppressive society are distorted. They simultaneously provoke shame or moral
outrage at the wrong things, while overlooking the proper shame or outrage that
should accompany oppressive elements of society.466 Therefore, Marcuse argues
that in order for a society to be liberated, the way morality is discussed must
change. Marcuse writes, “Political radicalism thus implies moral radicalism: the
emergence of a morality which might precondition man for freedom.”467 Marcuse
notes that this new, radical morality activates tendencies and predispositions
already present in human biology—namely, our biological drive to pursue life.
Marcuse argues, “Morality is a ‘disposition’ of the organism, perhaps
rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve ‘ever
greater unities of life’”468 Marcuse adds to this that this predisposition we have
towards pursuing greater unities of life may indicate an “instinctual foundation for
solidarity among human beings.”469 We should note here that Marcuse’s notion of
the human instinctual foundation for solidarity harmonizes very well with Freire’s
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notion of our vocation for humanization. While Marcuse focuses more on our
biological instincts and Freire focuses more on our language capacities as the
foundation for our ethics, they are both concerned with the types of attitudes,
morals and virtues that people practice in their day to day life that allow the
liberation of society to occur.
Marcuse develops this ideas of a new ethics and a new morality in terms
of his New Sensibilty which I detailed in the previous chapter. I believe that
Freire complements and extends Marcuse’s ideas about a liberating ethics and the
virtues that are necessarily entailed in such an ethic. While I do not have the space
in this chapter discuss all of the virtues that Freire mentions as a part of his ethics,
I would like to focus specifically on three practices that I think are integral to
Freire’s pedagogy: love, humanizing rebellion and hope. I will then discuss how I
believe Freire’s notion of practices of a liberating ethic is a complement to
Marcuse’s pedagogy and a significant contribution to the discussion of pedagogy
and justice in general.
§12—The Virtues of Love, Humanizing Rebellion and Hope
If there is a virtue that is central to Freire’s ethics of liberation, it is most certainly
the virtue of love. We have already seen that for Freire, dialogical relationships between
people in the world are essential for the transformation of society towards humanization.
Freire continually urges that a commitment to the dialogue that leads to humanization
cannot be carried out without a lack of love. Freire argues
Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the
world and for people.470 The naming of the world, which is an act of
creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love. Love
470
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is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus
necessarily the task of responsible subjects and cannot exist in a relation of
domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the
dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of
courage, not of fear, love is commitment to others. No matter where the
oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause—the
cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is
dialogical.471
Although Freire at time seems to be speaking here of love as an emotion, I believe
it is more of a practice of recognition and of valuing the human capacity for ethics
and humanization. This type of recognition requires a commitment to the world,
to humans as a species, and to them as individuals. The love Freire writes about is
a recognition of the fact that human beings cannot transform the world except for
in dialogue with one another, and it is a willingness to take on this challenge, even
though it is difficult and painful sometimes.
It cannot be emphasized enough how much love plays a role in Freire’s
philosophy for overcoming the situation of dehumanization. In Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, Freire writes that because “Women and men, among the uncompleted
beings, are the only ones which develop”472, they are always “Subjects in
expectancy”—people becoming aware of their status in an oppressive situation473
and working to transform that situation. The fact that men and women are subjects
in expectancy, which often makes them unpredictable, requires that if people are
to move towards a society marked by greater levels of humanization, they must be
committed to humanity more than they are to control. This commitment is the
love I believe Freire is speaking of: dedication to the autonomy of other people as
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expressed in their shared political and ethical life. This practice of love leads to a
type of loving rebellion against all forms of dehumanization. Therefore, I believe
that another virtue central to Freire’s liberatory ethics is humanizing rebellion.
For Freire, one of the primary functions of the classroom is to serve as a space in
which students and teachers can practice humanizing rebellion. While Freire does not
refer to the classroom directly as such, there is significant evidence that suggests that
Freire views the classroom this way. In Pedagogy of the Heart, Freire writes at length
about his religious commitment. Freire’s commitment to his faith (specifically Catholic
Christianity) spurred him to a rebelliousness against all forms of dehumanization. Freire
writes
It is not easy to have faith. Above all, it is not easy due to the demands
faith places on whoever experiences it. It demands a stand for freedom,
which implies respect for the freedom of others, in an ethical sense, in the
sense of humility, coherence, and toleration...For this reason, salvation
implies liberation, engagement in a struggle for it. It is as if the fight
against exploitation, its motivation, and the refusal of resignation were
paths to salvation. The process of salvation cannot be realized without
rebelliousness474.475
Here we note that salvation—and Freire mean this in both a spiritual and physical
sense—always involves rebellion against all forms of dehumanization because of
the respect that is due individuals. Freire continues
The issue around liberation and its practice is not fighting against the
religiousness of popular classes, which is a right of theirs and an
expression of their culture but rather overcoming, with it, the vision of
God at the service of the strong for a God on the side of those with whom
justice, love and truth should be. What marked popular religiousness-resignation and annihilation--would be substituted with forms of resistance
to outrage, to perversity. This way, submission-faith toward a destiny that
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would reflect God's will makes way for a spurring faith of loving rebelliousness.476 In this process, the understanding of the body--for those who
have evolved in their faith—as the dwelling of sin turns into an
intelligence of the body as the temple of God.477
Freire notes here again that it is his faith in God as God on the side of “those with
whom justice, love and truth should be” that motivate him to a loving
rebelliousness that fights against all forms of dehumanization.
Freire’s point here is not to convince people that they should be religious.
What Freire is suggesting here is that anyone who is committed to respecting
every human being and working for justice—whether they are religious or not—
must commit themselves to loving rebelliousness against all forms of
dehumanization. This implies that any educator who wishes to work for the good
of humanity, and wishes her students to work for his end as well, must cultivate
the classroom space as a place of humanizing rebellion. I have specifically chosen
the adjective humanizing to use with the word rebellion because it is certainly
possible for people to rebel in ways that are purposeless or dehumanizing.
Therefore, while rebellion is certainly important to Freire’s conception of
liberating ethics, it is a rebellion that is always in the service of greater
humanization for everyone.
Love and humanizing rebellion are integral virtues to Freire’s liberating
ethics, but these virtues cannot be sustained without the virtue of hope. Therefore,
I believe that hope is the third virtue that is integral to Freire’s liberatory ethics.
As long as I am dialoguing with others about how dehumanizing aspects of the
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world could be transformed, I am practicing the virtue of hope, even if I do not
feel particularly hopeful at the moment. Freire writes about hope
Nor yet can dialogue exist without hope.478 Hope is rooted in men’s
incompletion from which they move out in constant search—a search
which can be carried out only in communion with others. Hopelessness is
a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The
dehumanization resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair
but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by
injustice. Hope, however, does not exist in crossing one’s arms and
waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope; and if I fight with hope,
then I can wait. As the encounter of women and men seeking to be more
fully human, dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopelessness.479
If the dialoguers expects nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter
will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious.480
We see in this quote, one again, that hope is not so much a feeling that people have as it
is the constant commitment to dialogue. Indeed, all three of the virtues I have
mentioned—love, humanizing rebellion, and hope—are virtues that are best practiced
through dialogue with others, and I believe this is why dialogue is so essential to a
Freirean and humanizing notion of pedagogy. However, as central as dialogue is to the
type of liberating ethics and education we are discussing here, I believe that these virtues
can be cultivated and expressed in a wide variety of classroom practices, activities and
adventures. In the next section, I would like to share three examples of pedagogy that I
believe illustrate the kind of virtues I have been discussing.
§13—Freirean Pedagogy in Action
One of the most delightful examples of an educator enacting Freire’s pedagogy in
her classroom is Mary Cowhey, the author of the award-winning book black ants and
buddhists: Thinking critically and Teaching Differently in the Primary Grades. Cowhey
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is an elementary school teacher who acknowledges Freire’s influence on her teaching.481
In the introduction to her book, Cowhey relates a story about an event in her classroom
surrounding black ants that illustrates both her approach to teaching and the kind of
classroom practices and environment that cultivate the liberatory ethics that we have been
discussing in this chapter.
Cowhey narrates an event in her primary classroom one day in which students
found their corner of the room overrun by black ants, at which point they started
stomping on the black ants in order to kill them. One of the other young students in
Cowhey’s class, a practicing Buddhist, was appalled by this and pled with the students to
stop killing the black ants. While the Buddhist boy was certain that killing these ants was
a terrible action, other students in the class believed that it was perfectly okay and that
they had a right to kill the black ants. This collision of perceptions precipitated a classwide discussion, moderated by Cowhey, about why different people in the class had such
different perspectives about whether or not it was right to kill the ants. The class became
curious about different religious perspectives on this issues as well as why many people
in the United States viewed killing black ants so differently than people in other
countries.
This curiosity prompted Cowhey to invite a number of guest speakers from
different religious backgrounds to visit class to discuss their religious backgrounds and
their view of killing creatures like ants. It prompted the class to read a variety of books
that they found in their own library and other libraries pertaining to this issue. After a
Japanese Buddhist man visited the class, one of Cowhey’s students, a reluctant reader,
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discovered a book about the Japanese internment camps in the United States during
World War II. Because this boy made a connection between the speaker who visited the
class and the Japanese families and individuals the book was discussing, he became
extremely interested in reading the book during free-reading time in class, even though
the book was quite a bit above his reading level. As he read it, he received occasional
help from Cowhey and his classmates, and he was able to finish the book, strengthening
his reading skills considerably.
In addition to students learning about the topic of black ants through class
speakers and individual reading projects, the black ant discussion also prompted students
to launch a scientific investigation into the life, habitats and nature of ants. Lastly, the
discussion catalyzed classroom changes orchestrated by the students. In discussing the
ant problem, the students decided both that it was not fun to have ants crawling around in
the classroom but that it was also not right to upset their classmate by killing the ants.
Therefore, they began to investigate what changes they could make in the classroom that
would lead to a decrease in black ants without harming the ants in any way. This
prompted the students to create new classroom cleaning plans and routines, practices
which soon carried over into their home lives. The mother of one of Cowhey’s students
asked what Cowhey had done to her daughter because the daughter had suddenly become
very concerned about cleaning and organizing her room and other spaces around the
house.
While Freire passed away before Cowhey published her book, I believe he would
have been delighted by Cowhey’s classroom experience. In this story we see a teacher
and students involved in problem-posing: “Is it right to kill ants in the classroom?”
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Through the process of dialogical education, students not only experienced
conscientization about problematic elements of their views of ants and violence and
property, this conscientization inspired them to investigate their world further, a process
during which they strengthened their understanding of religion, culture, literature,
science, and psychology. Furthermore, this conscientization inspired authentic praxis in
which their dialogue inspired significant change in their environment towards greater
humanization.
I believe the story of black ants also exemplifies virtues like love, humanizing
rebellion, and hope that I have been discussing in this chapter. Because Cowhey chose to
turn the black ant crisis into a moment of dialogue, she empowered her students to rebel
against adopting hegemonic solutions to the ant problem, which certainly would have
happened if they had not engaged in dialogue about the situation. Furthermore, she
empowered them to love each other as classmates by creating a hospitable space in which
everyone’s voice could be heard, and she infused them with hope that they could come up
with a creative solution that would honor the particular situations and needs of their
classroom. In other words, she practiced a liberatory ethics that transformed a potentially
painful and dehumanizing situation into a humanizing situation for everyone in the
classroom and even those beyond the classroom. In doing so, she cultivated virtues in her
students that soon began to permeate all aspects of their lives.
It may be tempting to imagine that scenarios like the one I have just been
describing are necessarily rare and unusual moments in the classroom. However, I
believe these kinds of moments can become a new and exciting status quo when
educators devote themselves to the types of practices and virtues described in this
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chapter. One very interesting example of Freirean pedagogy at work is a detailed in an
article published in the Journal of International Pedagogy titled “Critical Pedagogy and
Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice”. This article describes a math educator who
decided to teach a required statistics unit by centering it around the problem of racial
profiling.482
During this unit, students not only read an article on racial profiling by the
American Civil Liberties Union, they also discussed instances of racial profiling in their
own lives.483 As the majority of the class was white with several African-American and
Latino students, the class soon became aware through this discussion that their
experiences and views of racial profiling were quite a bit different.484 After having
establish a conceptual foundation for the unit through reading and discussing the issue of
racial profiling, the class collected, analyzed and organized statistical information about
profiling from “44 law enforcement agencies” in Tennessee which detailed “the racial
composition of people pulled over for traffic violations.”485 The teacher witnessed
increasing engagement in the students as the unit progressed, and she noted that one
especially shy student who was normally withdrawn in class shared his personal
experience of racial profiling.486 The teacher notes in the article “I could have taught the
same mathematical skills traditionally with no difference in learning outcomes, but
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instead, I gave them the opportunity to raise their own awareness and form their opinions
on racial profiling.”487
This story is particularly striking to me. As a former secondary school instructor, I
heard a lot of student complaints about a wide variety of school subjects (including
occasionally my own). Unfortunately, many students would complain that they would
never use the math they were learning in real life. I think it is safe to say that the students
who experienced this unit on statistic and racial profiling understand how a strong grasp
of statistics is intimately connected to their lives and their ability to work for a more
humanized world.
It is tempting to write at length about the work of educators inspired by Freire.
However, because of the limited space I have to do so in this project, I will share just one
more story. Author and educator bell hooks is a student and personal friend of Freire, a
relationship she details in her chapter “Paulo Freire” in her book Teaching to
Transgress.488 In another chapter in this book, she details a continuing dialogue she had
with a student of hers named Gary. Hooks, a literature professor, is especially concerned
with feminist and, particularly, black feminist issues. Although Gary had been a student
of bell hooks, and they had a strong working relationship, Gary had decided to join a
fraternity, a decision bell hooks strongly disapproved of because, as Gary later
commented, the particular fraternity he wished to join represented “a vision of black
manhood that [hooks] abhorred, one where violence and abuse were primary ciphers of
bonding and identity”.489 Although Gary joined the fraternity, much to bell hooks’
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consternation, she and Gary continued to dialogue about the matter. Hooks writes that
“Ultimately, Gary felt that the decision he had made to join a fraternity was not
constructive, that I ‘had taught him openness’ where the fraternity had encouraged onedimensional allegiance. Our interchange both during and after this experience was an
example of engaged pedagogy.”490 I take hooks’ phrase “engaged pedagogy” to be
identical to Freire’s notion of dialogical engagement with students.
While this story illuminates an educational moment hooks shared with one
particular student, I think it illustrates the type of problems that emerge naturally out of
the everyday life of students. For elementary students, the problem might be that of
students figuring out what to do with ants in a classroom when some of the class thinks it
is okay to kill them and some do not. At the middle and high school level, the problem
might be the problem of how to organize, analyze and interpret statistical data
surrounding racial profiling in a fairly racially homogenous class. At college the problem
might be what to do when you value and are committed to the feminist ideals you have
been reading about in class yet feel socially pressured to join a sorority or fraternity with
values inimical to feminist ideals. The point is that because life presents itself as a
problem, problems arise at all levels of education. As they arise, it is possible and
important for educators to respond to these ideas in a way that establishes dialogical
relationships with students which lead to conscientization, problem-posing, and the
cultivation of liberatory virtues.
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§14—Freire’s Pedagogy: A Complement and Extension of Marcuse
I believe that Freire’s work provides an important extension and completion of the
educational views I have been discussing in this dissertation, and I would like to conclude
this chapter by examining why this is so. Freire is entirely sympathetic with Rousseau’s
notion that society is too often a place of dehumanization. Yet, in accordance with Kant,
Freire argues that despite the very real possibility of dehumanization in society, society is
most certainly the place where human beings achieve humanization and freedom. As we
have seen, Freire argues that it is in dialogue that we are able to be fully ethical and
political human beings. Therefore, Freire agrees with Kant and Hegel that it is only with
others that we can fully actualize our ethical and political capacities which allow us to
create a world amenable to human flourishing. Furthermore, Freire agrees with Kant and
Hegel that our goal as human beings is to work out a society through education and
politics that permits the full humanization of individuals and the human race.
It is important to note, too, how compatible Freire’s educational methods are with
both Kant’s and Hegel’s. Freire’s notion of students engaging in transformative praxis is
entirely in line with Kant’s notion that cultivating a robust will bent towards the good and
a commitment to the ethical commonwealth is the purpose of education. It also accords
with Hegel’s notion that education must cultivate students’ abilities to practice
recognition, right, responsibility, and reconciliation. Freire’s notion of dialogical
education is also harmonious with Kant’s development of moral reasoning through
casuistical discussion and Hegel’s notion that education is developed dialectically.
Following in the tradition of critical theory, it is also important to note that
Freire’s educational views resonate with Marcuse’s educational views that the classroom
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must disrupt blocks in the movement of freedom. It also resonates with Marcuse’s notion
that a New Sensibility which focuses on non-instrumentalized relationships that allows
for the full expression of human freedom. Because Freire is aware of both the
philosophical ideas in German Idealism, along with the important insights of critical
theory and the Frankfurt School, he is able to craft a pedagogy that critiques the
dehumanization present in modern society while maintain the liberating aspects of Kant
and Hegel’s educational insights. There are two specific ways I believe Freire’s unique
insights extend the discussion of education and justice in a meaningful way.
First, Marcuse was right to suggest that the progress of freedom can be blocked
by social forces such as surplus repression and one-dimensional thinking. It also seems
likely that these are, indeed, common forces in the United States that hinder the progress
of freedom. However, these are not necessarily the only forces that block the progress of
freedom. It is likely that different subcultures within the United States or people in
cultures markedly different from the United States experience different societal
hindrances of freedom. This is why Freire is helpful. While certainly influenced by
Marcuse’s notions of one-dimensional thinking, Freire’s account of myth-depositing and
the banking model of education reveal to us the types of hindrances to freedom present in
colonialized societies in which the differences between classes are much extreme and
entrenched than those in the United States. Furthermore, his practice of dialogical
education through conscientization and problem-posing suggests a broad heuristic that
can be used to discover all forms of dehumanization.
Secondly, Freire’s discussion of liberatory ethics is an especially important and a
helpful complement to Marcuse. Marcuse is right that that much of the talk of the

210

discussion of morality, virtue, ethics and even religion in our culture and cultures around
the world have been distorted or co-opted by oppressive and dehumanizing elements of
society. Therefore, we need a revolution in our moral and ethical language. However,
understanding how to bring about this revolution and the proper language that
accompanies it is certainly a challenge, and it is as task that perhaps critical theory and
critical pedagogy have just begun. In his article “Marcuse, Bloch and Freire:
Reinvigorating a Pedagogy of Hope”, Richard Van Heertum suggest as much when he
argues that critical theory and its related disciplines “tend to share too firm a commitment
to the first half of their sobriquet, forgetting that critique alone has never led to
revolution.”491 Van Heertum argues that critical theory must work to engender a hope
which empowers people to work for societal change, and he emphasizes the “Centrality
of hope as a necessary complement to critique”.492
He also further argues, specifically related to education that, “Teachers need to do
more than awaken students to the surrounding world; they need to simultaneously give
them the faith and strength to work to transform the world.”493 I believe that Paulo
Freire’s liberatory ethics and virtues complements important ideas in Marcuse work to do
exactly the things that Van Heertum is suggesting here.494 Freire believes, just like
Marcuse, that cultivating our aesthetic sensibilities is essential for creating a more
humane society, but he still believes that these ideas cannot be divorced from the ethical
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considerations we have been discussing in this chapter. Freire writes about a “rigorous
ethical formation side by side with an aesthetic appreciation.”495 He further argues that
“beauty and decency” must always go hand in hand and writes “I am more and more
convinced that educational praxis, while avoiding the trap of puritanical moralism, cannot
avoid the task of becoming a clear witness to decency and purity.”496 Freire, like
Marcuse, is not concerned here with a type of moral legalism that focuses narrowly on
issues such as sexual behavior and alcohol consumption, as sometimes certain ethical and
religious systems have done historically.497 Nor is he concerned with an ethics that is
grounded in anything other than the liberation of human beings.498 But it is right to say
that Freire believes that education cannot be a force for humanization unless it takes
seriously the ethical vocation of human beings which is the same thing as the vocation of
humanization.
I believe that Freire’s notion of liberatory ethics and the virtues it entails is a
concept that needs to be developed more in depth. In Pedagogy of Freedom, Freire
mentions a dozen or more practices, attitudes or virtues that he believes are necessary for
educators and students to possess in order to work for humanization. However, Freire’s
discussion of these virtus is a bit scattered. While some virtues seem to be more central to
Freire’s project, it isn’t clear which virtues are primary practices and which are
secondary. Furthermore, because of reasons I have mentioned previously in this chapter,
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Freire does not develop a systematic account of any of these virtues at length, nor does he
discuss in detail how they are cultivated. The purpose of my last chapter is to suggest
briefly how these ideas might be further explored and developed.
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Chapter Six: Epilogue
In this epilogue, I wish to accomplish three things. First, I wish to discuss the
contemporary relationship between philosophy and education in general. And second, I
would like to suggest how Freire’s notion of liberatory ethics might be developed further.
Lastly, wish to share some concluding remarks on this project.
One of the overall conclusions I have reached from working on this project is that
there needs to be greater dialogue between education and philosophy in the academy and
society today. It is interesting to note that while education has been a major concern for
almost every great historical philosopher, there seems to be not quite as strong of a
relationship between education and philosophy today. As someone who was trained in
secondary English education and earned her master’s degree in educational leadership,
both at very strong liberal arts schools, I had no class in either my undergraduate or
master’s training which required me to read the educational philosophy of Socrates,
Plato, or any of the philosophers I have written about in this dissertation.
To my knowledge, no such class was offered. My relationship with fellow
educators suggests that my experience is a fairly standard experience in teacher education
programs. In addition, it seems that few philosophy departments have professors who
specialize in the philosophy of education and that in addition, few philosophy
departments offer classes in this area, even though many graduate students of philosophy
will go on to teach philosophy classes as either adjunct or tenured professors. It seems
that if education is to work for justice in society at large, it would be extremely beneficial
for there to be a greater dialogue between philosophy and education. One practical way I
would like to build on this project is to research and write more about the necessity of the
dialogue between education and philosophy. I would like to examine potential causes of
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the lack of dialogue between these two disciplines and also examine ways this
relationship can be cultivated.
A second way in which I would like to develop the ideas in this project is to
develop in more detail Marcuse and Freire’s notions of liberatory ethics and virtues. The
notion of liberatory virtues holds great promise for helping us understand how to work
for humanization in both education and society while also critiquing dehumanizing
elements in that society. There are two key ways that I would like to explore the notion
of liberatory ethics further.
First, since the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe’s article “Modern Moral
Philosophy”, there has been greater contemporary philosophical discussion about virtue
ethics, and virtue ethics has become one of the three major approaches to ethics, along
with utilitarianism and deontological ethics.499 Nevertheless, it can be difficult, in my
opinion, to figure out exactly what the virtues are in any virtue system of ethics.
Furthermore, it can be difficult to give an account of the grounding of these virtues. This
problem becomes especially apparent when one examines classical virtue ethics, such as
those of Socrates and Aristotle. Virtues that we consider very important today, such as
love and compassion, were not a part of the Greek conception of virtue. Furthermore, the
Greek conception of virtue was grounded in a conception of human beings certainly
marred by racism, sexism, and a host of other problems.
I believe critical theory and critical theorists like Marcuse and Freire can play an
important role in the contemporary discussion of virtue ethics. Hegel, who is arguably an
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important influence on critical theory, was influenced by Aristotelian conceptions of
human beings and their relationship with the polis. Hegel’s goal in the Philosophy of
Right is to develop our understanding of how human beings can find themselves at home
in the state and their relationships with one another, a happy state of affairs that he
believes was lost with the shattering of the classical world. Nevertheless, as Hegel details
in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right, the classical world did not
have a fully developed conception of individual freedom and subjectivity.
This is a modern development, Hegel argues, and he attempts to show how the
fully just state is a perfect harmony of both the individual and the universal. Hegel’s
notion of ethics and virtue is certainly grounded in this conception. Therefore, Hegel’s
work may be a fruitful place to begin for understanding the role critical theory can play in
the contemporary virtue ethics discussion. Furthermore, since critical theorists such as
Marcuse and Freire are certainly influenced by Hegel and are also greatly concerned with
issues of ethics and virtue, it may be interesting to examine how their ideas can be
connected with Hegel to flesh out a virtue ethics grounded in human dignity, flourishing
and freedom.
It is interesting to note that some work is being done in this field already. While
Hegel’s ethics have not been explored in great detail, more scholars are starting to pay
attention to this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. While not incredibly recent, Andrew
Buchwalter published an article entitled “Hegel’s Concept of Virtue” in 1992 in Political
Theory. Joshua Goldstein’s 2010 book Hegel Idea of the Good Life: From Virtue to
Freedom, Early Writing and Mature Political Philosophy explores Hegel’s attempt to
forge a solution to the failure of Aristotelian virtue ethics. In this book, Goldstein
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suggests the way in which ideas such as rectitude and ethical life are a completion to
Aristotelian notions of virtue and phronesis. In addition, while I was previously unaware
of this, the notion of liberatory ethics is not an entirely novel concept. Greek philosopher
and economist Takis Fotopoulous has written about democratic liberatory ethics, and Lisa
Tessman, a philosophy professor at Binghampton University, has written a book called
Burdened Virtues in which she draws on Aristotelian virtue ethics to understand the
causes and solutions to various forms of oppression. She specifically relates this to
feminist issues.
In the future, I would like to develop a stronger understanding of Hegelian ethics
and virtues, and I would like to use this study as a springboard for connecting it to similar
issues in critical theory, especially to ideas in the work of Marcuse and Freire. I believe
that forging a strong understanding of liberatory ethics and virtues is necessary for
understanding how educators can teach in a humanizing manner. Therefore, while my
interest in the role that critical theory plays in virtue ethics may seem tangential to the
work done on education and justice in this dissertation, I believe it is foundational to it.
While I am very interested in the broad project of examining the way in which
Hegel’s ethics and critical theory can contribute to the discussion of virtue theory, I am
also very interested in developing a clearer understanding of individual liberatory virtues,
and I have already done some work in this area. In the space below, I have sketched out a
list of some specific liberatory virtues that I believe are implied by Marcuse and Freire’s
notion of liberatory ethics and that I wish to study more in depth.500 Some of the virtues I
have mentioned below, such as aesthetics, are virtues that Marcuse and Freire specifically

500

I also draw on Hegel a little bit for the first virtue of the hospitality of recognition.
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mention. Other virtues, such as hospitality and play, are virtues I have included that I
believe capture more fully some of the ideas that Marcuse and Freire’s work contain. I
do not think this list is necessarily the right list or the only list of liberatory virtues.
Rather, I intend the list to gesture towards the kind of exploration of individual liberatory
virtues I may wish to pursue in the future.
Hospitality, love and recognition: Our word hospitality comes from the Latin
word hospes which means both guest and host. The practice of hospitality has been a
practice throughout history that allows strangers and even enemies to share public or
private spaces temporarily for purposes such as rest, education, nourishment, negotiation,
or peacemaking. If true liberation comes through dialogue, as Freire has claimed, then it
is essential that we learn better to cultivate spaces of hospitality in which strangers and
even enemies can dialogue with one another. I think the practice of hospitality may
capture more clearly what Freire mean when he discusses the virtue of love in his various
works. I also think that the concept of hospitality may capture well Hegel’s notion of
recognition. Therefore, I am interested in researching more the type of virtuous
dispositions that allow people to give recognition to the stranger and even the enemy in a
way that facilitates liberating dialogue. Such a discussion may be very helpful in
understanding issues like non-violent resistance and the resolution of internecine conflict
we see in the Palestine-Israeli conflict or even racial conflict in the United States.
Critical Problem-Posing and Conscientization: This practice is at the heart of
Freire’s pedagogy. Critical problem-solving requires that people become aware of the
problems in society, something which the banking model of education and onedimensional thinking suppress. I see direct connections between Freire’s discussion of
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conscientization and problem-posing and the way in which Socrates uses aporia in his
dialogues to promote the pursuit of truth. Therefore, an area of research that has long
interested me is the philosophical account of the role aporia and perplexity play in moral
understanding and the way in which it might relate to Freire’s pedagogy.
Play: This is a virtue that I am especially interested in researching more. While it
may seem odd to consider play as a virtue integral to liberation ethics, I believe it is
indeed so. The notion of play as a virtue intimately tied to ethical liberation is already
present in the German idealist tradition such as in some of Kant’s pedagogical writings
and writings in the third critique, as well as Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education
of Man. Furthermore, the notion of play as a tool for human liberation appears in the
work of critical theorists such as Marcuse in his notion of phantasy as a vehicle for
liberation and Mikhail Bhaktin and his notion of the carnivalesque. It seems that
revisiting the notion of play as a liberation virtue is especially important in an era when
recess is being cut from school programs and time spent on homework and preparation
for standardized tests is increasing. In addition, the fact that people in the United States
are increasingly spending more hours working and are taking much less vacation is a sign
that play may be a necessary virtue for cultivating liberatory ethics. I presented a paper
on play and liberation at the 2014 Radical Philosophy Association conference. I am
currently working on turning this paper into a full-length article.
Aesthetic Sensibility: The practice of aesthetics is closely tied to the practice of
play mentioned previously. However, I think that it is fruitful to study play and aesthetics
as different virtues. We have already examined the way in which Kant argues that beauty
is the symbol of morality and Marcuse draws on these ideas to argue for the liberating
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power of aesthetics. Certainly these ideas are important to explore more in depth in
relation to education, especially as so many art and music programs are in jeopardy.
Furthermore, it is important to explore how the aesthetic virtue can be practiced in all
areas of life. As we saw in the chapter on Marcuse, Marcuse argues that the New
Sensibility is an aesthetic sensibility that permeates the entire psyched of individuals,
rather than a sensibility they only manifested during certain activities. I am especially
interested how this aesthetic virtue might illuminate discussions of environmental ethics.
Hope: As I explained in the chapter on Freire, hope is a practice integral to his
liberatory ethics. It is also central to critical theorists like Ernst Bloch who wrote a threevolume work on hope. Nevertheless, it can be extremely difficult at times to maintain
hope in the midst of the significant amount of suffering and cruelty in the world. One
potential area of study is to examine the way in which insights from Bloch and Freire can
be used to flesh out the virtue of hope as a part of liberatory ethics and the practices that
cultivate hope in the midst of such suffering and cruelty. I presented a paper on hope and
liberation at the 2015 Biennial Herbert Marcuse conference, and I am working on turning
this paper into a full-length article.
Compassion: It seems a liberating ethic must give us some way to cope with that
fact that, once again, there is so much suffering and cruelty in the world and that more
often than not, there is significant disagreement about how we should address this
suffering and cruelty. It seems that the virtue of compassion is a virtue that allows us to
understand, without excusing, why people act cruelly or respond in immoral ways to
cruelty and suffering. When we are able to understand without excusing, this creates a
space for us to hope and to work for change in the midst of conflict. Compassion is a
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virtue frequently associated with Buddhism, and it is interesting to note that critical
theorists such as Eric Fromm and bell hooks explore Buddhist ideas as a complement to
their critical theory. One of the projects I am most interested in exploring is the way in
which certain theologies such as Buddhism can inform the development of liberatory
virtues.
While I do not think it is likely that I can pursue all of the projects I have
mentioned above, I believe that these are some of the most worthwhile potential projects
implied by my dissertation, and I hope that they are pursued fully in the future by
philosophers who also find them worthwhile.
As I conclude this dissertation, I have become aware that this entire project has
been a work of praxis, a realization which should not really be a surprise to anyone. I
decided to write a dissertation on education and justice because of a very real problem I
encountered in the world. I am deeply committed to the cause of education and the notion
that education can and must work for the betterment of humanity as a whole.
Nevertheless, as I mentioned in my first chapter, throughout my past experience as a
student, educator, and even a principal of a private, parochial middle school, I have too
frequently observed education failing, sometimes radically, to live up to this goal. And
this failure is not just a failure I have seen in the lives of other teachers and students and
educators; it is a failure I have witnessed in my own life as well.
Nevertheless, my educational history is also marked by times as a student and
teacher when my life was dramatically transformed by a lesson I was taught or that I had
the privilege of teaching. Gratefully, I have also witnessed numerous teachers who have
had a profound effect in not only their students’ lives but even in their larger community
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because of their committed, intentional pedagogy. The problem then is how the practice
of education, which has so much potential, often fails to actualize that potential. Even
more perplexing is how education which has so much potential can, in the wrong hands,
actually become an instrument of oppression and dehumanization. That is the problem
that I believe Rousseau proposed to us initially. It is a problem that Kant, Hegel, Marcuse
and Freire are all deeply concerned with. And it is a problem that I am deeply concerned
with. In writing this dissertation, I have hopefully initiated a meaningful dialogue
between philosophers who have very important things to say about this issue. In
participating in this dialogue with the philosophers, I have attempted to name what I
believe are the causes and solution to this problem. In doing so, I have continually
refined my educational philosophy and pedagogy, and this has certainly transformed my
praxis in the classroom. It is my hope that this dissertation is an invitation for other
people to join in and continue working on the solution to this problem, which I believe is
intimately tied to the good of humanity.
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